The use of armed drones by the United States against Al-Qaeda and its ‘associates’: a study of law and policy arising from a ‘State of exception’ by Mir, Sana
Middlesex University Research Repository
An open access repository of
Middlesex University research
http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk
Mir, Sana (2019) The use of armed drones by the United States against Al-Qaeda and its
‘associates’: a study of law and policy arising from a ‘State of exception’. PhD thesis, Middlesex
University. [Thesis]
Final accepted version (with author’s formatting)
This version is available at: https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/26458/
Copyright:
Middlesex University Research Repository makes the University’s research available electronically.
Copyright and moral rights to this work are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners
unless otherwise stated. The work is supplied on the understanding that any use for commercial gain
is strictly forbidden. A copy may be downloaded for personal, non-commercial, research or study
without prior permission and without charge.
Works, including theses and research projects, may not be reproduced in any format or medium, or
extensive quotations taken from them, or their content changed in any way, without first obtaining
permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). They may not be sold or exploited commercially in
any format or medium without the prior written permission of the copyright holder(s).
Full bibliographic details must be given when referring to, or quoting from full items including the
author’s name, the title of the work, publication details where relevant (place, publisher, date), pag-
ination, and for theses or dissertations the awarding institution, the degree type awarded, and the
date of the award.
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact the
Repository Team at Middlesex University via the following email address:
eprints@mdx.ac.uk
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated.







THE USE OF ARMED DRONES BY THE UNITED STATES AGAINST AL-QAEDA AND 
ITS ‘ASSOCIATES’:  




A Thesis submitted to the Middlesex University in Partial Fulfilment of the 





School of Law 
 















The use of armed drones in undeclared warzones pose various challenges to 
well established rules of international law. The US drone policies rest on 
shaky legal grounds, are ambiguous in nature and have been justified by 
reinterpretation of international law. The UK government’s use of drone strike 
in Syria shows a new problematic trend. The frequency of armed drones by 
few states outside area of active hostilities has normalised the use of force 
and generated a permanent state of exception. Mainstream research on 
targeted killings has focused on legality of US strikes in Pakistan but largely 
ignored the problematic role of Pakistan, in particular, the military violence of 
the Pakistani military in the tribal areas. The case study of Pakistan  highlights 
that the drone strikes are directed against a population that is marginalised 
within the targeted state. The study argues that the special status of Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has allowed the US to conduct drone 
strikes without any accountability. The US has been targeting groups with 
varying degree of closeness to Al-Qaeda in multiple territories based in 
Yemen, Pakistan, Somalia and Syria. The study established with the help of 
control test devised by the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua case 
that the associations between Al-Qaeda and these groups or organisations is 
very loose. Targeting groups who pose no threat to the US is both illegal and 
counterproductive. Therefore the extraterritorial targeting of terrorists who 
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Drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles, are remotely piloted aircraft of different 
sizes and levels of sophistication, that are transforming the rules of 
engagement during armed conflicts, geographies and infrastructures of state 
violence. The way states are using drones in undeclared warzones is rewiring 
the international system and challenging the meaning of sovereignty. This 
thesis investigates the legal, ethical and political issues associated with the 
use of drone strikes by the United States of America (US). The objective of 
this thesis is threefold. First, it analyses the normalisation of exceptional 
measures associated to emergency situations and the ‘state of exception’ 
involved in the policies and practices underpinning the extraterritorial use of 
drones by the US for counterterrorism purposes.  
Second, the thesis deconstructs the arguments advanced to support the 
legality of the use of drones advanced by the US, demonstrating their flaws 
and potential for undermining the international legal order. The current 
policies on drone strikes have been legitimised by engaging in a 
reinterpretation of well-established rules of international law, such as those 
governing the right to self-defence on one hand while, on the other, 
articulating as a firmly established legal rule of international law the ‘unwilling 
or unable test’ despite its weak support in state practice. The rules of 
attribution, mostly framed in the field of responsibility for internationally 
wrongful acts, have been grotesquely distorted in order to justify attacks to 
‘affiliate’ groups that fail to meet the attribution tests and standards generally 
accepted in international law. The opacity of the operations and policies on 
drone strikes and the asymmetry between the US power and the power of 
targeted states, has also facilitated the abuse of the consent that provides 
legal varnish to attacks outside declared warzones.  
Finally, the research aims at highlighting that the asymmetry of power that 
characterises the use of drones is not confined to the different economic, 
political or military weight that states involved enjoy in international relations. 
As demonstrated for the case of Pakistan, the attacks are directed to 
population that is in a vulnerable position within the targeted state. This is an 
underexplored issue in the scholarship addressing the ‘war on terror’ in 
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general and the use of drones in particular. The force delivered by drones 
outside an armed conflict may not only be always unlawful but, under their 
current framework, also counterproductive.      
Research question 
Understanding the legal status of the targeted groups is a necessary condition 
to any assessment of the legality of the US counterterrorism policies outside 
its own territory. The core research of this thesis is focused on identifying who 
are the Al-Qaeda ‘associates’ targeted by US drone strikes. This analysis is 
necessary to elucidate whether their actions can be attributed to Al-Qaeda, a 
premise on which the current policies on drones relies. A credible response to 
this question is essential for any articulation of legal basis to support any use 
of armed force by the US in the territories outside its jurisdiction. Targeted 
individuals by drone strikes must belong or being controlled by the 
organisation that continues to (allegedly) pose a threat to other states. 
Establishing this relationship necessitates engagement with the rules on 
international responsibility. While this framework is not directly aimed to non-
state actors, it is the benchmark of reference provided by international law. 
Only when the legal status of the targeted groups is established, it is possible 
to address the current scope, limits, meaning and reach of the legal 
arguments supporting armed attacks against them. 
How is the study original?  
The legality of drone strikes, targeted killing and the exceptional power 
invoked by the US have been the object of a growing body of scholarship from 
different disciplines. What is original to the present research study is that it 
reviews legality of drone strikes by questioning the status of major terrorist 
groups targeted by the US in undeclared warzones. This involves the 
systematic and comparative analysis of terrorist organisations and their 
affiliation using the control test formulated by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) in the Nicaragua case. The in-depth analysis of these groups reveals 
that all are unique and follow distinct goals. The strength of the legal 
arguments advanced to support the legality of US drone strikes varies and 
there are solid grounds to rebut the legality of drone attacks outside combat 
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zones. However, all those arguments and counter-arguments are premised on 
the threat the targeted groups pose to the US. 
The case study of Pakistan constitutes a unique contribution to the existing 
scholarship on drone strikes. The one-dimensional analysis of the legality of 
US drones strikes in Pakistan invariably fails to capture the complexities of the 
country. Pakistan’s brutal policies towards minority groups based in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), its questionable involvement in 
the Afghan-Soviet war and the hostility between the Pakistani military and 
civilian institutions made Pakistan an accessible environment for the US 
targeted killing. The main hypothesis underpinning the doctoral research is 
anchored on the importance of approaching the use of drones from the 
perspective of the targeted groups, rather than focusing exclusively on the 
legality of the actions undertaken by the attacker. Such an approach to this 
topic has not been taken to date within the legal scholarship. Moreover, the 
Pakistani example is particularly interesting and important because legal 
issues surrounding US drone strikes in Pakistan are still unsettled. It is 
convenient for the US to claim the legality of its strikes in Yemen and Somalia 
because both states have explicitly consented. To date, the conceptual and 
practical contours of the consent provided by Pakistan in the past remain 
undetermined. Further nuanced analysis of the US-Pakistan relations also 
highlights the weakness of the state consent doctrine. Pakistan’s case 
emphasises that the state consent doctrine can allow both, the targeting state 
and targeted state to abuse their power.  
Research Method                                                         
The study is interdisciplinary in nature and involves areas of international law 
and politics. The US drone strikes in undeclared warzones is a vast 
multifaceted and controversial topic that includes inter alia, challenges to 
international law following the 11th September 2001 coordinated terrorist 
attacks by the Al-Qaeda against the United States of America (henceforth 
9/11 attacks); barriers imposed by the secrecy surrounding the US drone 
warfare; the domestic and foreign policy of targeted states; and involvement 
of clandestine terrorist organisations.  
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The scope of the research topic requires consideration of a vast body of 
literature related to the exceptional position of power of the United States, the 
legal framework governing the use of armed force against non-state actors 
and the rules of attribution of responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. 
The benchmark for attribution of responsibility is based on the case-law of the 
International Court of Justice and the rules codified by the International Law 
Commission in the Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts. This provides a useful analytical method to determine the attribution of 
actions carried out by non-state actors to host states. However, this analytical 
tool presents shortcomings when applied to the relationship between non-
state actors. Neither the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice’ 
nor the Articles on State Responsibility were designed to address such 
scenario and fail to seize the complexities associated to the use of force by 
and against non-state actors.1 Despite its shortcomings, it remains the most 
prominent and appropriate framework to decide grounds of attribution under 
international law regarding the conduct of non-state actors and has been used 
throughout the research as a methodological tool.   
The research and methodology supporting the analysis of the law and policy 
of drone strikes is conditioned by the secrecy surrounding this ‘war’. Credible 
figures of civilian casualties are unavailable. Although the White House 
released civilian casualties data in 2016, this failed to address the issue of 
transparency. It gave conservative estimate of civilian deaths and provided no 
details of the strike and casualties resulting from it. The study employed drone 
strikes data from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism and the New America 
Foundation to tally civilian casualties. The clandestine nature of terrorist 
groups further complicates the task of gathering data. The study relies on the  
global terrorism database gathered by the University of Maryland to 
investigate the objectives of terrorist groups.  
Structural overview 
In terms of structure this thesis consists of five distinct but interrelated 
chapters. 
                                                        
1 Lanovoy, Vladyslav. "The use of force by non-state actors and the limits of attribution of 
conduct." European Journal of International Law 28.2 (2017): 563-585. 
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The first chapter reviews the US policies through the lens of Carl Schmitt 
theory of the ‘state of exception’.2 The doctrine of state of exception and its 
argument that ‘necessity knows no law’ was revived after 9/11. Necessity is a 
concept open to abuse since states can argue necessity to escape 
accountability. The US policies after 9/11 are prime example of the doctrine of 
‘state of exception’. After outlining succinctly the ‘state of exception doctrine’, 
the chapter analyses the US’s expansion of the concept of imminence. This is 
followed by a case study on the use of drone strikes in Syria by the United 
Kingdom (UK) to highlight a new trend in normalising the use of lethal force in 
undeclared warzones. Finally, the chapter concludes that secrecy and 
amalgamation of military and intelligence agencies has made it extremely 
difficult to establish the relevant facts around the strikes. Here it is 
emphasised that the notion of state of exception has transformed US 
approach towards international law. 
The second chapter examines the rules on the use of armed force. It argues 
that well-established norms on the use of force were undermined after 9/11. 
For instance, before 9/11 a consensus existed that anticipatory use of force in 
self-defence against imminent threats. This consensus is currently challenged 
by the argument that new threats require new measures and associated legal 
doctrines to counter them. This new threat argument has served as grounds 
for some countries to use force against abstract challenges that might 
manifest a latent threat. This brings back to life the pre-UN Charter practice 
where Germany used preventive force against vague and distant threats. 
Chapter two also examines relevant principles of international human rights 
law and international humanitarian law. It engages the concept of neutrality 
and clarifies the irrelevance of the doctrine in today’s contemporary conflicts 
against non-state actors. The chapter concludes that the current state practice 
shows little support for the preventive use of force against non-imminent 
threats and the concept of transnational-armed conflict has no recognition 
within the international community.  
The third chapter will apply the principles of international law discussed in the 
former chapter to the US drone strikes. It considers the legality of armed 
                                                        
2  Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (University of Chicago 
Press 2004) 
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drones under jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and international human rights law. 
This chapter argues that extraterritorial targeting by means of armed drones 
against non-imminent threats violates international law. US armed drones also 
violate the principle of proportionality because the concrete military advantage 
gained from these strikes is minimal. Finally, it concludes that the US drone 
strikes may never be legal under international human rights law because in 
the absence of armed conflict the circumstances in which an individual can be 
targeted are much lower. Outside the context of an armed conflict, a person 
can only be targeted if he poses a lethal and imminent threat to someone. 
State would also have to prove that the benefit of using lethal force outweighs 
the dangers posed and that force was used as a last resort. It is submitted 
that the US has used force as a first resort and against non-imminent threat. 
Moreover it is argued that drone strikes against low-level combatants who are 
not even associates of Al-Qaeda would fail to satisfy the military necessity 
requirement.    
While Chapter three applies principles of international law to US drone strikes 
it does not investigate the legality of US drone strikes under the unable and 
unwilling test, and state consent doctrines. The fourth chapter explores these 
controversial doctrines using Pakistan as a case study. The first part of the 
chapter provides historical background that helps to evaluate the current 
situation in the former FATA now merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK).3 It 
explains the controversial role of the Pakistani government and the US 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the Afghan-Soviet war in 1979. It then 
analyses the security policy of Pakistan from 1999-to present. The scrutiny of 
Pakistani security policies reveals the protracted complicity of the Pakistani 
government and army officials in the US drone strikes. The chapter notes that 
the relationship between the US and Pakistan became problematic due to 
escalation of drones in former FATA under Obama administration. The 
chapter provides a detailed analysis of the consent doctrine and the unable 
and unwilling test, arising from two justifications for US drones in Pakistan: 1) 
Pakistan has consented 2) Pakistan has been unable or unwilling to prevent 
                                                        
3 The Nation, ‘President signs Fata-KP merger Bill into law’ (Islamabad, 1 June 2018) < 
https://nation.com.pk/01-Jun-2018/president-signs-fata-kp-merger-bill-into-law?show=836 > 
accessed 24 October 2018 
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terrorist attacks emanating from its territory. It is argued that the US cannot 
justify most of its drone strikes in former FATA under either doctrine. The final 
part of the chapter highlights the controversial role of the Pakistani military in 
former FATA. It explains that the legal status of former FATA resembled a 
state of exception in Pakistan because the Pakistani Supreme court, High 
Court and National Parliament had no legal authority there. Instead, tribal 
areas were governed by a draconian legal regime introduced by the British 
Empire in 1872, called the 1901 Frontier Crime Regulations. The final section 
of this chapter provides a brief analysis of the recent merger of FATA with 
KPK.            
Any analysis on the legality of extraterritorial drone strikes needs to explore 
whether the group targeted is an Al-Qaeda associate. The fifth and final 
chapter examines Al-Qaeda’s relationship with various terrorist organisations 
operating in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. There are dozens of players 
active in these regions and assessing Al-Qaeda’s relation with each one is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. The study primarily focuses on Al-Qaeda’s 
connections with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Haqqani Network (HN) and Al-Shabaab. The 
study utilises the control test established by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) in the Nicaragua case and consolidated in to explore the links between 
these actors. The control test established by the ICJ was intended to explore 
the state’s control over the criminal actions of non-state actors in the territory 
of another state. This chapter has borrowed the same test and applied it to 
non-state actors to assess the degree of Al-Qaeda’s control over them. In 
addition, the study endeavours to understand the objectives of these groups 
by focusing on the selection of targets of their terrorist attacks. In doing so, it 
relies on the terrorism database provided by the University of Maryland. The 
thorough investigation of the terrorist attacks carried out by these groups 
reveals they mainly target their own governments, military officials and 
civilians. None of them were capable of directing any attack against the US. 
The analysis of data relating to the total number of terrorist attacks carried out 
by these groups highlights an inherent flaw in the counterterrorism policy of 
the US. The chapter concludes that the US should focus more on local 
counterterrorism rather than conducting small or large-scale military 
 17 
operations abroad, in particular against forces that pose no imminent threat to 





















Chapter 1: State of exception after 9/11  
Introduction  
‘We are living in a state of exception. We do not know when it will end 
because we have no idea when the war on terror that began on 11 September  
2001 will end’.4 Although Al-Qaeda and similar organisations have undertaken 
terrorist actions over the previous decade5, the attacks on September 11 were 
unique because it was the first attack on the US soil by foreign forces since 
the Pearl Harbor.6 The post-911 era was portrayed as exceptional in nature 
paving the way for global scale military campaigns, giving special powers to 
the US President, expanding the role of military and intelligence agencies.7  
Within days after the 9/11 event President Bush declared a state of national 
emergency8 and the Congress granted President overly broad power to use 
military force against those responsible for 9/11 attacks and also to prevent 
                                                        
4 Mark Danner, Spiral: Trapped in the Forever War (Simon & Schuster 2016) 5. ;  
Two planes were hijacked and deliberately flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in 
New York causing the Towers to collapse.  As a result of the attacks some 3,000 people from 80 
different countries were killed See Fred Halliday, Two Hours That Shook the World: September 11, 
2001 - Causes and Consequences (Saqi Books 2001); Carolyn Gard, The Attack on the Pentagon on 
September 11, 2001 (Rosen Publishing Group 2003); Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda, The Age Of 
Terror: America And The World After September 11 (Basic Books 2002); Dean E. Murphy, September 
11: An Oral History (Doubleday Books 2002); The United States Department of Justice, ‘Attorney 
General Announces Forum Decisions for Guantanamo Detainees’ (13 November 2009) < 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-announces-forum-decisions-guantanamo-
detainees > accessed 13 April 2016 
5 Al-Qaeda’s attempt to kill US troops in Aden in 1992 See James Philips, ‘The Yemen Bombing: 
Another Wake-up Call in the Terrorist Shadow War’, (Heritage, 25 October 2000) < 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2000/10/the-yemen-bombing-another-wake-up-call-in-
the-terrorist-shadow-war > accessed 13 April 2016; Bombings of the US embassies in Kenya, Tanzania, 
and other countries See US Dept Of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535, 
Frontline (18 November 1998), Orcon/Law Enforcement Sensitive, < 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/bombings/summary.html > accessed 13 
April 2016; USS Cole bombings, (9/11 Memorial and Museum, 12 October 2000) < 
http://www.911memorial.org/uss-cole-bombing > accessed 13 April 2016, See details of these attacks 
in the 9/11 Commission report, 2004, 109-120 < https://www.9-
11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf > accessed 13 April 2016 
6 John W Dower, Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9-11, Iraq (Norton and Company, 2011)  
7 Ben Chappel, ‘Rehearsals of the sovereign: States of Exception and Threat Governmentality’ (2006) 
Cultural Dynamics 313, 314  
8 George Bush, ‘Declaration of National Emergency by Reason Of Certain Terrorist Attacks’ (The White 
House, 14 September 2001) < http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010914-4.html > accessed 6 April 2017 
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any future terrorist attacks. 9  The 2002 US National Security Strategy 
proclaimed that, ‘the war against terrorists of global reach is a global 
enterprise of uncertain duration...and America will hold account to nations that 
are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terror.’10 
This wording is vague enough to include virtually any ‘enemy’ anywhere and 
at anytime. It also indicates that the US is involved in a perpetual ‘global war 
on terror’, which is not geographically bound. The phrase that ‘America will 
hold account to nations that are compromised by terror, including those who 
harbor terror’ laid the groundwork for continued use of force against weak 
states failing to assert an effective control over their territories.11Before 9/11 
terrorist attacks were seen as criminal acts or small-scale war that could be 
dealt through law enforcement or a limited use of military.12 Counter-terrorist 
methods that were once considered illegal under international law (e.g. 
preventive war, indefinite detention, torture and targeted killings in undeclared 
war zones13) have been since legitimised by these exceptions.14  
This chapter identifies the distinguishing characteristics of the state of 
exception that emerged in the US foreign and defence policy after the 9/11 
attacks through the work of Carl Schmitt15. The first section of the chapter 
explores the move from pre-emption to prevention that allowed the US to use 
force against non-imminent threats. Second section will argue that the 
negative impact of US policies is visible in the UK governments targeted 
killing policies. The British governments adoption of a controversial definition 
                                                        
9 Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (Signed by the 
President on 18 Sep 2001)  
10 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) < 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/  > accessed 26 October 2018 
11 Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
(2010) Human Rights Council Fourteenth session Agenda item 3, 79-86 The US drone strikes in 
Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan illustrates how this new strategy can be used to justify unilateral use of 
force penetrating the territory of third states. 
12 Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Law in a time of emergency: States of exception and the temptations of 9/11’ 
(2004) Journal of Constitutional Law 1007, 1023-1024; Jonathan Hafetz, Habeas Corpus after 9/11: 
Confronting America’s New Global Detention System (NYU Press 2011) 52  
13 Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror' and the Framework of International Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2015) 306-307  
14 Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, ‘Rushing to break the law? The ‘Bush Doctrine’ of Pre-emptive strikes 
and the UN Charter on the use of force’, (2003) University of West Sydney; Elvira Domínguez 
Redondo, ‘The EU, torture secrets and dealing with the truth’ (2009) European Union Institute for 
Security Studies; Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin and Andrew Altman, Targeted Killings: Law and 
Morality in an Asymmetrical World, (Oxford University Press 2012) 
15 Schmitt (n 2) 
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of an ‘imminent’ threat used by the US to justify drone strikes in undeclared 
warzones sets a dangerous precedent. 16  A final feature of the state of 
exception analysed here is concerned with the uses and abuses of the secret 
power in this war particularly in relation to drone warfare in undeclared 
warzones. This chapter will conclude that these features characterising the 
war on terror demonstrate that exceptionalism has become a new norm.       
1.1 State of exception  
In a general sense, state of exception involves ‘governmental action taken 
during an extraordinary national crisis that usually entails broad restrictions on 
human rights in order to resolve the crisis’.17The state of exception arises in 
extreme situations for instance when state faces the threat of foreign invasion, 
civil war, or a large-scale terrorist attack. Anchored in the assertion ‘necessity 
knows no law’,18 derogations from law are justified to preserve society and its 
members. The declaration of the state of exception has serious 
consequences since it involves the suspension of fundamental human rights 
and transfer of exponential power to the executive, enabling it to respond 
quickly and effectively to the threat. The extensive emergency measures 
adopted in the US and other countries after 9/11 brought a renewed interest in 
emergencies in human rights, political theory and constitutional law 
scholarship.19  
                                                        
16 Reprieve, ‘UK Government adopts US principles on secret drone war’, (19 October 2016) 
 < https://reprieve.org.uk/press/uk-government-adopts-us-principles-secret-drone-war/  > accessed 
28 Dec 2017 
17 Claudio Grossman, ‘A Framework for the Examination of States of Emergency 
Under the American Convention on Human Rights’ (1986) U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 35, 36 
18 When Germany violated Belgian territory on August 4, 1914 the German Chancellor’s justification 
was that “We are in need and necessity knows no law” See Roger Alford, “’Necessity Knows No Law”’, 
(Opinio Juris 2009) < http://opiniojuris.org/2009/05/18/necessity-knows-no-law/ > accessed 12 Dec 
2017 
19 Giorgio Agamben, State of exception, translated by K. Attell, Chicago: (Chicago University Press 
2005); Oren Gross, 'Extra-Legality and the Ethic of Political Responsibility,' in V.V. Ramraj (ed.), 
Emergencies and the Limits of Legality (Cambridge University Press 2008) 62; idem, 'Chaos and Rules: 
Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?' (2003) The Yale Law Journal 1011; Oren 
Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice 
(Cambridge University Press 2006); Scheppele (n 12); William E. Scheuerman, ‘Emergency Powers and 
the Rule of Law After 9/11’ (2006) J.POL. PHIL; David Dyzenhaus, 'The State of Emergency in Legal 
Theory', in V.V. Ramraj, M. Hor and K. Roach (eds.), Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge 
University Press 2005) 65; idem, ‘The Compulsion of Legality', in Emergencies and the Limits of 
Legality (Cambridge University Press 2008); Anna-Lena Svensson-McCarthy, ‘The international law of 
human rights and states of exception: with special reference to the travaux preparatoires and case-
 21 
State of exception is not a new concept and has its roots in Roman times.20 
The doctrine was applied at the dawn of the modern era in the US. In 1861 
during the Civil War President Abraham Lincoln suspended the habeas 
corpus between Washington and Philadelphia without Congress authorization 
when there were cases of rebellion or invasion. In a speech to Congress that 
same year, the President justified his actions by declaring ‘[w]hether strictly 
legal or not’ the measures adopted were taken ‘under what appeared to be a 
popular demand and a public necessity.’21 
During the Great Depression Hitler’s government ‘proclaimed the decree for 
the protection of the people and the state’ and suspended the Weimar 
Constitution. The law suspended the right of due process, protection from 
arbitrary arrest and search, and freedom of speech and assembly. 22 Similarly, 
during the course of World War II, democratic regimes like the US expanded 
the power of the executive. In 1942, after the attack on Pearl Harbor President 
Franklin D Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, effectively authorising the 
internment of Japanese-Americans as a preventive measure. 23 The 
                                                                                                                                                              
law of the international monitoring organs’ (1998) Brill ; L.C. Green, ‘Derogation of Human Rights in 
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Systemic Failure of Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies’, 
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(n 2) 
20 Roman state used to nominate a "dictator" in exceptional circumstances of external attack or 
internal rebellion see Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship (Princeton University Press 1948) 
22; Nomi Claire Lazar, States of Emergency in Liberal Democracies (Cambridge University Press 2009) 
120-125 
21 Habeas Corpus, Cornell University Law School, Legal information institute < 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/habeas_corpus > accessed 24 April 2016; Abraham Lincoln, July 4th 
Message to Congress (1861) < http://millercenter.org/president/lincoln/speeches/speech-3508 > 
accessed 26 April 2016 
22 Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of the People and State of 28 February 1933 < 
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=2325 > accessed 26 April 
2016 
23 Executive Order 9066 (1942) General Records of the United States Government; Record Group 11; 
National Archives < http://www.archives.gov/global-pages/larger-image.html?i=/historical-docs/doc-
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declaration of a state of emergency was frequently used to justify US actions 
in its fight against communism. In the Cold War era the confrontation with the 
Soviet Union also led the US to adopt exceptional measures in order to 
confront exceptional powers. Between 1950 and 1970, the Congress allowed 
the President to use extra power to deal with exceptional situations. 24 
Scheppele notes that ‘[b]etween the 1930s and 1970s, Congress passed 
about 470 statutes that empowered the executive branch to act under 
emergency powers’.25  
The conceptual rationale for state of exception is quite clear and is rooted in 
the nature of the exceptional. The current chapter focuses on the writings of 
Carl Schmitt because of its particular relevance to this thesis. In his book 
‘Political Theology’ Schmitt famously wrote ‘sovereign is he who decides on 
the exception’26. Schmitt conceives the sovereign as the absolute power and 
attacks all forms of constitutional rationalism particularly the principle of the 
rule of law, as far as it imposes legal restrictions to the state under all 
circumstances. He argues that during exceptional circumstances it is simply 
not feasible to submit the sovereign unconditionally to the rule of law because 
norms and laws become obsolete and hence are unable to deal with the 
exceptional challenge.27 Schmitt claims in the state of exception the normal 
legal order ‘recedes’, making way for an ‘authority that is unlimited in 
principle’.28  
In the state of exception, the sovereign has carte blanche to take all 
necessary measures to suppress the threat posed including the suspension of 
constitutional rights and freedoms to safeguard the state. The Schmitt’s 
conception of the state of exception implies that the action of the sovereign 
requires neither ‘legality’ nor ‘legitimacy’ because it has the power to declare 
the emergency, the power to determine when the emergency is over to 
restore rule of law and the power to decide which political actors who are 
                                                        
24 James Bilsland, The President, the State and the Cold War: Comparing the foreign policies of Truman 
and Reagn (Routledge 2015) 33-35  
25 Scheppele (n 12) 1019 
26 Schmitt (n 2) 13 (The book was written during Weimar Republic (1919-1933) a time in which state 
sovereignty constantly threatened to dissolve into countless acts of non-state violence) 
27Schmitt (n 2) 15-16; Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito, The International Political Thought of Carl 
Schmitt: Terror, Liberal War and the crisis of global order (Routledge 2007) 87 
28 Schmitt (n 2) 15 
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during normal time protected lose their protection during the time of 
emergency.29Schmitt’s approach is based on the premise that the integrity of 
the state is more pertinent than the rule of law, which may prevent a state 
from defending itself when its survival depends on the suspension of laws.30 
Indeed, the most distinctive feature of the sovereign is its power to suspend 
the law linked to its responsibility to defend the integrity of state.31 Schmitt’s 
idea of the state of exception is quite negative and destructive. Schmitt 
confers the exclusive power to ‘suspend’ the law but what prevents the 
sovereign from becoming as dangerous as the threat justifying it?32History 
demonstrates what happened when sovereign exercised this right: the rise of 
fascism, war, the collapse of democratic governments and camps. 33 
Schmittian paradigm promotes fascism.34It may not be wrong to say that state 
of exception ‘is therefore a label that may provide instant legitimacy to the 
greater limitation of human rights by governments’.35  
The unfettered powers of the executive may lead to normalisation of the 
exceptional measures, which is evident in the US policies after 9/11. 36 
Arguably the challenge after 9/11 is not of exceptionalism but normalisation of 
the state of exception.37Seventeen years after 9/11 it remains impossible to 
foresee the expiry date of these exceptional measures. In today’s war on 
terror traditional distinctions between war and peace, combatant and civilian, 
                                                        
29 ibid 93 
30 ibid 20  
31 ibid 
32 Petra Brown, ‘Bonhoeffer, Schmitt and the state of exception’ (2013) Pacifica 246, 257 
33 Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present (University of California press 
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34Roy Coleman, Joe Sim, Steve Tombs and David Whyte, State Power Crime, (SAGE Publications 2009) 
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and army and intelligence, have become eroded.38The following sections will 
examine the revival of the Schmittian paradigm after 9/11. This involved a 
reinterpretation of international law to legitimise the US’s right to militarily 
intervene in countries that pose threat to national security. As explained below 
the concept of exceptional circumstances paved the way for the preventive 
use of armed force. 
1.2 From pre-emption to prevention  
Following the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, legal basis for the 
preventive use of force have been increasingly developed. This can be 
observed at different normative levels. The event of 9/11 brought a number of 
changes to law enforcement in the US. New policies ‘shifted from the 
investigation and prosecution of terrorists to a single-minded emphasis on the 
prevention of future terrorist acts’.39 The Justice Department made it clear that 
their ‘single objective was to prevent terrorist attacks by taking suspected 
terrorists off the street.’ 40  On this basis suspected terrorists have been 
detained in the US under Section 412 of the USA Patriotic Act that allows the 
Attorney General to detain foreign nationals as terrorist suspects without a 
hearing and without supporting evidence to demonstrate that they pose a 
danger. 41  The preventive detention of suspected terrorist gives executive 
exceptional power during times of emergency.42  
The use of preventive armed force is a security strategy in which force is used 
to thwart the development of possible future threats. The 2003 Iraq war was 
preventive because the US invaded Iraq based on the suspicion that Saddam 
Hussein was attempting to acquire nuclear weapons, which posed a threat to 
the US security. At the other end of the spectrum would be limited actions 
intended to prevent potential threats from developing. Smaller-scale 
                                                        
38David Chandler, ‘The Revival of Carl Schmitt in International Relations: The Last Refuge of Critical 
Theorists?’ (2008) Millennium: Journal of International Studies 27, 36 
39 Attorney General John Ashcroft, ‘Prepared Remarks for the US Mayors Conference’ (2001) < 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks10_25.htm > accessed 2 May 
2016 
40 ibid 
41  8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a) (2006)  
42 The Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on Federal Courts, ‘The indefinite 
detentions of enemy combatants balancing due process and national security in the context of the 
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applications of preventive force include: targeted killing with drone strikes in 
undeclared warzones against individuals who are deemed to pose security 
threat to the US as well; special operations and cyber-attacks. 43 The US 
targeted killings in undeclared warzones highlights the continued US policy of 
preventive force; the narrative of the Iraq war in 2002-2003 is still in use 
today.   
1.2.1 US preventive logic before 9/11 
Anticipatory logic has a long history in the US foreign policy. The government 
of US has always argued that the anticipatory use of force is both legal and 
legitimate and in line with customary international law. 44  According to the 
Caroline standard pre-emptive use of force is justified providing a state 
demonstrates that the threat of attack is imminent and, use of force is 
extremely necessary and proportional to the overall goal of self-defence. 45 
Anticipatory or pre-emptive force is different from preventive force. According 
to Doyle ‘preemption is motivated by wars that are expected to occur 
imminently; prevention by wars that, if they must be fought, are better fought 
now than later’.46 Thus preventive force refers to the use of force against non-
imminent threats that ‘may mature into threats of an armed attack at some 
unspecified time in the future’. 47  The US and the broader International 
Community have considered the use of preventive force illegal and illegitimate 
before 9/11 as exemplified already in the rejection of Germany’s arguments 
that, ‘it had been compelled to attack Norway and Denmark in self-defence to 
prevent a future allied invasion’ by the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg.48 The Tribunal concluded that the attacks were act of aggression 
                                                        
43 A cyber-attack on another country’s banking, electrical or other utilities systems would be 
equivalent of armed attack that is only permitted in self-defence. But with the advancement of 
technology there is a possibility that technologically advanced nation may take risk free covert 
preventive cyber-attack on another country in the name of self-defence See Luciano Floridi and 
Mariarosaria Taddeo, The Ethics of Information Warfare (Springer 2014) 65-70; Linda Robinson, ‘The 
Future of Special Operations: Beyond Kill and Capture’ (2012) Foreign Affairs 110  
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not legitimate act of self-defence. According to the Tribunal: ‘to initiate a war 
of aggression…is not only an international crime; it is the supreme 
international crime’. 49 Nurembergs ‘condemnation of preventive war was 
incorporated into the UN Charter, affirmed by the General Assembly and 
accepted by the Security Council’. 50 In 1950 President Truman rejected 
preventive wars and declared, ‘we do not believe in aggression or preventive 
war. Such a war is the weapon of dictators, not of free democratic countries 
like the US.’ 51  President Eisenhower labelled preventive war as war of 
aggression and confirmed in 1955, ‘we will never start an aggressive 
war’.52Secretary of State Dulles also emphasised ‘any idea of preventive war 
is wholly out of the question’ and preventive war ‘will never be any part of the 
United States foreign policy.’53  Preventive war was considered at several 
points during the cold war against Russia during the 1950s before they 
acquired nuclear weapons but each time it was rejected because it was 
immoral and inconsistent with American ideals.54President Johnson ruled out 
preventive attack against China in 1964 afraid of the political backlash this act 
would carry, both at home and abroad. 55  When the Israel launched a 
preventive attack against an Iraqi nuclear plant, in 1981, the UN Security 
Council unanimously condemned it as a ‘clear violation of the Charter of the 
UN and the norms of International conduct.’56A Council member explained the 
consensus: ‘The concept of preventive war for many years served as a 
justification for the abuses of powerful states, since it left to their discretion to 
define what constituted a threat to them, was definitively abolished by the 
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Charter of the UN’.57 On that occasion, the US and Iraq jointly drafted Security 
Council resolution that condemned Israel.58 
The consideration of preventive war as immoral and illegal started to shift in 
the 1990s. The threat of nuclear proliferation to states like North Korea and 
Iraq led the Clinton administration to consider preventive strikes on nuclear 
facilities as a viable option but decided against it in the case of North Korea 
because of its military risks. 59  Building on this emerging acceptance of 
preventive force, the Bush administration officially presented it as a policy in 
the National Security Strategy in 2002 and practically waged the preventive 
war against Iraq in 2003.          
1.2.2 US preventive logic after 9/11 
The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction and the more 
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, 
even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s 
attack.  
National Security Strategy of the US, 2002 60  
Major shift in the US policy materialised after 9/11 because it was portrayed 
as an exceptional event that changed everything.61 As discussed earlier, after 
9/11 Bush declared a state of emergency which was not only imposed during 
his first term but it matured during his second term and persisted under the 
administrations of President Obama and Donald Trump. International law 
recognise the right of preemptive force in self-defence but rejects the right of 
preventive force in self-defence without Security Council’s authorisation.62 
The state of exception doctrine allowed the shift from pre-emption to 
prevention because the exceptional circumstances demanded state 
authorities to employ extraordinary measures in the name of national security. 
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It was argued that the menace of terrorism was substantially different from 
past threats. Different features of the terrorist threat have been articulated to 
explain their exceptional danger. First, terrorists who pose a threat to the US 
and its allies control no territory thus, have no territory to preserve or people 
to protect.63  They are extremely dangerous because they commit suicide 
attacks and are motivated by religious ideology that glorifies death. 64 
Secondly, these terrorists are irrational and unlike the Great power rivalry of 
the Cold War in which nuclear weapons or other WMD were tools of last 
resort terrorist are willing to get hold of these weapons to kill large number of 
people.65 Finally, terrorist organisations are secret, they are decentralised, 
small in size and can move undetected between states and are still able to 
inflict devastating harm.66 Under these circumstances the Bush administration 
argued that: 
We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients 
before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction 
against the United States and our allies and friends… Given the goals 
of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely 
rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter 
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a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the 
magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ 
choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our 
enemies strike first.67 
This logic imposes that the new threat of terrorism demands a shift toward 
strategies of prevention. The National Security Strategy suggests first strikes 
will tend to be useful, against threats ‘before they are fully formed’, because 
‘traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy . . . 
whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent 
protection is statelessness’.68Arguably, a blanket prohibition on the use of 
preventive force in self-defence is unreasonable. But preventive force should 
only be allowed in extraordinary circumstances particularly when ‘potential 
threat is bigger than the risks inherent in preventive action and the threat 
cannot be mitigated by any other means’.69 
The National Security Strategy does not identify the rare conditions under 
which preventive force is acceptable. Instead it claims an unrestrained right to 
strike first eradicating the difference between ‘imminent threat (soon to be 
realised) and immanent threat (already and permanent)’. 70  There is no 
difference between a present and future threat because the US is always 
vulnerable, setting a dangerous path that undermines well-established 
principles of international law 71  
Thus, this willingness of using force on mere suspicion of potential threat or 
on weak evidence goes against well-established international norms and sets 
a dangerous precedent. 
1.3 Impact of US policies on the use of force by the UK  
The UK government’s use of armed drones generated controversy when they 
were for the first time used in Syria without Parliamentary approval to target 
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British citizens in a country they were not involved in a war with. On 21 August 
2015 Reyaad Khan, a British citizen from Cardiff, was killed by a Royal Air 
Force drone strike in Raqqa, Syria. He had appeared in a prominent 
recruitment video for ISIS (Islamic state in Iraq and Syria) and was suspected 
of being involved in plotting and directing terrorist attacks in the UK and 
elsewhere.72 This attack demonstrated that ‘the UK government has adopted 
the controversial practice of extra-judicial ‘targeted killing’, similar to that 
carried out by the US and Israel’.73  
The targeted killing of Khan reveals a fundamental change in British 
counterterrorism policy in two ways: First, prior to these strikes the UK 
government had treated terrorism as a criminal activity and counterterrorism 
operations were handled by the civilian authorities. But involvement of the 
Royal Air force in elimination of a terror suspect shows that the British 
government actions have turned to address acts of terrorism through a war 
paradigm. On 7 September 2015, the Prime Minister David Cameron, told the 
House of Commons that, the drone strike in Syria constituted ‘a new 
departure...(because) this is the first time, in modern times, a British military 
asset had been used in a country in which the UK was not involved in a war.... 
the strike was not part of coalition military action against ISIL in Syria; it was a 
targeted strike to deal with a clear, credible and specific terrorist threat to our 
country at home’.74 
Second, it reveals that the British government has adopted the same modern 
interpretation of International law that the US has employed since the 
launching of its War on Terror 16 years ago. One has suggested, ‘the strike 
amounts to a sea change in the UK’s legal position, and indeed aligns it with 
several US legal positions in the ‘war on terror’ that, yet, no European state 
has formally embraced’.75 The British response to the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, regarding its policy on the use of drones for targeted killing, 
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also shows that it has adopted some of the key principles of the US drone 
programme. The British Prime Minister’s statement to the House of Commons 
on 7th September confirmed: ‘that it is the government’s policy to be willing to 
use lethal force abroad, outside an armed conflict (in Libya, for example), 
against individuals suspected of planning an ‘imminent’ terrorist attack against 
the UK, as a last resort, when there is no alternative available to prevent the 
attack’.76 The legal basis of the UK government’s use of lethal force outside of 
an armed conflict is self-defence. The government’s interpretation of the term  
‘imminence’ is imperative because, ‘it determines the scope of its policy of 
using lethal force outside areas of armed conflict’.77 The consequences of this 
reinterpretation of well-established legal terms are of particular significance 
due to the leading role of the UK and the US as permanent members of the 
Security Council. In addition there are genuine concerns that UK’s approach 
is setting a dangerous precedent, influencing the position of other states 
eroding established legal frameworks applicable to the use of armed force. 
1.3.1 UK government’s definition of imminence 
In April 2004, the then Attorney General Lord Goldsmith distinguished the UK 
government’s position from the US governments wider interpretation of pre-
emptive self-defence set out in the US’s 2002 National Security Strategy: 
 
It is...the government's view that international law permits the use of 
force in self-defence against an imminent attack but does not authorise 
the use of force to mount a pre-emptive strike against a threat that is 
more remote.78 
The UK government changed its position in 2015 favouring a more flexible 
and broad interpretation of the term “imminence”. In the context of the oral 
evidence taken before the Justice Select Committee on 15 September 2015, 
the Attorney General suggested that the traditional ‘Caroline’ test for 
‘imminence’ may not be perfect in dealing with the modern threat of terrorism 
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and needs to be reassessed.79  
The UK government’s legal position on defensive force presented by Attorney 
General Wright on 1st January 2017 further confirms that the UK has now 
adopted the US definition of ‘imminence’. Wright argues that the long-
established Caroline test for imminence was established in 1837 and so much 
has changed since 1837 that the Caroline test is no longer sufficient. Wright 
pointed that while in the past authorities would have been able to ‘see troops 
massing on the horizon’ modern technology means that individuals can 
‘inspire, enable and direct attacks’ from distance.80 He stressed that: 
At the time of 9/11, social media, Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and the 
like, did not exist. Technology was far less mobile.... Now, an individual 
so inclined can watch a video on YouTube, source an instruction 
manual on homemade explosives on the Dark Web, and act on 
whatever misconceived ideology they have absorbed, all in a short 
space of time, without travelling abroad and without direct 
communication with any established organisational leadership.81  
Wright argues that the world is changing fast and so is the threat of terrorism 
so we must be sure the law is keeping up: 
In a world where a small number of committed plotters may be seeking 
to inspire, enable and direct attacks around the world, and indeed have 
a proven track record of doing so, we will not always know where and 
when an attack will take place, or the precise nature of the attack.82  
Further Wright refers to Bethlehem’s observation that: 
[t]he absence of specific evidence of where an attack will take place or 
of the precise nature of an attack does not preclude a conclusion that 
an armed attack is imminent for purposes of the exercise of a right of 
self-defence, provided that there is a reasonable and objective basis 
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for concluding that an armed attack is imminent.83 
And states that this ‘has been the ‘settled position of successive British 
government’.84Thus, according to Wright ‘specific’ advance evidence of a 
terror plot threatening UK interests is not legally required before launching 
pre-emptive drone strikes against suspects in foreign states. This extremely 
loose understanding of imminence would enable the government to kill 
members of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) anywhere. Indeed, 
international law allows states to use force in self-defence against imminent 
threat; it does however outlaws pre-emptive uses of force against a threat that 
is more remote and vague. The use of drones outside armed conflict in the 
absence of any real and imminent threat may normalise the use of force 
against sovereign states. This new understanding of term ‘imminence’ may 
enable few powerful states to use force against less powerful states without 
any consent. Arguably, ‘UK’s actions could have knock-on effects for the 
stability of the international rules-based order. The long-term implications of 
an expansive definition of ‘imminence’ are the potential erosion of use of force 
norms more broadly in a manner that may be used by an increasingly greater 
number of states, including states such as Russia, North Korea and China’.85  
1.3.2 UK’s armed conflict against ISIS 
The approach of the UK and the US to the fight against ISIS differs. While the 
US government considers itself to be in a single non-international (albeit 
geographically global) armed conflict with Al-Qaida and its associates, the UK 
claims to be involved in a geographically defined non-international armed 
conflict with ISIS in Iraq and Syria only.86  
The UK government sees this position as compatible with the use force in 
self-defence against ISIS members outside an armed conflict providing they 
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pose an imminent threat to the UK. The UK government’s use of preemptive 
force against imminent threat in itself is not controversial because there is no 
established rule of customary international law prohibiting the preemptive use 
of force undertaken in self-defense against imminent threat. 87  Despite 
disavowing the wide US view of the existence of a non-international armed 
conflict the UK interpretation of the term ‘imminent’ is so broad that, in 
practice, its policy is undistinguishable from its US counterpart.  
Additionally, the then Secretary of State for Defence stated that all uses of 
military force is governed by international humanitarian law even when force 
is employed outside of armed conflict.88 This is a controversial position and 
goes against the conventional view that human rights law governs the use of 
lethal force outside of an armed conflict as stressed by Dr William Boothby in 
his written evidence regarding the UK government Policy on the Use of 
Drones for Targeted Killings. In the same context, Nicholas Justin Mercer 
made a similar statement arguing that: 
Any counter-terror policy the Government puts in place which may 
breach the right to life, must comply with the limits imposed by the 
ECHR. Outside of a declared war zone, the Government can only take 
life if absolutely necessary.89  
The UN Special Rapporteur in his Report on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism 
(2013) stated 
International human rights law prohibits arbitrary killing... Outside 
situations of armed conflict, the use of deadly force by the State is 
lawful only if strictly necessary and proportionate, if aimed at 
preventing an immediate threat to life and if there is no other means of 
preventing the threat from materializing. It follows that lethal remotely 
                                                        
87 Attorney General (n 80) 96. 
88 The Government’s policy on the use of drones for targeted killing Legal Basis (9 May 2016) 3.17  < 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201516/jtselect/jtrights/574/57406.htm#footnote-127-
backlink > 
89 Written evidence submitted by Reverend Nicholas Justin Mercer (DRO0005), WRITTEN SUBMISSION 
TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, (9 Nov 2015) < 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/human-
rights-committee/the-uk-governments-policy-on-the-use-of-drones-for-targeted-
killing/written/24291.pdf > accessed at 20 Dec 2016 
 35 
piloted aircraft attacks will rarely be lawful outside a situation of armed 
conflict, because only in the most exceptional of circumstances would it 
be permissible under international human rights law for killing to be the 
sole or primary objective of an operation.90  
1.3.3 Lack of transparency and accountability  
The question of the legality of the UK government’s targeted killing has been 
raised multiple times. To date, however, there is not enough information 
available to be confident in providing answers regarding their legality. In its 
response to the 2016 Joint Committee’s report the UK government declined to 
state explicitly which law applies to lethal drone strikes outside of armed 
conflict on the basis that this is ‘hypothetical’.91 The government’s response is 
disappointing because it inhibits accountability. It is difficult to hold a 
government accountable for unlawful actions if it is unclear what legal regime 
they are following. Therefore, ‘government cannot claim the right to target and 
kill individuals worldwide, but then refuse to provide even basic answers as to 
the legal basis for such action’.92  
It is nonetheless commendable that the Military of Defence respected the 
increasing demand of transparency and routinely published ‘Operation Shader 
reports’93 providing details of airstrikes conducted by Royal Air Force in Iraq 
and Syria against ISIS. While it is a step forward towards transparency, but 
the vague and incomplete wording of the report makes it difficult to analyse 
the legality of drone strikes. A comprehensive analysis of these reports 
carried out by Max Byrne raised reasonable objections explaining that 
describing targets of drone strikes as ‘‘terrorist’ or ‘extremist’ has no basis in 
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international law and it is inappropriate and unhelpful in terms of 
transparency’.94 Also it is unclear ‘who decides whether a person killed by a 
drone was a ‘terrorist’ or an ‘extremist’’.95 Moreover reports of civilian casualty 
are largely absent in this report. ‘Just 4% of reports of drone strikes within 
Operation Shader refer to the presence of civilians and the fact that they were 
not harmed by the air strike being reported’.96 It is striking that the ‘96% of 
reports make no mention of civilians’97 making it impossible to know the 
impact on them.98The report has even failed to address key issues such as 
the basis to decide which targeted individuals could be lawfully killed.99 Since 
no information is shared demonstrating their participation in hostilities it is not 
even clear whether ‘the individuals targeted were armed (which, regardless, 
may well not be sufficient to render someone a lawful target)’.100 The report 
does not provide complete information of drone operations. For instance only 
53% of reports gave detailed information on the drone targets.101 
The All Party Parliamentary Group also presented a comprehensive report on 
‘The UK government’s use of armed drones’ in July 2018. The report 
expressed its concern on the UK’s criteria for selecting the target. It stressed 
that the UK is ‘adopting an overly expansive approach to determine who is a 
lawful target.’102The UK government has confirmed that the standard on the 
selection of targets is in place but has refused to disclose it to either the 
Parliament or the public alleging security reasons. Furthermore, it is hard to 
accept governments absurdly low number of civilian casualty. The UK 
government has conducted above 1700 airstrikes in Syria but claims that only 
one civilian died from it.103This suggests a violation of international law by 
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wrongly qualifying civilians as combatants by applying an overly broad 
definition introduced by Daniel Bethlem.104 
It can be concluded that to date, the UK targeted killing policies are not clear. 
Further the reports of airstrikes available on the Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
website only gives an impression of transparency. Insufficient information and 
non-legal terminology employed by the MoD in these reports makes it difficult 
to analyse the legality of each strike. The All Party Parliamentary Group on 
Drones also recommended that the UK should make public the policies it was 
following, including the legal basis for targeted killings and the criteria used in 
the selection of targets as well as its position on the geographical scope of 
armed conflicts when engaging with non-state armed groups.105 
The following section will discuss how the powers associated to the state of 
exception and the secrecy of operations affect governmental unaccountability. 
1.4  Secrecy and unaccountable drone wars 
In its fight against terrorism, the US government has used secret evidence 
against suspected terrorist, transferred detainees to secret CIA black sites 
and drafted secret ‘kill list’ for targeted killings of people in undeclared 
warzones.106 This section will focus on the secrecy surrounding the current 
US use of drones. Secrecy is extremely problematic because it inhibits 
accountability. Transparency establishes whether targeted operations are 
being conducted lawfully. The secrecy in drones is continued through the 
‘CIA’s refusal to publicly discuss the drone program and to provide relevant 
guidelines, policy, and legal rationales toward the use of drones’. 107 
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International pressure to mitigate the impact of the opacity surrounding the 
use of armed drones, has not yielded relevant results.108  
There are institutional, administrative and legal frameworks compounding the 
issue. Achieving accountability becomes further complicated by the fact that 
two distinct organisations are conducting joint operations under vague legal 
authorities. The issue of extensive fluidity between the military (the Special 
Forces) (SOF) and intelligence agencies (the CIA) in relation to drone killings 
is central to this section.109 Peter Singer has termed this situation as ‘double-
hatting around the law’ a process that morphs the role of warriors, spy and 
civilian actors. 110 This strange morphing of uniformed military, civilian 
intelligence and private security contractors seems to serve bureaucracy. 
Philip Alston argues that this double hatting is deliberate and seeks to hinder 
the possibility of finding out which agency is behind any given attack. 111 
Today’s drone warfare is highly secretive and bureaucratic in nature; probably 
nobody enjoys the full authority and nobody can be held accountable. Hannah 
Ardent once stated that, ‘bureaucracy is the form of government in which 
everybody is deprived of political freedom, of the power to act; for the rule by 
Nobody is not no-rule, and where all are equally powerless we have a tyranny 
without a tyrant’.112 Therefore, a bureaucratic system ensures that nobody has 
direct responsibility for anything and the humanity is lost in faceless 
administrative procedures. In this bureaucratization of drone warfare killing 
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has become highly administered, organised, impersonal and morally 
remote.113  
The CIA is a civilian bureaucracy conducting drone strikes from thousands of 
miles away in Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia in total anonymity. No one knows 
precisely who runs the program of targeted killing. The strikes are secret all 
the information is classified; lawsuits are blocked114 and consequently nobody 
is held accountable for human rights violations or abuses of law. The fusion of 
the CIA and the military along with the blurring of the line between the war 
and the peace has created a state of exception where accountability is 
impossible because nobody could be held accountable and exceptional 
circumstances warrant secrecy.  
It would be naive to ignore that, traditionally, intelligence agencies have 
always operated covertly because of the nature of their job. Secrecy is crucial 
because it ‘enables policymakers or operation commanders to make effective 
decisions’.115 It has been argued that transparency or declassification may 
compromise the CIA’s ability to undertake its missions, and special situation 
of intelligence agencies demands for lower-threshold measures of 
accountability.116 It might appear oxymoronic to demand transparency and 
expecting information sharing from the CIA whose very existence is based on 
secrecy. However, there is a fundamental difference between the ability to 
gather intelligence and the power to kill suspected militants in foreign lands. 
Cohan noted that the September 11 attack and hunt for Bin Laden 
transformed CIA into ‘hunters not gatherers’. 117  Arguably the need for 
intelligence services to be accountable has never been stronger because of 
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the excessive power they possess and the likelihood of the abuse of that 
power.118  
After September 11, US intelligence agencies became the leading players in 
counter terrorism operations and exercised their power without any 
meaningful congressional consultation. The intelligence agencies ‘kidnapped 
suspected terrorists, established secret prisons, performed “enhanced” 
interrogations, tortured prisoners, and carried out targeted killings’. 119 
Gradually, special operations became far more common, and ‘double hatting’ 
helped to make accountability even more difficult. The exponential growth of 
SOF indicates that these groups have evolved from marginal actors towards 
major networked forms of organisations. US special operations, or possibly 
the CIA and other intelligence agents, now pursue war-on-terror tasks in at 
least 75 countries. Moreover, the Congressional report suggests that the US 
has intended to increase the number of Special Forces to 70,000 120 
1.4.1 Armed Drones and the rise of secret warfare  
The era of unaccountable secret wars began with Laos- aerial strikes without 
the approval of Congress.121 While the militarisation of the CIA materialised in 
1961 in the Laos war, it reached its peak in the years after September 2001 
when the Agency began targeted killing missions in undeclared warzones.122 
The CIA and the US foreign policy changed after Laos becoming ‘another 
branch of the US Special Forces.... a paramilitary organisation whose primary 
purpose was killing and war fighting’.123 CIA’s paramilitary operations were not 
restricted to the Laos war before the 9/11 attacks. President Reagan signed a 
secret Executive Order directing the CIA ‘to support and conduct paramilitary 
operations against Nicaragua’. 124  Then Ronald Reagan signed Executive 
orders for covert paramilitary operation in Afghanistan for combating 
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Moscow.125The Snowden budget documents revealed that after September 
11 attacks the traditional intelligence gathering role of the CIA became 
secondary and the Agency spent most of its time conducting drone strikes 
and many other aspects of paramilitary operations across the globe.126    
Pre-9/11 the Bush administration was less inclined to carry out lethal military 
actions in foreign countries because of legal barriers. It was believed that the 
CIA became something of a loose cannon when Ronald Regan gave the CIA 
an official legal authority to conduct covert ‘counterintelligence activities 
outside the United States’ by signing Executive Order 12333 in 1981.127 The 
Executive Order 12333 maintained the ban on assassinations. 128  This 
changed after the African bombings in 1998, when President Clinton’s secret 
Memorandum of Understanding authorised the CIA to kill Osama Bin Laden 
and key Al-Qaeda figures.129The norm against targeted killings completely 
disappeared after 9/11 when Bush lifted this restriction by signing a 
Memorandum of Notification creating a secret list of ‘High Value Targets’ that 
the CIA was authorised to kill anywhere in the world without further 
presidential approval.130This order began the CIA’s transformation from an 
‘espionage service devoted to stealing the secrets of foreign governments’ 
into ‘a killing machine . . . consumed with man hunting’.131It is further argued 
that after 9/11 ‘thorny questions about assassination, covert action, and the 
proper use of the CIA in hunting America’s enemies were quickly swept aside’ 
and the Bush and Obama administrations fully embraced drones as an 
‘ultimate weapon for a secret war’.132  
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The era of drones began two months after 9/11. The first US armed drone 
attack took place in Afghanistan in mid-November 2001 killing Mohammed 
Atef, the military commander of Al-Qaeda.133  A few months later, on 4th 
February 2002, the CIA conducted a second drone strike on a group they 
believed included Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan.134These drone strikes 
were less controversial because they were fired in hot battlefield. Drone 
strikes began hotly contested when, on 4 Nov 2002, the CIA conducted the 
first known targeted killing outside of a declared war zone in Yemen.135The 
strike killed suspected USS Cole bombing mastermind Qaed Salim Sinan al-
Harethi in Yemen. The use of drones outside active hostilities increased and 
‘since 9/11, over 95% of all non-battlefields targeted killings have been 
conducted by drones’.136 The strikes outside the warzone have raised issues 
of legality, legitimacy and accountability that will be discussed in next 
chapters. The focus of this section is to highlight that secrecy erodes the rule 
of law and makes accountability difficult. 
1.4.2 The Convergence of CIA and JSOC operators: 
There has been very little public discussion of the significant and complex role 
of the Joint Special Operation Commands (JSOC) in targeted killings. The 
JSOC is a secretive and elite branch of the United States’ Department of 
Defence. It falls under the United States Special Operations Command, under 
the acronym USSOCOM. SOCOM deals with a universe of US military activity 
that occurs almost completely outside of the view of the American 
public.137JSOC was designed to be shrouded in secrecy by camouflaging 
itself ‘...with cover names, black budget mechanisms, and bureaucratic 
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parlour tricks’ to maintain its secrecy.138The official description of JSOC is 
confusing and does not mention its involvement in any sort of targeting killings 
or drone operations. Conversely, it merely lists a number of roles comprising 
the study of Special Operations requirements, ensuring the interoperability 
 and equipment standardisation, the development of joint Special Operations 
plans and tactics, and conducting joint Special Operations exercises and 
training.139 Rumsfeld signed a (classified) 2004 Directive (Al-Qaeda Network 
Exord) with the approval of the President, which ‘gave JSOC broad authority 
to launch intelligence gathering and sometimes lethal operations all over 
world, from South America to Africa, Asia and the Middle East’.140This order 
relaxed the rules and allowed the military to act outside declared war zones. 
However targets in some countries would still require the approval of high-
level administration. The Secretary of Defence, for instance, must approve 
targets in Somalia, but for countries like Pakistan and Syria, it requires the 
approval of the President.141  
It is a misconception that US drone programme is run by two distinct 
organisation- one the military’s overt strikes in declared warzones142 and other 
CIA’s covert strikes in undeclared warzones.143 Interestingly, many continue 
to portray a straightforward situation where lines of authority remain relatively 
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clear and uncomplicated. For instance, Radsan and Murphy claim that, ‘the 
Air force controls drone operations in the clear war zones of Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Elsewhere in the Northwest Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, CIA 
controls’.144But this is oversimplification of a really murky situation on the 
ground particularly in the case of Pakistan. Seymour Hersh has reported a 
former intelligence officer stating that drone strikes in Pakistan involve 
multiple actors: The NSA, the CIA and the DIA (Defence Intelligence Agency) 
along with Special Forces.145 
This increasing overlap between the functions of military and civilian 
organisation is problematic. To understand how this convergence opens 
further doors of abuse one needs to understand the difference between Title 
50146 and Title 10 of the US Code, Armed Forces147. The CIA is covered 
under Title 50 defining covert actions as ‘activities of the United States 
government . . . where it is intended that the role . . . will not be apparent or 
acknowledged publicly, but does not include traditional . . . military 
activities.’148 In the case of covert operations, the government cannot legally 
provide any information about how the CIA conducts targeted killings. Covert 
actions require permission of the President of the United States who declares 
that the activity is necessary to ‘support identifiable foreign policy objectives’ 
and ‘is important to the national security of the United States’.149The CIA is 
also obliged to report their covert activities to Congressional Intelligence 
Committees.150The CIA can avoid the advance notification to Congress if the 
President determines there are ‘extraordinary circumstances affecting vital 
interests of the United States,’ but it still has to notify to the ‘Gang of Eight’.151 
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Afterwards, the congressional intelligence committees may conduct the 
oversight of the relevant covert actions. Special Forces are governed by a 
completely different regime. JSOC is a subunit of Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM) that manages and coordinates US special operations 
forces operating globally. 152 Title 10 of the US Code that guides JSOC 
operations and outlines the role of the armed forces.153 The ‘traditional military 
activities’ regulated under Title 10 require neither a presidential finding nor 
Congressional notification.154 Therefore, JSOC differ from CIA strikes since 
their operations are acknowledged by the US government. 155Oversight of 
operations carried out under Title 10 lies with the two chambers156 of the US 
Congress and the Armed Services Committees. 157  Title 50 oversight may 
actually be more rigorous, though less transparent, than Title 10 oversight.158 
Title 10 refers to Defence of Department and military operations, while Title 50 
covers intelligence agencies, intelligence activities, and covert action.159Thus 
under Title 10 ‘military’ action can be undertaken much more freely and will be 
subject to little or no congressional oversight, providing it does not cross the 
threshold of engagement in hostilities.  
JSOC is a military organisation that works alongside the CIA. Yet it is neither 
part of the conventional military nor wholly similar to the CIA. The raid of Bin 
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Laden demonstrated that CIA and JSOC work well together. 160  The CIA 
played a vital role in the intelligence gathering that led to Bin Laden’s 
location.161 The cooperation was even acknowledged by Barack Obama who 
explained that intelligence officials gathered at CIA’s headquarters and 
labelled the operation as a team effort.162 Although US Navy SEALs executed 
Bin Laden’s raid, it was characterised as Title 50 operations referring to the 
section of the US Code that governs the CIA.163This might seem like no more 
than a typical bureaucratic loophole, but it would have a significant result: 
JSOC is now empowered to carry out covert operations around the globe with 
less accountability than the CIA.164The legal ambiguity of such operations, 
which are described as CIA-led but executed mostly or entirely by military 
commandos, suits the government. As a result, ‘some apparently covert 
operations have, because of the preponderance of military personnel 
involved, not been conducted with the requisite presidential finding and 
congressional notification’.165  
This convergence gives the US government a political and strategic 
advantage. For instance the overlap of CIA and JSOC drone strikes in Yemen 
allows the government to officially acknowledge that they run the programme 
due to involvement of military in it but at the same time gives it the benefit of 
maintaining secrecy and deniability enjoyed by CIA operations.166As Gates 
has posited ‘one of the things we have seen since 9/11 is an extraordinary 
coming together, particularly of CIA and the military, in working together and 
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fusing intelligence and operations in a way that just, I think, is unique in 
anybody’s history’.167  
The CIA-JSOC convergence creates the potential for further exploitation of 
the situation. During a March 2012 hearing, Representative Hank Johnson, a 
member of the House Armed Services Committee, questioned military officials 
about oversight of SOF working under the authority of the CIA. Johnson noted 
‘that although the Committee has budgetary authority over SOCOM, when 
Special Operations Forces act under CIA authority, the Pentagon is not 
required to report back about its activities’.168 It has been suggested that since 
JSOC plays an ever-increasing role in drone operations, it should become 
accountable to Congress and the public about its practices and procedures, 
particularly in relation to civilian protection.169 
At times even government officials do not have a clear understanding of which 
organisation is responsible for a strike or for particular conduct. In 2011, the 
Washington Post reported: ‘Their comingling at remote bases is so complete 
that US officials ranging from congressional staffers to high-ranking CIA 
officers said they often find it difficult to distinguish agency from military 
personnel’. 170 A senior US official commenting on his recent visit to 
Afghanistan revealed, ‘You couldn’t tell the difference between CIA officers, 
Special Forces guys and contractors. They’re all three blended together, all 
under the command of the CIA’.171 According to another 2009 report, General 
Petraeus aggressively pushed the military deeper into CIA’s turf allowing 
Special Forces and private contractors to conduct covert intelligence missions 
in various countries of the Middle East and outside traditional war zones. As a 
result, it became impossible to differentiate between military and intelligence 
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actors. 172 Al-Awlaki’s death represents the most literal illustration of the 
convergence between the CIA and the military in targeted killings. According 
to the US officials: ‘the CIA was in control of all the aircraft, as well as the 
decision to fire, and the operation was so seamless that even hours later, it 
remained unclear whether a drone supplied by the CIA or the military fired the 
missile that ended the al-Qaeda leader’s life’.173 
The legal framework governing these operations is, therefore, also uncertain. 
In the words of Representative Rush Holt at a House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence hearing in October 2009: 
There is a lot that one could imagine that is going on in the world these 
days, whether it be remote killings or assassinations or intelligence 
collection that falls – or other kinds of actions – that fall somewhere 
between Title 10 and Title 50 depending on who does them and how 
they are done. It has become practice here on the Hill not to brief some 
of these activities….174  
In addition, given the secrecy involved, the official assertion that targets are 
based on evidence, cannot be trusted by the public because it does not need 
to be explained to anyone outside the US Administration. As Philip Alston, UN 
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, has 
noted, the drone campaign is “It’s a lot like the torture issue. You start by 
saying we’ll just go after the handful of 9/11 masterminds. But, once you’ve 
put the regimen for waterboarding and other techniques in place, you use it 
much more indiscriminately. It becomes standard operating procedure. It 
becomes all too easy. Planners start saying, ‘Let’s use drones in a broader 
context. Once you use targeting less stringently, it can become 
indiscriminate.’ 175 
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1.4.4 Secrecy prevents transparency and accountability 
The most significant problem stemming from the fusion of intelligence and 
military operators is its impact in terms of accountability. Already in 2003 
Colonel Kathryn Stone noted that: ‘When the CIA and SOF operate together 
on the battlefield the legal distinctions regarding operating authorities and 
procedures and accountability can become blurred’ 176 . The National 
Commission appointed to investigate the 9/11 attacks also addressed the 
problems stemming from overlapping responsibilities. The Commission 
recommended the CIA to keep its responsibility for clandestine and covert 
operations, including propaganda, renditions, and non-military disruption. But 
it insisted that ‘[l]ead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary 
operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defence 
Department.’177 Likewise US pro transparency voices, including former senior 
intelligence and military officials, condemned a ‘long-term killing program 
based on secret rationales’ and recommended that the Pentagon rather than 
the CIA should conduct drone strikes.178 
One viewpoint is that even if implemented this may not have a significant 
impact under current level of secrecy. According to Jack Goldsmith, a former 
Bush administration Justice Department official highlights the inherent 
problems of Department of Defence (DOD) since ‘moving lethal drone 
operations exclusively to DOD might bring benefits’ but they ‘are no less 
secretive than the CIA's, and congressional oversight of DOD ops is 
significantly weaker’.179Thus if drone deployment continues to be managed by 
JSOC based on its secretive operation, there may be no significant 
improvements in transparency and accountability. Unaccountable intelligence 
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agencies should not be conducting lethal operations.180 The responsibility of 
the DOD for paramilitary covert operations outside war zones would facilitate 
accountability. Whether some bodies may need to operate without full 
disclosure, they should still respect international law, inform about their policy 
and procedures, specify which group is being targeted and on what legal 
grounds as well as publish the rate and number of civilian casualties. 
Under the Trump administration the situation appears to have worsened 
because the US drone policy has become even less restrained, transparent 
and accountable. 181  The following section will analyse the continuation of 
exceptional policies in the Trump-years.   
1.4.5 The Trump administrations changes to the US drone policy 
The US airstrikes have increased drastically under the Trump administration. 
Reportedly, by January 2018, it has carried out 126 airstrikes in Yemen, 35 in 
Somalia182 and 6 drone strikes in Pakistan.183 The CIA operated drone strikes 
in Pakistan have increased from 3 in 2016 (under Obama administration) to 5 
in 2017. On 7 June 2018, the Stimson organisation presented a report 
showing their concern for more relaxed rules for targeted killing in undeclared 
warzones. According to this report, the Trump administration made three 
changes to drone policy184: 
1. Expanding the targets of armed strikes by eliminating the requirement 
that the person pose an ‘imminent threat’,  
2. Loosening the requirement of ‘near certainty’ that the target is present 
at the time of the strike to a ‘reasonable certainty’, and 
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3. Revising the process through which strike determinations are made by 
reducing senior policymaker involvement and oversight in such 
decisions and delegating more authority to operational commanders.  
By removing the ‘imminent threat’ requirement, President Trump has 
broadened the scope of drone strikes. Under the new rules, the US may be 
able to target even low-level militants who lack special skills or leadership 
roles even when they pose no threat to the US. The Trump administration has 
given decision-making power to drone operating commanders. They are 
allowed to make vital decision on targeted killing which involve they face 
fewer internal hurdles to launching specific strikes or raids. 185  The 
consequence of these changes is an escalating use of targeted airstrikes.186 
The Trump administration has preserved a loosened version of the existing 
requirement of ‘near certainty’ that no civilians are present before a lethal 
strike is allowed.187  
Another negative development is the expansion of areas of ‘active hostilities’, 
with the designation three more provinces in Yemen as areas falling within the 
category. A similar approach has affected operations in Somalia.188  
As explained above, the controversial secrecy surrounding the US drones 
warfare is not new but has taken a new dimension in recent years. For 
instance, the Trump government has not disclosed the changes introduced to 
procedures and safeguards laid down by the Obama administration and the 
involvement of the CIA’s in conducting targeted strikes- an information that 
former President Obama was forced to release by US courts.189 It is alarming 
that the Trump administration is further widening the use of armed drones 
outside areas of active hostilities. According to recent reports, the US has 
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started armed drone flights over Niger. Despite the US military officials 
admitting that ‘none of the groups pose a direct threat to the U.S. today, but 
there are concerns they could become one if left unchecked’.190 The United 
States Africa Command (AFRICOM) chief Gen. Thomas Waldhauser 
applauded the presence of armed drones in Niger and said, “we have beefed 
up a lot posture-wise”. 191  The presence of US armed drones in Niger 
broadens the scope of US war, it normalises the use of lethal force against 
low level militants who pose no imminent threat to the US and it may worsen 
the internal conflict in Niger because the impact of US drone strikes in Yemen, 
Somalia and Pakistan has been negative at national level.192   
Conclusion 
The extra-legal justifications for states of exception lost its support amongst 
most of the international community due to the horrors of the twentieth 
century. The threat of terrorism and US policies has created a global state of 
exception where preventive use of force, amalgamation of military and 
intelligence agencies and secret wars has become a new norm. It may not be 
wrong to say that since 9/11 the US counterterrorism policies have normalised 
lawlessness. Framing the fight against al-Qaeda as exceptional circumvents 
legality by defying any legal categorisation. This reinterpretation of 
international law has served as basis for the US to claim a right to use 
preventive force against states or individuals which they deem may pose a 
threat to the State. The Bush administration purported to ‘adapt the concept of 
imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries’.193 
The UK government’s drone strikes in Syria against ISIS militants who 
allegedly pose no imminent threat to the UK highlight that the US has created 
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a dangerous precedent that other major powers with a permanent seat and 
veto in the UN Security Council are willing to follow. The emergence of ever 
increasing, borderless and shadowy forms of war suggest that war and use of 
force have become standardised. This current form of covert wars fought in 
the name of ‘security’ resembles a global and permanent policing operation 
that is based on continuous surveillance and preventive strike operations 
across the globe. These actions undermine the principle of sovereignty of 
States targeted and blur the distinction between war and peace and playing a 
key role in the regularisation of State violence. Finally, the alterations in drone 
policy introduced by President Trump undermine further transparency and 
contribute to make the norm what is portrayed as exceptional rules. In the 
words of Hardt and Negri: 
If war is no longer an exceptional condition but the normal state of 
affairs…. we have entered a perpetual state of war….where war not be 
a threat….a destabilizing force, but rather, on the contrary, an active 
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Chapter 2: International law and the use of lethal force by states 
2. Introduction  
This chapter seeks to set out principles of the international legal frameworks 
relevant to the conflicts that emerged after the event of September 11 2001.  
After the September 11 attacks, the US has used force against states and 
non-state actors both in the context of the law of self-defence and relying on 
the legal frameworks governing armed conflict. The chapter will examine three 
distinct legal paradigms applicable to the use of lethal force by states namely: 
1) Right of self-defence as given in Art 51 (Jus ad bellum), 2) International 
humanitarian law also known as law of war or law of armed conflict (Jus in 
Bello) and 3) International human rights law. While an in-depth analysis of 
these three legal frameworks fall outside the scope of this study, this chapter 
focuses on how law has been applied or disregarded. It also explores how 
normative frameworks maybe developing as a result of state responses to the 
threat of terrorism.  
2.1 Use of force in International law 
After World War II one of the main aim of the UN Charter was to limit the use 
of force to avoid the horrors of war. The first purpose of UN Charter given in 
Art 1(1) is ‘to maintain international peace and security’. 195  The Charter 
sought to establish a general and comprehensive prohibition on the use of 
force and also to set up an organisation that was able to take collective action 
to deal with the threat to the peace or breaches of the peace.196 The founder 
states agreed to surrender their right to use force as a means of protecting 
their interest and legal rights. In return the UN would provide an effective 
collective guarantee of security for its when force was used against them or 
where there was a threat to peace. Indeed, the UN system could never fulfil 
its promise- a commitment to enforce peace through common action.197  
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196 ibid 
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The political climate characterising the Cold War resulted in a protracted 
debate over the need to relax of the prohibition of the use of force enshrined 
in the Article 2(4) of the Charter because the collective security scheme 
foreseen in it, had failed. More specifically, some scholars have considered 
that the prohibition of the use of force should be relaxed in the present day to 
respond to terrorism.198 
There are three key provisions in the UN Charter dealing with the use of force, 
including the prohibition contained in Art 2(4);199 the right of individual and 
collective self-defence foreseen in Article 51;200 and Article 42 allowing the 
Security Council to authorise the use of force when the Council considers that 
there has been a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of 
aggression.201 This section will only deal with the prohibition of the use of 
force provided for in Article 2(4).  
2.2 Prohibition of the use of force in International law 
The UN Charter is based on the abolition of war as a means of national 
politics to resolve international disputes. Article 2(4) obliges all member states 
to ‘refrain…. from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
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the purposes of the United Nations’. It has been established that ‘the 
prohibition of the use of force enjoys the status of a jus cogens rule’.202This 
means that no state can contract out of the obligation. It is very difficult to 
change Jus cogen rules and it can only be modified ‘by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same characteristic’.203In practice, the 
termination or amendment of jus cogen rule would require ‘near-universal 
state practice and strong evidence indicating that the value it protects is no 
longer considered a fundamental one by international community’.204  
The interpretation of the notion of ‘force’ used in Art 2(4) is critical. It is 
generally agreed among scholars that the meaning of ‘force’ as used in Art 
2(4) refers only to physical or armed force excluding economic or political 
pressure.205The International Court of Justice (ICJ) considered the meaning of 
the use of force in the Nicaragua case. The Court referred to an armed attack 
as the gravest form of the use of force within Art 2(4).206 Although article 2(4) 
itself contains no qualification of the term ‘force’ but the wording of Art 41207 
and 46208 suggest that force means military force. In 1970 the UN General 
Assembly unanimously passed a Resolution ‘Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations’ which stated that Art 2(4) 
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dealt solely with military force.209The prohibition of economic, political or other 
types of coercion was covered in the 1970 Declaration under the heading of 
non-intervention,210and not of the prohibition of the threat or use of force 
which suggest that use of force only refers to measures of a military nature.  
 
Art 2(4) covers the use of force by the regular forces of states against other 
States. However, the question arises whether prohibition extends to the state 
support for irregular or non-state groups who carry out armed attacks in the 
territory of another state. It remains disputed whether the prohibition only 
covers the inter-state use of force or if it also extends to indirect use of force 
involving non-state actors against a state. The ICJ has asserted that indirect 
use of force may amount to a breach of Art 2(4). In the Nicaragua case, the 
Court stated that acts which breach the principle of non-intervention and 
which ‘directly or indirectly involve the use of force, constitute a breach of the 
principle of non-use of force in international relations.’211 This was reaffirmed 
in the Armed Activities case between the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Uganda. The Court confirmed its position and stressed that the principle of 
‘non-intervention prohibits a state to intervene, directly or indirectly, with or 
without armed force, in support of an internal opposition in another state’.212  
The section of UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV) dealing with the prohibition of 
the use of force obliged states to ‘refrain from organizing or encouraging the 
organization of irregular forces or armed bands.’213 In the Nicaragua case the 
ICJ appears to have treated General Assembly Resolution 2625 as one 
generating customary international law. The Court noted that the effect of 
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consent to the text of such resolutions must be understood ‘as an acceptance 
of validity of the rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by 
themselves’.214 Still, the nature of conflicts has changed since the drafting of 
the UN Charter and there has been an increase in the state support and 
state’s military conflicts with non-state actors.215 The central issue is state’s 
responsibility for the actions of non-state actors. What level of support by a 
state to a non-state group would amount to a use of force by the state and 
thus a breach of Article 2(4). In the Nicaragua case, the Court distinguished 
between different forms of state support to non-state groups because the 
levels of support affect the legal classification of the activity. In this case, the 
Court distinguished between ‘the most grave forms of the use of force’ (those 
constituting an armed attack) and other ‘less grave forms’.216 The Court held 
that ‘the supply of arms, funds and other support … cannot be equated with 
armed attack…. such activities…. constitute a breach of the principle of the 
non-use of force and an intervention in the internal affairs of a state’ therefore 
force cannot be used in self-defence with regard to these activities. 217 
However, if an armed group is operating on behalf of a state, for instance 
where it has organised and sent them, a victim state will have the right to use 
force in self-defence depending on the gravity of the force used.218 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter does not just prohibit the threat of the use of 
force but also to ‘use force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state’. This phrase leaves unanswered the possibility of 
to use force which is not against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of state This question is significant because it impinges on the 
scope of the prohibition of the use of force. It is clear that if a state uses 
armed force resulting in the occupation of that state or uses force that is 
aimed at the regime change, these actions will amount to breaches of the 
territorial integrity or political independence of the state. However, there is no 
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such clarity for uses of armed forces not seeking such aims or involving such 
effect. For instance, if it is just airstrikes by planes or missiles against another 
state that do not have the effect of the occupation or changing the 
government will that still fall under Art 2(4)?  
The broad interpretation of the term ‘territorial integrity’ means that every 
territorial incursion is a violation of territorial integrity. This interpretation of 
‘territorial integrity’ turns Art 2(4) into a general prohibition.219 Whilst under a 
narrow interpretation of the term ‘territorial integrity’, a state may only violate 
Art 2(4) if it occupies another states territory.220 A rigid interpretation of such 
terminology is problematic because it would generally allow the state to use 
force against another state221and will also render the phrase which is included 
in Art 2(4) ‘or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN’ 
which are expressly provided by the Art 1(1) of the Charter meaningless.222 
Randelzhofer has supported the broad interpretation of the term ‘territorial 
integrity’ and stressed that the major reason behind the specific reference to 
territorial integrity and political independence made in Art 2(4) was to reinforce 
the general prohibition of the use of force.223This issue was further clarified by 
1965 Declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs 
of states224, the 1970 Declaration on principles of International Law225 and in 
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the ruling of the Corfu Channel Case.226The Corfu ruling was reaffirmed in the 
Nicaragua case, where the Court interpreted Art 2(4) in a non-restrictive 
way227and endeavoured to make it clear that Art 2(4) ought to be read in a 
non-restrictive way because the provision was drafted to provide guarantees 
to small and weak states.228      
Some scholars have pressed for a narrow interpretation of Art 2(4) during the 
Cold War because that would permit unilateral military intervention by one 
state in another to prevent gross human rights abuses. They have argued that 
such an intervention would not be aimed at destroying either the ‘territorial 
integrity’ or the ‘political independence’ of the targeted state. Moreover it 
would be entirely consistent with one of the UN’s purposes, which is to 
promote universal human rights.229Others reject this proposition and argue 
that the wordings of Art 2(4) are very precise and allow no room for any such 
misinterpretation, nor does it allow any state to act as a ‘world policeman’ by 
taking unilateral action. 230  Any use of force which falling outside the 
exceptions expressly laid out by the Charter231even for humanitarian reasons 
is in direct violation of the general prohibition of the recourse to force 
contained in Art 2(4).232 
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To summarise, the phrase ‘use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state’ in Art 2(4) does not limit the prohibition on 
the use of force but rather signifies the totality of legal rights of a state 
therefore a prohibition on the use of force is a comprehensive prohibition and 
any use of force will be prima facie breach of that prohibition. If the use of 
force was to be deemed to be lawful than it would need to be supported by an 
exception, for example the right of self-defence as given in Article 51 or 
authorisation of a use of force by the Security Council as established in 
practice due to the failure to implement in full the collective security system 
foreseen in the Charter. The following section will discuss right to use force in 
self-defence.   
2.3 The right of self-defence in International law 
Article 51 of the UN Charter sets out the central elements of the right of self-
defence. First of all it is an ‘inherent right’ of states and Article 51 is merely 
recognising that such right already exists; however, the UN membership 
involves additional conditions. The term ‘inherent’ refers to customary 
international law.233 In assessing the states right to use force in self-defence 
one must look not only at the Art 51 but also at the customary international 
law.234The dual legal basis of the right of self-defence was recognised by the 
ICJ in the Nicaragua case, where the Court considered that Article 51 does 
not ‘subsume and supervene customary international law….it rather 
demonstrates that customary international law continues to exist alongside 
treaty law’.235 Secondly the right to use force in self-defence is available only 
in response to an ‘armed attack’. This means that political or economic 
pressure and less grave use of force does not give rise to the right to use 
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military force in self-defence. 236  Thirdly, self-defence can be individual or 
collective so there is recognition of mutual defence agreements. Finally it 
applies only until ‘the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security’.237 
States must fulfil certain conditions to use force in self-defence lawfully. The 
ICJ has held in various cases that according to customary international law, 
the use of force in self-defence is only permissible where the measures are 
proportional to the armed attack they are trying to repel and its necessary to 
respond to it.238The requirements of necessity and proportionality are found in 
the Caroline case.239 
2.3.1 Necessity 
The condition of necessity requires justifying both the immediacy of the attack, 
the use of self-defense is trying to deter and as the use of force a last resort. 
Immediacy does not mean that a period of time cannot elapse between the 
original armed attack and the use of force in self-defence. There are few 
examples of this in state practice. The UK forces responded to the attacks of 
the Falkland Islands in the 1980s weeks after they started.240 When the Iraqi 
government invaded Kuwait in 1991 the coalition forces waited four months to 
react on self-defence.241 Likewise, the US invaded Afghanistan four weeks 
after the attack of 9/11.242  Thus, state practice reveals that some margin 
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exists in the timing to respond to an armed attack. However, a state loses its 
right to use force in self-defence where the armed attack is over, damage has 
been done and there is no future immediate threat occurring. A forceful 
response long after an attack is considered retaliatory and therefore 
unlawful.243 Conversely, a state may use force in self-defence in the case of 
continuing threat or series of armed attacks. 244 In short, the principle of 
necessity requires that an armed attack must be in progress or about to be 
launched in the near future and there are no alternatives available in order to 
stop or repel the attack. 
2.3.2 Proportionality  
Proportionality requires that once force is deemed to be necessary the 
amount of force used must not exceed what is sufficient to repel the threat of 
attack. The principle of proportionality does not require the victim state to use 
equal amount of force in self-defence. In the words of Judge Higgins, ‘the 
concept of proportionality in self-defence limits a response to what is needed 
to reply to an attack’ and does not involve ‘a requirement of symmetry 
between the mode of the initial attack and the mode of response’.245 Indeed, it 
is not always possible for a victim state to use equal amount of force in self-
defence. This is the case of illegally occupied territories where the attacking 
State has a position of military advantage associated to the control over a 
territory.  
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2.3.3 Existence of an armed attack 
Art 51 makes the right of self-defence dependent on the existence of an 
armed attack. It is argued that self-defence is not available to be used against 
all unlawful use of force but is only available if an armed attack has occurred. 
The conceptual contours of the term ‘armed attack; cannot be found in the UN 
Charter but have been provided by the ICJ in the Nicaragua.246 According to 
the ICJ, the attack will only be considered an armed attack triggering the right 
of self-defence, if the scale of violence is above the ‘mere frontier 
incidents’,247 although a series of small-scale attacks taken cumulatively may 
also amount to an armed attack. 248 In the Oil Platforms case, the ICJ 
reaffirmed this position. 249 The narrowness of the Nicaragua criteria for 
determining whether a state sponsor of terrorist acts would be considered as 
the author of an armed attack sustained strenuous criticism from one of the 
dissenting Judge. Judge Jennings argued that the provision of arms could be 
‘very important in what might be thought to amount to armed attack, where it 
is coupled with other kinds of involvement’. 250  He raised the important 
question that what a state can do when there is unlawful use of force not 
amounting to an armed attack. He stressed that the Court’s view created a 
‘large area where both a forcible response to force is forbidden, and yet the 
United Nations employment of force, which was intended to fill that gap was 
absent’.251 A similar position was advanced by Judge Schwebel who argued 
that the provision of ‘arms, munitions, other supplies, training, command and 
control facilities, sanctuary and lesser forms of assistance’ in fact represented 
‘substantial involvement’, and should be sufficient to trigger the right of self-
defence.252 While requiring passing a test of intensity, the Court has failed to 
provide clear criteria on the level of intensity necessary to define an armed 
attack and uncertainty remains in this area.    
                                                        
246 Nicaragua v USA, International Court of Justice, June 27, 1986, Para 103-104 
247 Ibid Para 93 
248 Ibid Para 119-120 
249 Oil Platforms case Supra note 291, Para 64 
250 Nicaragua v USA, International Court of Justice, June 27, 1986, p. 543-545; Also see Gray Supra 
note 275, 186-187 
251 Ibid Nicaragua  
252 Ibid, Para 162-171  
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2.3.4 Collective self-defence  
In this globalised world it is important to note that self-defence can also occur 
when multiple states are operating together. Collective self-defence consists 
of joint action taken by several states in response to an actual armed attack 
against any one state. The legal framework governing the legality of collective 
self-defence does not defer from those established for individual self-defence. 
An example of acting together whether or not lawfully could be invasion or 
occupation of Iraq in 2003 in which the US, UK, Australia, Spain and Poland 
joined to oust Saddam Hussein.253 In case of collective self-defence a third 
state cannot act on behalf of a victim state until the victim state asserts that it 
was attacked and formally requests the third state to help.254 
2.4 Use of force in self-defence and war against terrorism 
A grey area regarding the use self-defence is the applicability of the rules 
governing inter-states disputes when a non-state actor who is based in the 
territory of another state conducts an armed attack. This is an area where 
practice has grown exponentially since the Charter was drafted and where 
perhaps the law might be changing through practice and opinion juris. In 
October 2001, the US used force against the Taliban who were providing, at 
most, only logistical support to Al-Qaeda. 255 The Nicaragua test of ‘effective 
control’ formulated by the ICJ does not fit easily since there is no evidence of 
such control of the operations of Al-Qaeda by the Taliban.256 However, a 
growing state practice suggests the emergence of a right to use armed force 
against a state where terrorists are based, even when such state is not 
imputable for the actions of the terrorist group. Examples of this state practice 
are numerous and can be found in Israeli invasion of Lebanon,257 Turkey’s 
                                                        
253  Dominic McGoldrick, From '9-11' to the 'Iraq War 2003': International Law in an Age of 
Complexity, (Hart Publishing 2004) 
254 Nicaragua v USA, International Court of Justice, June 27, 1986, Paras 233-234   
255 Paolo Tripodi and Jessica Wolfendale, New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the 
Contemporary World (Ashgate 2012) 51 
256 There was never any suggestion that the 9/11 attacks were the actual work of the Taliban regime 
in Afghanistan See Rachel E. Utley, 9/11 Ten Years After: Perspectives and Problems, (Routledge 2016) 
184 
257 Yaroslav Shiryaev, ‘The Right of Armed Self-Defence in International Law and Self-Defence 
Arguments Used in the Second Lebanon War’ (2008) ACTA SOCIETATIS MARTENSIS, 80-97 (In 2006 
Israel responded to actions by Hezbollah based in Southern Lebanon by invading Lebanon and using 
force in self-defence. This example was complicated by the fact that although Hezbollah was 
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invasion of Northern Iraq, 258  the use of armed force by Russia against 
Georgia,259 Ethiopia against Somalia,260 Uganda against Congo,261 or the US 
drone strikes in Pakistan Yemen and Somalia262. In 2014 and 2015 states 
have invoked the right of self-defence to use force against the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
in Syria and Iraq.263 All invocations of the right to use force in self-defence 
against terrorist attacks since 9/11 are based on a right to use defensive force 
                                                                                                                                                              
controlling a substantial portion of Southern Lebanon but was not acting on behalf of Lebanese 
Government. This raises the question that was state of the Lebanon responsible for the actions of 
Hezbollah nevertheless?)  
258Sebnem Arsu & Stephen Farrell, ‘Turkey Says Its Raids in Iraq Killed 150 Rebels’ New York Times (26 
Dec 2007) < http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/26/world /europe/26turkey.htm > (Turkey’s 2008 
ground incursion into Iraq to incapacitate Kurdish rebels is another example. Iraq’s Kurdish region had 
considerable autonomy from the central government but was not in any meaningful sense 
ungoverned. Moreover, although some Iraqi officials were probably sympathetic to the rebels, the 
evidence that these officials actively harboured or supported the rebels is weak. Iraqi officials in the 
Kurdish region had dissociated themselves from the rebels, and the central Iraqi government was 
working with Turkey to address the violence. The government was, however, unable to prevent the 
violence. The incident also raised question can you invade a sovereign states territory from where 
non-state actors attack?) 
259 Theresa Reinold, ‘State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defence Post-9/11’ 
(2011) American Journal Of International Law 244, 255-57 (reviewing incident) Russia’s 2002 and 
2007 incursions against Chechen rebels in Georgia. Although Georgia was actively taking measures to 
suppress the rebels’ violence, these measures were not yet effective.   
260 Getachew Metaferia, Ethiopia and the United States: History, Diplomacy, and Analysis (Algora 
publishing, 2009) 140 (Ethiopia invaded Somalia in 2006 to fight religious extremist in self-defence. 
This use of force was never condemned by the SC or the African Union, thereby suggesting that the 
rules on forcible responses to terrorism have developed to some extent outside the UN framework) 
See Vincent-Joël Proulx, Institutionalizing State Responsibility (Oxford University Press 2016) 316 
261 In March 2008 Columbia attacked members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia at a 
base located in Ecuador. Columbia claimed it had acted in self-defence because the non-state actors 
were using force against them from a third country) see Abraham D. Sofaer, The Best Defence?: 
Legitimacy & Preventive Force (Stanford University 2010) 52  
262  David Cortright, Rachel Fairhurst and Kristen Wall, Drones and the Future of Armed Conflict: 
Ethical, Legal, and Strategic Implications (University of Chicago Press 2015) 103; Robert Mandel, 
Coercing Compliance: State-Initiated Brute Force in Today's World (Stanford University Press 2015) 38 
(US argues that it targets non-state actors in these states because states are unable or unwilling to 
deal effectively with the threat) 
263 Security Council ‘Unequivocally’ Condemns ISIL Terrorist Attacks, Unanimously Adopting Text that 
Determines Extremist Group Poses ‘Unprecedented’ Threat, 20 Non 2015, SC/12132 < 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12132.doc.htm > accessed 21 May 2016; UK wrote a letter to SC 
to use force in collective self-defence of Iraq against ISIL in Syria Letter dated 7 September 2015 from 
the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the 
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2015/688 <  
 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_688.pdf > accessed 21 May 2016; Iraqi government wrote a letter to SC 
stating that they have requested US to help them in regaining their territory from ISIL See Letter 
dated 20 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council,22 Sep 2014,  S/2014/691, < 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_691.pdf > accessed 21 May 2016   
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directed against non-state actors. In each case, the victim state has argued 
that the territorial state is either complicit in the attacks or is unable or 
unwilling to thwart the terrorists in their territories. In all these cases the states 
have not claimed a right to use force directly against the territorial state and 
did not claim that these non-state actors were controlled by the state targeted.  
Such state of affairs contradicts the jurisprudence of the ICJ regarding the 
responsibility of states for the actions of non-state actors and the legality of 
the use of force.264 While it can be argued that state practice has resulted in a 
change of customary international law, this has not been reflected in the 
judgements of the International Court of Justice who has maintained its 
position in cases decided after September 11. It is Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Territory and its 
Judgment on the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo the ICJ has 
reiterated that force may only be used in self-defence against a state, if the 
territorial state is legally responsible for the acts of non-state groups.265  
These decisions are at odds with state practice. Another intergovernmental 
organisation, NATO, has invoked self-defence provision for the first time after 
9/11 attacks266 and the UNSC adopted Resolution 1368 and 1373 (2001) 
implicitly affirming the right of self-defence in this situation.267 It has been 
argued that the rules of attribution governing the responsibility of states are 
not the adequate lens for analysing self-defence because the right to self-
defence is an inherent right of a state and there is no need for a host state to 
be legally responsible for the actions of non-state actors. The right of self-
defence serves the purpose of repelling an attack with independence of 
another state’s responsibility for a breach of international law. As long as the 
                                                        
264 (Court said that financing, training, supplying and equipping and armed group would not trigger 
the right of self-defence but sending the groups or substantial involvement in their actions may do) 
Nicaragua Para. 195 
265 In Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Request 
for advisory opinion), 2004, para 138-141 The ICJ has said that a state may use force in self-defence 
against non-state actors in a host state if the actions of the non-state actor can be imputed to the 
host state; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Uganda) (2005), Paras 146-147 A majority of the ICJ judges agreed that if the attacks by armed bands 
were not attributable to a state there are no legal circumstances for the exercise of a right of self-
defence against the state.    
266 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Collective defence - Article 5, (2001) < 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm > accessed 18 May 2016 
267 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1368, S/RES/1368 (12 Sep 2001); United Nations 
Security Council, Resolution 1373, S/RES/1373, (18 Sep 2001) 
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territorial state is either unable or unwilling to prevent non-state actors from 
using their territory against other states, these activities are threats 
comparable to any other armed attack that would raise the right to stop of 
repel it by all available means, including the use of armed force.268 
Other commentators disagree with this position and argue that Art 51 does 
not exist in a vacuum and must be read in conjunction with other principles of 
law, enshrined in the Charter and customary law, including the principle of 
territorial integrity, sovereignty and the prohibition of the use of force. 
Interpreting Article 51 to permit the use of force against non-state actors on 
the territory of another state, without the consent of that state, would 
undermine the notion of territorial integrity or state sovereignty.269 Arguably, 
the unwillingness and inability of a specific state to combat terrorism within its 
borders does not equate to complete freedom to use force in self-defence. 
The traditional criteria of necessity and proportionality apply in situations 
where a territorial state is not legally responsible for the acts of non-state 
actor. It is important then to question- is it necessary to use force to prevent 
future attacks? Are those attacks imminent? What other peaceful actions if 
available were taken by the victim state before using force in self-defence?  
2.4.1 Law of self-defence and pre-emptive strikes 
As discussed above, some states have claimed that the post-9/11 scenario 
has changed the International law. For instance, the 2002 US National 
Security Strategy suggests that a right of self-defence cannot be confined to 
imminent armed attacks. It had to be capable of being used pre-emptively 
                                                        
268 Dapo Akande, ‘The Right of Self-Defence in International Law’ < 
http://legal.un.org/avl/ls/Akande_PS_video_2.html > accessed 18 May 2016; However others argue 
that “It is certainly possible to argue that the customary rules governing the use of force in self-
defence have evolved to adopt the “unwilling or unable” standard.  But that is a highly contentious 
and extraordinarily difficult question” See Kevin Jon Heller, ‘The “Unwilling or Unable” Standard for 
Self-defence’, (Opinio Juris,17 Sep 2011) < http://opiniojuris.org/2011/09/17/the-unwilling-or-unable-
standard-for-self-defense-against-non-state-actors/ > accessed18 May 2016; Ruys concluded in his 
study of Article 51 that examines state practice and opinio juris concerning the use of armed force 
against non-state actors suggested that law is developing in this field and concluded that ”we believe 
that customary law is evolving towards a different application of Article 51 UN Charter in relation to 
defensive action against a State – viz. coercive action that directly targets the State’s military or 
infrastructure – and defensive action within a State – viz. recourse to force against a non-State group 
present within the territory of another State.” See Tom Ruys, 'Armed Attack' and Article 51 of the UN 
Charter Evolutions in Customary Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2010) 
269 Mr. Dire Tladi, ‘Use of Force in Self-Defence Against Non-State actors in International Law’ < 
http://legal.un.org/avl/ls/Tladi_PS_video_2.html  > accessed at 18 May 2016 
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against the threat that has not yet become imminent.270 Scholars who defend 
that the standard outlined by Caroline Case applies do not share this view.271 
However, states were not facing the threat of international terrorism in 1837. 
Arguably,  
The destructive power of today’s weapons....make it possible to launch 
attacks....with little or no warning....eliminating altogether the time 
between when it is known that an attack is imminent....and when the 
attack occurs.....terrorists operating in secret may carry out attacks 
causing great destruction without warning, without them ever having 
become visibly imminent.272  
The sign of the coming terrorist attack will often be the attack itself. Thus 
imminent as defined in traditional International law is a limiting factor because 
terrorist can launch attacks with greater speed and surprise the states. For 
this reason it is argued that a new and more nuanced definition of pre-emptive 
force is necessary.273  
Whether a new conceptual framework is needed or not, the use of force in 
self-defence to respond to threats that might occur at some point in the future 
have no basis in the present International law. The preventive theory has 
failed to attract ample support internationally, whereas the notion that pre-
emptive force could be employed in self-defence against imminent armed 
                                                        
270 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The white House Washington, (Sep 
2002) 15 (“For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before 
they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of 
attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of pre-emption on the 
existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces 
preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives 
of today’s adversaries.”) 
271 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, Oppenheim's International Law (Longman 1992) 420 (“The basic 
elements of the right of self-defence were aptly set out in connection with the Caroline incident in 
1837…”); Clive Parry and John Grant, Parry and Grant encyclopaedic dictionary of International law, 
(Oceana publications 1986) 361 (Under customary international law, it is generally understood that 
the correspondence between the US and UK…arising out of the Caroline incident…expresses the rules 
on self-defence……”)   
272 Karl P. Mueller, Jasen J. Castillo, Forrest E. Morgan, Negeen Pegahi and Brian Rosen, Striking First: 
Pre-emptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy (RAND Corporation 2006) 57 
273 W. Taft/T. Buchwald, ‘Pre-emption, Iraq and International law’ (2003) Journal of International law, 
563; A.D. Soafer, ‘On the necessity of pre-emption’ (2003) European Journal of International law, 225; 
R Wedgwood, ‘The fall of Saddam Hussein, Security Council mandates and pre-emptive self-defence’ 
(2003) American Journal of International law, 582-585   
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attack has received robust sustenance. 274  The current position on the 
(un)lawfulness of preventive strikes can be summed up by the 2004 UN 
report, ‘A more secured world our shared responsibility’ reiterating the 
principles of imminence and proportionality underpinning lawful uses of force 
in self-defence. 275  Non-imminent threats must be assessed by the UN 
Security Council, which can authorise the use of force, but are not the legal 
basis of unilateral actions involving armed force. 276  If the legal limits are 
vague, not fixed and interpretation is left to the state, it would render 
meaninglessness the Charter's central purpose, which prohibits states' ‘threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state’ under Article 2(4).277  
So far we have discussed the rules and laws that govern the lawfulness of the 
resort to armed conflict (jus ad bellum). The next section will deal with the law 
applicable to the conduct of hostilities that applies once a party has entered 
into armed conflict (jus in bello). Once hostilities have begun, the rules of 
international humanitarian law equally apply to both sides in the conflict, 
                                                        
274 Lord Goldsmith gave secret advice to UK Government on the legality of use of force against Iraq 
which was leaked in 2005. He stated that use of force could be justified if state faces to some degree 
an imminent threat. On the issue of preventive self-defence, he notes simply that, “if this means 
more than a right to respond proportionately to an imminent attack (and I understand that the 
doctrine is intended to carry that connotation) this is not a doctrine which in my opinion exists or is 
recognised in International law” See Prime Minister Iraq Resolution 1441, Para 2-3 < 
http://downingstreetmemo.com/docs/goldsmithlegal.pdf > accessed 18 May 2016; Philip Alston and 
Euan Macdonald,  Human Rights, Intervention, and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press 2008) 6-
12; Theresa Reinold, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: The Power of Norms and the 
Norms of the Powerful (Routledge 2012) 149 (The author rejects the legality of preventive war 
categorically and argues that “the debate over the legitimacy of preventive war has not only 
reaffirmed the primary rules of international law on the use of force…but has bolstered the traditional 
approach to custom formation which draws a clear distinction between what law is and what the law 
ought to be”); Rainer Hofmann, ‘International law and the use of military force against Iraq’ (2002) 
German Yearbook of International law, 32-33 ; Michael Bothe, ‘Terrorism and the legality of pre-
emptive force’ (2003) European Journal of International law, 236-239; On domestic level even 
American public rejects the notion of using force in self-defence against non-imminent threat See 
Fraser Cameron, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Global Hegemon Or Reluctant Sheriff? 
(Routledge 2005) 111 
275 UN, A more secure world: Our shared responsibility Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, (2004) Para 188 
276 Ibid para 189-191 (The issue of imminence becomes very serious if seen in the context of individual 
right of self-defence. However it becomes less problematic when seen in the context of collective self-
defence authorised by SC under Art 39 of Charter. The measure in Art 39 can be used pre-emptively 
and there is no requirement to show that the threat is imminent)   
277 Thomas M. Franck, ‘Collective Security and UN Reform: Between the Necessary and the Possible’ 
(2006) Chicago Journal of International Law, 607  
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regardless of who is the aggressor. 278  Because the main purpose of the 
humanitarian law is to protect individuals rather than states, and those 
individuals are in general not responsible for the criminal actions of their 
state.279     
2.5 International Humanitarian law  
International humanitarian law (IHL) is also referred as law of armed conflict 
or jus in bello and applies in times of armed conflicts. IHL distinguishes 
between two types of armed conflicts; 1) armed conflicts of an international 
character, and 2) armed conflicts not of an international character. 
International armed conflict (IAC) occurs between two or more states and 
non-international armed conflict (NIAC) occurs between states and organised 
non-state armed groups or between such groups.   
2.5.1 International armed conflict 
In IAC all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions280 and Additional Protocol 
I281(only for states that have ratified it) apply. A declaration of war is not 
required in the case of IAC. The threshold for an IAC is extremely low.282 An 
                                                        
278 At the diplomatic conference which adopted the 1977 Additional Protocols, Vietnam argued that 
states which committed acts of aggression should not be allowed to benefit from the provisions of 
humanitarian law see Official records of the diplomatic conference on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian law applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-1977), 
Volume IV, P. 177-178, <  https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC-records_Vol-4.pdf > 
accessed 3 June 2016 ; Vietnams proposal was roundly rejected and the preamble to Additional 
Protocol I was instead adopted by consensus which reads that ‘the provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and of this Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances to all 
persons who are protected by those instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the 
nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the 
conflict’ 
279 War crimes trials held at the end of WWII make clear that the provisions of the earlier Hague 
Conventions on the laws of wars apply equally to all parties in a conflict See US v List (1948) 15 Annual 
Digest 632; Singapore oil stock case (1956) 23 ILR 810   
280 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. Geneva, 12 August 1949; Convention (III) 
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949; Convention (IV) relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949;    
281 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. Additional Protocol applies 
because Article 1.3 notes “This Protocol….supplements the Geneva Conventions” and “apply in the 
situations referred to in Art 2 common to those Conventions”       
282 In the words of the Geneva Conventions, the law of international armed conflict applies to ‘all 
cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the 
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IAC occurs where one state’s armed forces intervene in another state.283 The 
duration of conflict 284  and number of civilian casualties is irrelevant. 285 
However minor incidents that last for short period of time with fewer or no 
casualties were not classified as armed conflicts.286 For instance in 1981, the 
US fighter aircrafts were engaged in a fire fight with Libyan aircraft above the 
Gulf of Sidra. Although the event involved the use of force but because of its 
low intensity scholars classified this case as an incident, not an armed 
conflict.287 Obviously, the armed attack will only materialise if the victim state 
responds in kind. For instance the UK has recently concluded that the 
allegedly Russian involvement in the poisoning of Mr Sergei Skripal and his 
daughter in March 2018 ‘amounts to an unlawful use of force by the Russian 
state against the United Kingdom’ 288 . However, an IAC would require a 
response in self-by using armed force by the UK. 
2.5.2 Non-international armed conflict 
In a NIAC common Article 3, Additional Protocol II and Article 8(2e) of the ICC 
Statute apply. Common Art 3 does not provide definitions; it simply refers to 
‘the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties…’289 The difficulty historically in 
turning to Article 3 is that there is no definitive guidance to what is meant by 
                                                                                                                                                              
High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognised by one of them’ see Common 
Article 2 Geneva Conventions of 1949 
283 ICRC Commentary explains that ‘any difference arising between two states and leading to the 
intervention of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict’ see J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary to 
the First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and the Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field (ICRC, 1952), 32; In Tadic ICTY held that an international armed conflict 
exists wherever there is ‘resort to armed forces between states’ see Cf. Prosecutor v Tadic, Decision 
on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber (2 Oct 
1995), p. 70  
284 Abella v Argentina, supra n 4 at paras. 149-55 (Commission held that an armed conflict had indeed 
occurred despite the fact that fighting lasted only thirty hours because of the the direct involvement 
of governmental armed forces, and the nature and level of the violence); Pictet ibid  32  
285 J. Pictet, ‘Commentary to the Third Geneva Convention, Relative to the treatment of prisoner of 
war’ (ICRC 1960) 23 < http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/GC_1949-III.pdf > accessed 3 June 
2016   
286 M E O’Connell, ‘Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors Through a Global War on Terror’ (2004) 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 435, 445-46  
287 Steven R. Ratner, ‘The Gulf of Sidra Incident of 1981: The Lawfulness of Peacetime Aerial 
Engagements, in International Incidents’, (1985) 10 Yale J. Int'l L. 59, 75-77 
288 BBC News, ‘Russian spy: Highly likely Moscow behind attack, says Theresa May’ (13 March 2018) < 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-43377856 > 
289 Article 3, Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949  
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the phrase ‘conflict not of an international character’. The fact that common 
Article 3 applies to all cases of armed conflict not of an ‘international 
character’ suggest its applicability could be virtually limitless. This begs the 
question in what circumstances organised armed violence constitutes an 
armed conflict? And what is the difference between internal armed conflict or 
internal violence? This answer can be found in Additional Protocol II to the 
Geneva Convention which supplements the common Article 3290and expressly 
excludes ‘situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence other acts of similar nature, as not 
being armed conflicts’.291 Situations of internal violence are dealt with the 
framework of human rights law. The time, space and intensity of the hostility 
are helpful in deciding whether a specific situation amounts to NIAC. 292 
Protracted violence293that extends to a significant part of the territory of a 
state would affect large sectors of the population and will be categorised as a 
NIAC. Intensity is also crucial because it distinguishes between internal 
violence and internal armed conflict. Low intensity armed conflicts can fall 
within the definition of common Article 3; a low level violence that pose no 
threat to government or civilian population cannot be classified as internal 
armed conflict.294  
2.5.3 Additional Protocol II and non-international armed conflict 
A much higher threshold of application was introduced in Additional Protocol 
II. Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II only applies to armed conflicts between 
the armed forces of a high contracting party and ‘dissident armed forces or 
other organised armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise 
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained 
and concerted military operations’.295 In addition Art 1(2) provides that ‘this 
                                                        
290 Art 1(1) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977 
291 Art 1(2) ibid 
292 Laura Perna, The Formation of the Treaty Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2006) 57 
293 In Tadic case ICTY confirmed that internal armed conflict involves ‘protracted armed violence’ See 
Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, Para 70    
294 ibid 
295 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977  
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Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, 
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar 
nature, as not being armed conflicts’. Unlike common Article 3, Additional 
Protocol II is quite limited in its application. Additional Protocol applies only to 
conflicts between state and a rebel group, Common Article 3 is broad enough 
to cover a conflict between different rebel groups as well. The Additional 
Protocol requires a higher degree of organisation of armed groups whilst 
common Article 3 only requires a minimal degree of organisation.296 Another 
requirement for the applicability of the Protocol is that the armed group must 
exercise control over a sizeable part of territory. 297  The Akayesu Trial 
Judgement noted that the armed group ‘must be able to dominate a sufficient 
part of the territory so as to maintain sustained and concerted military 
operations and to apply Additional Protocol II’.298       
The effective control over territory attracted mixed reactions from states. 
Some states, such as Indonesia, took the view that the armed forces should: 
‘exercise effective and continuous control over substantial…part of its territory 
for such a prolonged period as to enable them to carry out sustained and 
concerted military operations of a high intensity and to implement this 
Protocol’.299  However other states such as Syria and Kenya rejected the 
requirement of territorial control and argued that ‘it opened the door to 
conflicting interpretations which would make it impossible to implement’ the 
Protocol.300 For Egypt the requirement of territorial control ‘was too restrictive 
in view of the nature of modern, and particular guerrilla, warfare….urban 
guerrilla armed conflict would not fulfil the requirement of territorial 
control….would then exclude from the ambit of Protocol II’. 301 The UK 
government argued that the Protocol is limited in scope and can only be 
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applied to conflicts that were of a ‘significant intensity’. 302 The opinions 
regarding the threshold of Protocol are so different that ‘it is impossible to 
trace any common understanding’.303The result of the limitations discussed 
above may indicate ‘Additional Protocol II is basically a non-operational 
treaty’.304No wonder various commentators view application of Common Art 3 
favourably in the case of NIAC in lieu of Protocol II. For instance the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda noted:  
The limited categories of armed conflicts to which Additional Protocol II 
may be said to apply and doubts as the extent to which it is now part of 
customary international law have deterred the prosecution….from 
entering the realm of Additional Protocol II with much enthusiasm, 
preferring instead to rely on Common Article 3305 
Similarly, George Aldrich, who was the head of the US Delegation to the 
Protocol negotiations stated:  
Protocol II…affords very limited protections and has escape clauses 
designed to make its applicability easily deniable. In the end the only 
useful result of Protocol II may be to make it somewhat more likely that 
[common] Art 3…may be found applicable in lieu of Protocol II306     
The crucial point is that the criteria contained in Protocol provide little help in 
defining what constitutes NIAC. Moreover it can be argued that the high bar of 
application established by the Protocol has provided further excuse for 
governments to deny the existence NIAC within their borders.307 
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2.5.4 The 1995 Tadic Jurisdiction decision and non-international armed 
conflict 
A decision by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) in the case of Tadic has significantly influenced the development of the 
law of armed conflict.308The ICTY established that an ‘armed conflict exists 
whenever there is a resort to armed force between states or protracted armed 
violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or 
between such groups within a state.’309 The Tribunal thus defined NIAC as 
‘protracted’ armed violence that occurs between a state and organised armed 
group or between two or more armed groups within a state. The term 
protracted refers more to the intensity of the armed violence than to its 
duration; it does not require sustained military operations that are conducted 
continuously.310 
 
The Tadic Trial Chamber further explained the definition of NIAC in the 
following words: 
The test applied by the Appeals Chamber to the existence of an armed 
conflict for the purposes of the rules contained in common Article 3 
focuses on two aspects of a conflict; the intensity of the conflict and the 
organisation of the parties to the conflict. In an armed conflict of an 
internal or mixed character, these closely related criteria are used 
solely for the purpose, as a minimum, of distinguishing an armed 
conflict from banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or 
terrorist activities, which are not subject to international humanitarian 
law.311 
The two aspects of NIAC put forward by the Tadic Trial Chamber -the 
‘intensity’ of the conflict and the degree of ‘organisation of the parties’ involved 
in the conflict- arguably now serve as a basis for the recognition of ‘de facto’ 
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NIAC, and thus for the application of Common Article 3 to such conflicts. 
Support for this view can be found in case law. The International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda employed this approach to determine the existence of 
NIAC when it held that ‘it is necessary to evaluate both the ‘intensity’ and 
‘organisation of the parties’ to the conflict’.312 
Further endorsement of the Tadic criteria is reflected in the adaptation of the 
‘Tadic formula’ in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The 
Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute states that the Statute applies ‘to armed 
conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted 
armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups 
or between such groups’.313  
However, both the Statute and case law have failed to categorically explain 
the level of intensity and organisation required in an armed conflict. The 
requirement that the violence must be of a certain level of intensity can be 
interpreted in a number of ways. The existing jurisprudence has highlighted 
the relevant factors in assessing the required level of intensity such the level 
of collateral damage, duration of hostilities314, involvement of the UNSC,315 
geographic spread of the violence316, or the displacement of the population.317 
The violence of higher magnitude although of brief duration may be regarded 
as NIAC.318 In the absence of the exact meaning of the terms ‘intensity’ of a 
conflict and ‘organisation of the parties’ to a conflict, future state practice will 
sanction the validity of this approach.319 
2.5.5 Transnational non-international armed conflict 
In addition to the IAC or NIAC, conflicts can also be ‘transnational’, that is, 
between a state and a non-state group (or between non-state groups) that 
take place on the territory of more than one state. This category is not codified 
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under international law and, arguably, IHL does not apply.320 Some scholars 
agree that the US could be involved in NIAC with Al-Qaeda but reject the 
notion of global armed conflict.321  
Transnational armed conflicts do not fit the category of IAC, because they 
don’t take place between states, or the ‘high contracting parties’ - the 
prerequisite for the application of the Geneva Conventions.322 Nor do these 
conflicts fall within the traditional understanding of NIAC. 323 The Bush 
administration reasoned that common Article 3 is geographically bound and 
only applies within the territory of a state, and because the hostilities with Al 
Qaeda are boundary-less they could not be categorised as NIAC. The 
position that the conflict with Al Qaeda fell outside the scope of the Geneva 
Conventions was unfounded because Geneva Conventions cover all armed 
conflicts324 and was also rejected by the US Supreme Court in Hamdan.325 
Many scholars did not accept the concept of transnational armed conflict but 
believed that there exist a NIAC between Al Qaeda and the US.326 
Some argue that the use of force against non-state actors extraterritorially, 
even without the consent of territorial state, does not amount to IAC where the 
attacks are limited against non-state armed group and its associated military 
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infrastructure. 327  However, it is also possible to argue that transnational 
conflicts should be treated as international conflicts, particularly where the 
territorial state has not consented to the use of force against non-state actors 
within its jurisdiction and thereby, they are subject to Geneva Law and 
Additional Protocol I in their entirety.328 The use of force by a state against a 
non-state group on the territory of another state is NIAC where the force is 
used exclusively against non-state group. 329  But the conflict may as well 
become IAC when the attacks by the outside state are made more broadly on 
the territorial state on whose territory non-state groups are present.330  
The law that governs transnational conflicts between a state and a non-state 
group will depend, in the first place, on whether the territorial state in which 
the non-state group is based has given its consent to the foreign state using 
force against that group. Where territorial state has consented to the military 
attacks, the conflict remains one of a non-international character. The 
situation here will be no different from a situation in which the territorial state 
is itself fighting the non-state group and invites the foreign state to intervene. 
Conversely, in situation where the territorial state opposes, or at least 
condemns the attacks, the law of international armed conflict will govern the 
situation. Thus the consent of the territorial state decides whether or not there 
are two opposing states involved in the conflict. 331 The rules of IAC are 
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relevant where non-state groups acts on behalf of or with the support of the 
state against the foreign state.332   
The International Court of Justice in the Armed Activities case held that: 
The Court considers that the obligations arising under the principles of 
non-use of force and non-intervention were violated by Uganda even if 
the objectives of Uganda were not to overthrow President Kabila, and 
were directed to securing towns and airports for reason of its perceived 
security needs, and in support of the parallel activity of those engaged 
in civil war333 
The UN Commission of Inquiry into the conflict in Lebanon in 2006 confirmed 
that an IAC exists where a state uses force against a non-state armed group 
on the territory of another state without the consent of the territorial 
state.334The conflict was considered to be IAC even when Israel mainly used 
force against Hezbollah and Lebanese armed forces did not respond in the 
conflict.335  
It is important to clarify that even when there is an IAC between foreign state 
and territorial state (where non-state actors are based) this will have no 
bearing on the conflict between foreign state and the non-state group because 
that conflict will still be NIAC in nature and there would be two conflicts 
running simultaneously. This situation means that NIAC against non-state 
actors will be bound with IAC and it will be difficult to separate the two. Thus, 
when the US invaded and attacked Afghanistan in response to 9/11 against 
the Taliban government, claiming that the de facto Taliban government of 
Afghanistan was supporting Al-Qaeda, an IAC was created between the US 
and Afghanistan-one High Contracting Party invading a second High 
Contracting Party (common Article 2 IAC).336 Concurrently, there was a NIAC 
between the US and Al Qaeda.337 Therefore, a ‘dual status armed conflict 
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existed’ where IAC (US and Afghanistan) NIAC (US and Al Qaeda) are 
occurring at the same time within the same state.338   
Scholars have also debated whether the US is engaged in a single global 
armed conflict without defined territorial limits with Al Qaeda or in multiple 
armed conflicts with Al Qaeda in different states, such as Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia339. A NIAC overspill to other territories, but 
remain part of the core conflict. A NIAC that spills outside territorial 
boundaries would remain covered by common Article 3. Indeed, it is not 
unusual for members of non-state armed groups to be based in the border 
regions of a neighbouring state. For instance, a conflict between the USA and 
Taliban in Afghanistan that spills over into Pakistan, remains a NIAC. There is 
one conflict that is fought in another state.340 The Operation Phoenix that 
Colombia conducted against Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(FARC) is illustrative of this kind of scenario. The NIAC between Colombia 
and FARC spilled into Ecuadorian territory. Colombian forces entered 
Ecuadorian territory to fight FARC fighters who were based there and argued 
that this operation amounted to ‘hot pursuit’ because hostilities with FARC 
commenced in the territory of Colombia.341 However the hot pursuit doctrine is 
a maritime law concept and it could not be extended to actions on land.342 Hot 
pursuit over land is only permissible if the territorial state explicitly consents 
because it is an exception to the international rule of state sovereignty.343 Still, 
we are witnessing the development of land incursions justified by the hot 
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pursuit doctrine in recent years exemplified by the Kenyan cross-border action 
against al-Shabaab militants in Somalia 344  and the Turkish cross-border 
action against Kurdish militants.345  
Hot pursuit by land involves the use of force ‘literally and temporally in pursuit 
and following the tail of a fugitive’ crossing the borders of the chasing state.346 
While hot crossing the borders of a third state to capture terrorists remains 
controversial and not codified outside the confines of the Law of the Sea, it is 
not comparable to invading another states without an ongoing pursuit’.347 
When the territorial state consents to a cross-border attack between a State 
and a non-state actor, such attack would constitute the continuation of a 
NIAC. When the consent is expressly denied, the conflict resulting from the 
use of armed force against the rejecting state would be classified as IAC. If no 
consent was sought before commencing the attack then the reaction of 
territorial state will decide whether the conflict would amount to an 
international or non-international armed conflict.348  
Taking into account the categories outlined above, the classification of an 
armed conflict with an armed group such as Al Qaeda, will depend on whether 
it is consider that the presence of Al Qaeda in different locations -Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia- represent different groups or whether they are 
parts of the same group.349 If these entities are considered the same group, a 
single NIAC may exist between the US and Al Qaeda. Conversely, the 
situation is one of multiple NIAC between the US and the distinct groups, 
providing that the hostilities satisfy the intensity test outlined in Tadic.  
Drawing from the arguments above, two main conclusions emerge. Firstly, the 
identity and nature of the group are the key factors in determining the nature 
of the conflict and not the territory on which they are based. Second, a state 
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can be involved in NIAC with non-state actors in multiple territories; however a 
global non-international armed conflict against a vague enemy is not 
supported by any legal category. 
2.6 Status of individuals on battlefield 
A basic principal enshrined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions requires that 
every individual under enemy control must have some status recognised by 
international law. They are combatants, prisoners of war (protected by the 
Third Convention), civilians (Fourth Convention) or a member of the medical 
personnel of the armed forces (First Convention)350 
2.6.1 Combatants 
 
Article 43 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I defines combatants as members of 
the armed forces of a party to a conflict that have the right to participate 
directly in hostilities. Without the risk of being prosecuted as long as their 
actions are in accordance with the laws of war.351 This special status is known 
as ‘combatant immunity ‘.352 Combatants remain military targets at all times, 
whether or not they are a threat to the enemy, until they surrender or become 
Hors de combat.353 Only when they fall into the hands of the enemy they 
benefit from the status and rights associated to the prisoners of war.354 
The concept of combatancy is confined to IAC. In the context of NIAC, 
captured fighters, rebels or insurgents don’t enjoy combatant immunity who 
are treated as ordinary criminals that may face prosecution for murder or 
treason. Only Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention assures a minimal 
standard of humane treatment.355Additional Protocol II is applicable only to 
the limited number of state parties to it and in situations where rebels control 
some part of the national territory. It also guarantees fundamental human 
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rights to the rebel forces, including the status of prisoner of war if categorised 
as legal combatants. 356  This protection extends to other groups such as 
member of the militia or volunteer corps fighting alongside a party of the 
conflict, provided they satisfy the following conditions (art. 4 Geneva 
Convention III):  
a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
b) that of carrying arms openly; 
c) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war.357 
The requirements of ‘having a fixed distinctive sign and carrying arms openly’ 
were modified by 1977 Additional Protocol I. Art 44 requires that combatants 
distinguish themselves only while in an attack or preparatory to an attack; if 
they are unable to do so because of circumstances, they must still carry their 
arms openly during that period.358This means, ‘if resistance movements are to 
benefit by the Convention, they must respect the four special conditions…’359 
If they fail to satisfy them then they are unlawful combatants.  
2.6.2 Civilians 
The Additional Protocol II defines a civilian in negative terms, as a person  
‘who does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 
4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this 
Protocol.’ 360  A joint reading of these articles reveal that they refer to all 
categories of armed forces which constitute military objectives and as such 
are liable to be attacked.361 Art 50 of AP I also describes civilian in excluding 
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terms as anyone who is not a member of the armed forces.362 According to 
this definition only individual who wear uniforms, openly display weapons 
amongst other criteria are deemed combatants, the rest of the population may 
be classified as civilians. In the case of any doubt whether a person is a 
civilian or not, that person shall be considered a civilian.363  
Civilians enjoy the ‘general protection against dangers arising from military 
operations’.364 International law protects civilians from harm during an armed 
conflict. As the ICTY notes, ‘The protection of civilians in time of armed 
conflict, whether international or internal, is the bedrock of modern 
humanitarian law….it is now a universally recognised principle…that 
deliberate attack on civilians or civilian objects are absolutely prohibited by 
international humanitarian law.’365  
Once civilians take up arms they lose the protection available to them under 
the IHL and may be attacked or taken as prisoners of war in the event of their 
capture. 366 Under IHL persons who are not actively involved in hostilities but 
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work closely with military personnel will still be treated as civilians.367 These 
include ‘civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, 
supply contractors and member of labour units or of services responsible for 
the welfare of the armed forces’.368 The crew members of merchant ships and 
of the civil aircraft of parties to the conflict as well as retired members of 
armed forces and legal experts who closely work with armed forces are 
considered civilians and as such may not be the subject of attack.369 
2.6.3 Direct participation in hostilities 
In both IAC and NIAC civilians enjoy protection from attack unless and for 
such time as they take a direct or active part in hostilities. This is a rule of 
conventional and customary international law. 370  However, ‘participation in 
hostilities’ remains an uncodified terminology, 371  it has been left open to 
states’ own interpretation. 372  The International Committee of Red Cross 
(ICRC) offers the following interpretive recommendation: A civilian can be 
considered to be directly participating in hostilities, according to the ICRC, 
only if his act satisfies all three conditions: 
1. The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or 
military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict 
death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against 
direct attack (threshold of harm),  
2. There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely 
to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of 
which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation) 
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3. The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required 
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the 
detriment of another (belligerent nexus).373 
This criteria excludes conduct that indirectly supports war: such as production 
of weapon and military equipment,374 political advocacy, supplying food or 
shelter, or economic support and propaganda 375  The ICRC’s interpretive 
guidance has been criticised by various experts because it defines direct 
participation in hostilities too narrowly.376 It has been observed that in ‘this 
narrow interpretation, terrorists enjoy the best of both worlds –they can remain 
civilians most of the time and only endanger their protection as civilians while 
actually in the process of carrying out a terrorist act’.377 Some argue that the 
‘definition of direct participation results in a ‘revolving door’ of protection, 
giving individuals the liberty to participate in attacks and then quickly regain 
protection from counter-attack’. 378  Critics described such individual as a 
‘farmer by day, fighter by night’,379 who regains protection as a civilian every 
time he returns home. 380  To prevent the ‘revolving door’ effect, various 
scholars have argued that a civilian who is repeatedly involved in hostilities 
should be considered as continuously participating. Critics insist that direct 
participation must also involve preparation for an attack not just actual 
execution of the specific act.381  
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Defending the opposite view, it has been argued that direct participation 
should only include the conduct of those behaving close to a fighter or directly 
supporting combat as the only effective mean of protecting the vast majority of 
civilians.382 There is a risk of potential abuse of power by states if the term 
‘direct participation in hostilities’ is defined too broadly. For instance, Lubell 
contends that the broader interpretation of direct participation in hostilities 
may ‘make it possible for states to fit almost any desirable target into them, for 
example by claiming the individual was involved in planning.’383 Rather than 
broadly defining the term ‘direct participation in hostilities’ one can resolve the 
‘revolving door’ problem by the concept of the membership of armed group. 
The members of the armed group may be targeted at any time, regardless of 
whether or not they are taking a direct part in hostilities at the time at which 
they are targeted. 384  The individuals who are considered members of 
organised armed groups are those who are engaged in a ‘continuous combat 
function’ 
2.6.4 Continuous combat function   
Continuous combat function is a new concept introduced in a 2009 ICRC 
report.385  Unlike the conventional armed forces of states the members of 
organised armed groups are not recognisable because they wear no uniform. 
Therefore membership in organised armed groups is not evidenced by 
uniform or ID card, but by function. 
Membership must depend on whether: 
the continuous function assumed by an individual corresponds to that 
collectively exercised by the group as a whole, namely the conduct of 
hostilities on behalf of a non-state party to the conflict….The decisive 
criterion for individual membership in an organised armed group is 
whether a person assumes a continuous function for the group 
involving his or her direct participation in hostilities….continuous 
combat function….which requires lasting integration into an organised 
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armed group acting as the armed forces of a non-state party to an 
armed conflict….A continuous combat function may be….for example, 
where a person has repeatedly directly participated in hostilities in 
support of an organised armed group in circumstances indicating that 
such conduct constitutes a continuous function rather than a 
spontaneous, sporadic or temporary role…386     
According to this interpretation, civilians who are occasionally involved in 
hostilities are not members of armed forces nor represent continuous combat 
function. For the purpose of this thesis, Al-Qaeda leaders or Taliban fighters 
do not regain civilian protection against direct attack when they put down their 
weapons. A member of organised armed group will always remain a lawful 
target whenever he may be located and whatever he may be doing. However 
this does mean that his targeting at all times be legal because proportionality 
always remain an issue.387  
2.6.5 Unlawful combatants 
Another group between the two extremes of lawful combatants on the one 
hand and civilians on the other are the ‘illegal’ or ‘unlawful’ combatants. It is 
this type of excluded person that is of most interest in relation to terrorists. 
The term unlawful combatant does not appear in the Geneva Conventions, 
the Additional Protocols, or any other conventional rules governing armed 
conflicts. Although the discussion on the legal situation of unlawful 
combatants is not new, the term became frequently employed by the United 
States following the US-led military campaign in Afghanistan in 2001. The Ex 
Parte Quirin case (1942) is one of the first places where the term ‘unlawful 
combatant’ seems to appear. In this case Supreme Court of the United States 
stated that: 
The law of war draws a distinction between the….lawful and unlawful 
combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention 
as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants 
are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are 
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subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which 
render their belligerency unlawful388 
The legal advisor of the ICRC described unlawful combatant as ‘all persons 
taking a direct part in hostilities without being entitled to do so and who 
therefore cannot be classified as prisoners of war on falling into the power of 
the enemy.’ 389  Various scholars consider unlawful combatants as a 
subcategory of civilian rather than a distinct group390 that can be useful  ‘for 
describing those civilians who take up arms without being authorised to do so 
by international law.’391Their status would be the counterpart of guerrillas and 
militias are a subset of combatant.392 
A person who engages in military raids by night, while purporting to be an 
innocent civilian by day is an unlawful combatant.  Consequently, those who 
seek to blend in with the civilian population would not enjoy the status of 
prisoners of war if captured. Terrorists form part of this group and are thus 
neither soldiers nor civilians.393 Although unlawful combatant fails to reap the 
benefits of prisoner of war status but they must not be deemed beyond the 
ambit of law.394At a minimum, captured unlawful combatants are entitled to 
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the basic humanitarian protections of common Article 3, and 75 of Additional 
Protocol I.395Both endow basic humanitarian guarantees, such as protection 
against murder, torture or hostage taking. Either military or domestic courts 
can prosecute unlawful combatants.396 
 
So far the chapter has assessed the status of conflict and status of individuals 
in the battlefield. The following sections outline the four core principles of IHL 
governing the legality of actions of those taking part in hostilities.   
2.7 Distinction 
The principle of distinction codified in Art 48 of Additional Protocol I to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions397, obliges belligerent parties to distinguish at all 
times between civilian persons and objects and between combatants and 
military targets. This is a fundamental principle of IHL and protects civilian 
persons and objects from harmful effects of the hostilities. The ICJ has 
described the principle of distinction as ‘cardinal’ and ‘intransgressible’.398 
This principle obliges combatants to distinguish themselves from civilians by 
wearing uniform or a distinctive sign that is recognisable from the distance. 
Combatants must distinguish between civilian and military objectives and can 
only target military objectives. What constitutes a civilian object depends on a 
number on the vague concept of ‘military advantage’. However, the category 
normally includes ‘civilian dwellings, shops, schools and other places of non-
military business, places of recreation and worship, means of transportation, 
cultural property, hospitals and medical establishments and units’,399 unless 
used for military purposes.  
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However, it is difficult in practice to apply the principle against an enemy, such 
as terrorist fighters, who disregard it. The traditional laws of war rely on the 
willingness of the belligerent groups to distinguish between civilian individuals 
and objects and between military and non-military targets. The clear 
distinctions become impossible in NIAC where insurgents resort to guerrilla 
warfare.400 On today’s battlefields, where unlawful combatants tend to mix 
with civilian population sometimes combatants have to make hard decisions 
on the spot. So mistakes do occur and at times civilians get killed during 
hostilities. The most memorable example was the bombing of the Al Firdos 
bunker in February 1991 by the US Air Forces in Iraq during Gulf war that 
killed around three hundred Iraqi civilians.401Originally built during the Iran-
Iraq war as a civilian air raid shelter, it was upgraded in 1985 to become an 
emergency headquarters for Iraqi officials. The wives and children of the 
secret police used it as a shelter from the US air raids. The evidence suggests 
that the US failed to detect presence of so many civilians.402 The ICTY has 
held in Blaskic that only wilful and intentional targeting of civilians or civilian 
objects will constitute a violation of distinction.403Thus it is logical to conclude 
that the bombing of the Al Firdos was not a war crime because the US Air 
Forces did not intentionally targeted civilians.  
The respect for the principle of distinction is not reciprocal and its application 
does not depend on mutual respect by the adverse party, so the presence of 
individual combatants in the midst of a civilian population does not allow other 
party to use force because the presence of a combatant does not change the 
civilian character of that population.404  However, this does not mean that 
civilian persons and civilian objects enjoy complete immunity. For instance 
Additional Protocol I declares lawful any incidental civilian damage that is not 
excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated from the successful 
execution of an attack.405This legal framework acknowledges that incidental 
loss of civilian life in the vicinity of the theatre of operations is almost 
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unavoidable. Therefore the aim of law is not to make it impossible for parties 
to conflict to use force in hostilities but to oblige parties to the conflict to carry 
out military operations cautiously to minimise loss of civilian life and harm to 
civilian objects.406   
2.8 Military necessity  
The military can only lawfully use force that is necessary to achieve the 
objective in those circumstances.407 This principle is closely related to the 
principle of proportionality and only allows military attack if the attack will offer 
some definite advantage. The military advantage to be gained is at some 
unforeseen time in the future.408 Military necessity is not codified in the 1949 
Geneva Conventions or in Additional Protocol I. It appear in Art 23 (g) of 1907 
Hague Regulation IV 409 , in Art 8(2)(b)(xiii) of the Rome Statute of the 
international court410and in all four 1949 Geneva Conventions and in both 
1977 Additional Protocols.411 It was defined in 1863 by Francis Lieber in Art 
14 of his ‘Lieber Code’ as consisting in the necessity of those measures which 
are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful 
according to the modern law and usages of war’.412 
The rules of IHL forbid unnecessary violence. At first sight at least from a 
humanitarian perspective, military necessity seem to contradict the principle of 
humanity because it seeks to justify violence, and has been described by 
Professor Alan Dershowitz as ‘the most lawless of legal doctrines....’ 413 . 
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However, it only provides legal cover for actions that are in conformity with the 
laws and customs of war; a state cannot invoke military necessity as a 
justification to violate humanitarian law or to depart from those rules. 414 
Military necessity cannot justify, for instance, killing prisoners of war. 415 
Phrases like ‘I did it to save American lives’ or for ‘state survival’ are too often 
used to justify unlawful acts including torture,416 or to blur the line between 
military convenience and military necessity.417 
The principle of military necessity tries to achieve ‘a middle ground’ 418 
approach and acknowledges that civilian casualties are unavoidable in armed 
conflicts so incidental injuries or loss of life are allowed ‘if a particular military 
objective will provide some type of military advantage in weakening the 
enemy military forces’. 419  The limitations imposed by the principle are 
illustrated by the actions of the Iraqi army during the 1991 when they set 
ablaze more than 600 Kuwaiti oil wells. Since Iraqis had already been 
defeated and the area was evacuated, ‘this act could not possibly affect the 
progress of the war and did not offer a definite military advantage…’ 
Consequently there was no military necessity for destroying the wells. 420 
Similarly, the ICTY found, in the 2006 Rajic421case, that the attack on a village 
was unlawful because ‘evidence indicated that the village has been 
destroyed, that its destruction had not been necessary to fulfil any legitimate 
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objectives, that the civilian population was the target of the attack, and that 
the offence appeared to have been planned in advance…all of which were 
unjustified by military necessity.’422 
2.9 Unnecessary suffering 
The infliction of unnecessary suffering on opposing combatants is also 
prohibited in international law. This principle was first enshrined in the 
Preamble to the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration.423 The Additional Protocol I 
propounds the basic rule: ‘It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and 
material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering’. 424  Several factors are considered relevant in 
determining the categories of suffering or injury that are superfluous or 
unnecessary, among them, the mortality rates associated to specific actions 
or weapons, their painfulness or severity of the wounds as well as the 
incidence of permanent damage or disfigurement. 425Psychiatric harm is not 
included and it is contested whether the social or economic impact on society 
of the suffering of combatants should be considered as relevant factor.426  
The interpretation of unnecessary suffering is intertwined with military 
necessity. ‘The more effective a weapon is from military point of view, the less 
likely it is that the injuries which it causes will be characterised as 
unnecessary’.427 The ICJ has stressed that unnecessary suffering means ‘a 
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harm greater than that avoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives’.428 
Weapons are not banned based exclusively on the suffering they may 
cause429 but in relation to the military advantage they provide.430This principle 
has found echoed at domestic level, as illustrate in the Shimoda Case where 
the Tokyo District Court stated that “the use of a certain weapon, great as its 
inhuman result may be, need not be prohibited by international law if it has a 
great military effect’.431 However, an increasing number of treaties ban the 
use of certain weapons based on this principle.432 
2.10 Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality seeks to minimise unavoidable and collateral 
civilian casualties in war.433The principle of proportionality is anchored in Art 
51(5)(b) that describes breach of the principle as ‘an attack which may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation 
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’.434 Article 57(2)(b) 
directs that ‘an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent 
that the objective is not a military one…. or that the attack may be expected to 
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’.435 The attack that cause 
excessive collateral damage to civilians/civilian objects in relation to the 
anticipated military advantage violates the principle of proportionality and is 
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codified as a war crime by Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute.436 In her 
dissenting opinion in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion case, Judge R. 
Higgins stated: 
The principle of proportionality, even if finding no specific mention, is 
reflected in many provision of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1940. Thus even a legitimate target may not be 
attacked if the collateral civilian casualties would be disproportionate to 
the specific military gain from the attack437  
There is a close relationship between the concept of proportionality and 
military necessity and compliance can only be assessed in a case-by-case 
basis. 438 Even the destruction of an entire village with scores of civilian 
casualties will be acceptable if an entire artillery battery would operate from 
within the village.439 
The main problem with proportionality is that the whole assessment of 
whether the injury or collateral damage is ‘excessive’ in the circumstances is 
subjective.440 One issue is that military advantage and civilian casualties are 
incomparable in a quantifiable manner. Civilian casualties can be calculated 
and civilian damage may be estimated but how can one measure an 
anticipated military advantage?441 Then warring parties hardly share the same 
viewpoints when it comes to measure military advantage and collateral 
damage. 442  Attacking belligerent party may intend to satisfy the test of 
proportionality by claiming it has achieved long-term military advantage. It 
remains possible however, to weigh the projected collateral damage against 
the anticipated military advantage. Additional Protocol I gives some indication 
on how to calculate military advantage. Both Art 51(5)(b) and Article 
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57(2)(a)(iii) uses the phrase ‘concrete and direct military advantage’ and443 Art 
52(2) uses the terminology ‘definite military advantage’. 444  The words 
‘concrete’, ‘direct’ and ‘definite’ suggest that ‘the anticipate military advantage 
need not to be substantiated, but it must be concrete, that is to say, it must be 
particular, perceptible and real as opposed to general, vague and 
speculative’.445 
The regulatory framework is based on the expectation that the attacking 
commander to act reasonably and in good faith.446 Under the principle of 
proportionality a military commander can only avoid liability if before attacking 
he gathered and assessed information about the target, the surroundings and 
people in the vicinity of the target.447In the Galic case, the ICTY trial Chamber 
stated: 
In determining whether an attack was proportionate it is necessary to 
examine whether a reasonable well-informed person in the 
circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the 
information available to him or her, could have expected excessive 
civilian casualties to result from the attack448 
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute adds the term ‘overall’ to the phrase 
“concrete and direct military advantage”.449 The overall test suggests that the 
military advantage may not be confined to the geography and time frame of 
the attack.450 But ‘the temporal or geographic dimensions must be construed 
reasonably. They cannot be too remote or long-term’.451  
                                                        
443 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977  
444 ibid 
445 Nils Melzer, Targeted killing in International law (Oxford University Press 2008) 293 
446 L C Green, ‘Aerial considerations in the law of armed conflict’ (1980) AASL 89, 104 (The attacker 
must act in good faith, yet subjectivity inevitably colours judgement); Dormann (n 385)165 (‘the 
standard to be applied must operate in good faith and not in accordance with subjectivity’) 
447 F Kalshoven, ‘Implementing limitations on the use of force: The doctrine of proportionality and 
necessity’ (1992) PASIL 39, P. 44 (Commander is not allowed to ‘simply turn a blind eye on the facts of 
the situation; on the contrary, he is obliged to weigh all available information’)  
448 Galic (n 419) Para 58 
449 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,  (“Intentionally launching an attack in the 
knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian 
objects….which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military 
advantage anticipated”) 
450 Dormann (n 414) 161 foot note 36 
451 Yoram Dinstein, The conduct of hostilities under the law of international armed conflict (Cambridge 
University Press 2016) 161  
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The vagueness of the principle of proportionality has attracted criticism. In the 
words of Cassese: 
[Proportionality] leaves the belligerents plenty of room to act as they 
feel the military situation requires. Would it be fair to say that in 
proclaiming the two principles [proportionality and distinction] states 
were being entirely hypocritical, pretending to accept bans that are not 
bans because they can be eluded at every step?....[T]he Great Powers, 
without whose consent these principles would never have become 
legal precepts, had every reason to leave them as loose as 
possible…Yet, since they are not very effective, they can be applied 
only in exceptional circumstances when their relevance is undeniable. 
In other words….they become effective in highly pathological and 
“dramatic” situations, when the disproportion between what they 
“impose” and how one or more of the belligerents behaves, is 
gigantic452 
The four core principles (distinction, military necessity, unnecessary suffering 
and proportionality) are intertwined. Any military action that fails to satisfy the 
standard of military necessity is unnecessary, leading to unnecessary 
suffering; the collateral damage resulting from the attack will be 
disproportionate and disproportionate act violates the principle of distinction. 
Thus, violation of one core principle may often result in the violation of the 
other three principles as well.453 
2.11 The law of neutrality 
Another cardinal principle of IHL applicable in IAC identified by the ICJ, in the 
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion is that of neutrality.454     
The law of neutrality in international law defines the relationship between 
states engaged in an armed conflict and those that are not participating in that 
armed conflict (neutral states). 455The main purpose of neutrality is to contain 
                                                        
452 Antonio Casssese, Violence and law in the modern age (Princeton University Press 1988) 17 
453 Solis (n 407) 285 
454 Advisory opinion on nuclear weapons (n 245) 261-262  
455 ICRC, The law of armed conflict neutrality, 2002 see 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/law8_final.pdf ; L. Oppenheim, International Law a 
Treatise, Vol 2 (7thed, 1952), p. 653 
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the spread of hostilities to states that do not take any part in hostilities.456 
Neutrality is a geographic based framework in which belligerents may only 
fight on belligerent territory and cannot carry out operations on neutral 
territories. The neutral state may use force to prevent belligerent state from 
using its territory for war making purposes.457A neutral state may only use 
force against other state if the violation constitutes an armed attack within the 
meaning of Art 51 of UN Charter.458 
 
The Hague Convention V sets forth neutrality law's basic principles. 459  It 
prohibits the movement of belligerent troops or material across neutral 
territory460and the use of military installations or communications facilities on 
neutral territory.461It also restricts belligerent states to attack targets in neutral 
territory. However, neutral state only enjoy such protection if it does not 
provide, or enable the provision of military supplies to any belligerent, nor 
allows its territory to be used for military operations.462 These principles are 
expanded further by Article 6 of the Hague Convention XIII provides that: ‘The 
supply, in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral Power to a 
belligerent Power, of war-ships, ammunition, or war material of any kind 
                                                        
456 John Astley III& Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of the Sea and Naval Operations, 42 
A.F. L. REV. 119, 139 (1997)  
457 Art 5 Hague Convention V (“A neutral Power must not allow any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 
[ Link ] to 4 to occur on its territory. It is not called upon to punish acts in violation of its neutrality 
unless the said acts have been committed on its own territory”); Art 2 Hague Convention XIII (“Any 
act of hostility, including capture and the exercise of the right of search, committed by belligerent 
war-ships in the territorial waters of a neutral Power, constitutes a violation of neutrality and is 
strictly forbidden”); Art 9 Hague Convention XIII (“a neutral Power may forbid a belligerent vessel 
which has failed to conform to the orders and regulations made by it, or which has violated neutrality, 
to enter its ports or roadsteads”); Art 24 Hague Convention XIII (“If, notwithstanding the notification 
of the neutral Power, a belligerent ship of war does not leave a port where it is not entitled to remain, 
the neutral Power is entitled to take such measures as it considers necessary to render the ship 
incapable of taking the sea during the war, and the commanding officer of the ship must facilitate the 
execution of such measures. When a belligerent ship is detained by a neutral Power, the officers and 
crew are likewise detained”) 
458 Dieter Fleck, The handbook of international humanitarian law, (Oxford University Press 2014) 561 
459 Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on 
Land. The Hague 18 October 1907 
460 Art 2 Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War 
on Land. The Hague 18 October 1907  
461 Art 3 Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War 
on Land. The Hague 18 October 1907  
462 Dinstein (n 451) 27 
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whatever, is forbidden.’463Massive financial support for a party to the conflict 
also affects neutral states status.  In brief, the neutral state must abstain from 
any actions that may have an impact on the conflict.  
Traditionally, the rules governing neutrality distinguish between unlawful 
assistance by the neutral state and assistance by private persons or private 
companies belonging to a neutral state. Therefore, a neutral state is not 
bound to prevent the export or transport of war material by private persons for 
the advantage of one of the belligerent parties (Article 7 of Hague Convention 
V). 464  Law does not attribute private individuals’ unlawful activities to the 
neutral state and nor does it obliges neutral state to prevent those activities. 
However, the state practice has modified this rule because the separation of 
the state and the contemporary private armament industry is artificial; both 
arms production and trade are mostly controlled by the state.465The armed 
forces of neutral states are not allowed to take part in a conflict but the neutral 
state is not compelled to prevent its nationals from taking part into hostilities at 
their own risk.466 
The airspace of a neutral state is inviolable.467 This rule is significant because 
in the era of modern technology of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicle, 
violations of airspace are easily committed. A neutral state has the right to 
prevent violations of its airspace. Aircraft that enters into neutral airspace can 
be forced to leave or put down.468 A neutral state has full jurisdiction over the 
military aircraft and crew of that aircraft.469 
                                                        
463 Convention (XIII) concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War. The Hague, 18 
October 1907  
464 “A neutral Power is not called upon to prevent the export or transport, on behalf of one or other of 
the belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which can be of use to an army 
or a fleet” 
465 G P Politakis, Modern aspects of the law of naval warfare and maritime neutrality (1998) 506 
466 Art 6 Convention (V) respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of 
War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907 (“The responsibility of a neutral Power is not engaged by 
the fact of persons crossing the frontier separately to offer their services to one of the belligerents”) 
467 Art. 40 Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare. 
Drafted by a Commission of Jurists at the Hague, December 1922 - February 1923 (“Belligerent 
military aircraft are forbidden to penetrate into the jurisdiction of a neutral State”) 
468 Art 40 ibid (“A neutral Government is bound to use the means at its disposal to prevent belligerent 
military aircraft from entering its jurisdiction and to compel them to land or to alight on water if they 
have penetrated therein”) 
469 Ibid (“A neutral government is bound to employ the means at its disposal to intern every 
belligerent military aircraft which is found within its jurisdiction after landing or watering for 
whatever cause, as well as its crew and its passengers, if any”) 
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As discussed in the early sections, the law governing the use of force is 
normally categorised into two types: jus ad bellum (when state may resort to 
the lawful use of force) and jus in bello (concerns with means and methods of 
force a state may legally employ during war or armed conflict). Within the jus 
ad bellum analysis, there are three possible legal paradigms in which a state 
may be acting. First, during peace time states are governed by human rights 
law and may only use law enforcement methods to ensure security. Second, 
is self-defence paradigm where state is entitled to use force under UN article 
51 and customary international law if it is confronted with imminent threat and 
the use of force is necessary and proportionate. Finally if there is an armed 
conflict a state may use force according to the rules of IHL. 
IHL is a specialised body of law that is applicable only during the time of war. 
It regulates, the methods of conducting hostilities and the treatment of victim 
of warfare. It is different from international human rights law (IHRL) because 
IHRL principally applies in times of peace, including situations where ‘violence 
exists, but falls short of the threshold for armed conflict’.470 But today it is 
widely accepted that IHRL also applies in situations of armed conflict (whether 
of an international or non-international character). 471 Thus whether IHL 
supplements, displaces or discounts IHRL raises a number of important 
questions. The following section will outline the principles governing the 
applicability of IHRL during armed conflicts. 
2.12  International human rights law      
IHRL applies in peacetime and in times of armed conflict. IHRL fill existing 
gaps in IHL and applies where a state is using military force,472 functioning as 
a lex specialis 473  during armed conflicts. 474  IHRL apply in situations of 
                                                        
470 Alston, op. cit., para 31  
471 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p.226, 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), 8 July 1996, para. 25; Concerning Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, 
p.136, ICJ, 9 July 2004, para 106. Lex specialis, in short, means the “law governing a specific subject 
matter” which when applied overrides more general laws 
472 Supra note 297 at para 25  
473 The principle that special law derogates from general law is a widely accepted. It suggests that if a 
matter is being regulated by a general standard as well as a more specific rule, then the latter should 
take precedence over the former, See Alexander Peczenik, Juridikens metodproblem (Stockholm: 
Gebers, 1980) p. 106; A 
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occupation or international or non-international armed conflict to complement 
the protection provided by humanitarian law, for example in relation to the 
prohibition on torture, prohibition on death in custody, and right to a fair 
trial.475Although IHRL applies during both peacetime and during an armed 
conflict it does not, however, govern the laws of war. Issues such as the 
conduct of hostilities or the treatment of prisoners of war are dealt in 
accordance with IHL principles.476   
Human rights are not absolute and derogation is allowed in most general 
treaties in times of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation.477However certain rights are considered to be so fundamental and 
                                                                                                                                                              
special rule is more specific and clear than a general one and it regulates the matter more effectively 
than general rules. This rationale is well expressed by Grotius: 
“What rules ought to be observed in such cases [i.e. where parts of a document are in conflict]. 
Among agreements which are equal … that should be given preference which is most specific and 
approaches most nearly to the subject in hand, for special provisions are ordinarily more effective 
than those that are general” See Hugo Grotius, De Jure belli ac pacis. Libri Tres, Edited by James 
Brown Scott, The Classics of International 
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925) Book II, Chap. XVI, Sect. XXIX, p. 428;   
474 Dinah Pokempner, Terrorism and Human Rights: The Legal Framework, in TERRORISM AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, p. 19 (Michael N. Schmitt & Gian Luca Beruto, 
eds. 2002); Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Addendum, Study 
on Targeted Killings, U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 14, 29 (28 May 2010) 
by Philip Alston; (However Michael Newton, Professor of Vanderbilt University Law School, disagrees 
that international humanitarian law is subset of human rights law, and said "[i]t is an oxymoron to 
argue that humanitarian law is a mere subset of human rights law [because] IHL has a much richer, 
longer, and diverse history’) see Michael Newton, Flying into the Future: Drone Warfare and the 
Changing Face of 
Humanitarian Law, 39 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, (2011) 601, p. 602  
475 RUONA IGUYOVWE, The Inter-play between International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights Law, (2008), Commonwealth Law Bulletin Routledge, Vol. 34, No. 4. 749-789, p. 749  
476 Jakob Kellenberger, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, “International 
humanitarian law and other legal regimes: interplay in situations of violence”, statement 
to the 27th Annual Round Table on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law, 
San Remo, Italy, 4–6 September 2003; L Doswald-Beck, International Humanitarian law and the 
advisory opinion of the International Court of justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons, (1997), 316 Int’L Rev. Red Cross 35, at 51 (‘In the context of the conduct of hostilities, 
human rights law cannot be interpreted differently from humanitarian law’)   
477 Article 4 (1) of the International Covenant Civil and Political Rights states (“In time of public 
emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed..”) 
; Article I5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights states (“In time of war or other public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures 
derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies 
of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law”) ; Article 27(1)  of the American Convention on Human Rights 1969 states (“In time 
of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State 
Party, it may take measures derogating from its obligations under the present Convention to the 
extent and for the period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that 
such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law and do not 
involve discrimination on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion, or social origin”) 
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important that a state cannot derogate from these rights even in times of 
national emergency. This includes the right to life; the prohibition against 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; freedom from 
slavery; right to a name; freedom of religion and expression; and no 
punishment without law.478 The right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life is 
particularly relevant during armed conflicts because the elimination of military 
targets and possible civilian casualties are expected. However, the ICJ has 
confirmed its applicability in times of war: 
The protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the 
Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time 
of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, 
such a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of 
one’s life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary 
deprivation of life, however, than falls to be determined by the 
applicable lex Specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict 
which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities479   
Therefore, in times of war, the term arbitrary ‘refers to whether or not the 
deliberate taking of life is unlawful under that part of the international law 
which was specifically designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities, that is 
the laws of armed conflict’.480   
The use of IHL as lex specialis involves the subsidiary application of IHRL. 
Under certain circumstances, it has been argued that both legal regimes 
should be complementary. For instance, the members of the UN fact-finding 
mission on Gaza established by the Human Rights Council in 2009 adopted a 
complementary approach.481  The Commission examined the allegations of 
killing of civilians involving a deliberate attack on police facilities that killed 
                                                        
478 Art 27 (2) of the American Convention on Human Rights 1969; Art 4(2) of the International 
Covenant Civil and Political Rights states; Art 15 (2) of the European Convention of Human Rights 
states  of  
479 Nuclear Weapons ICJ, Supra note 532, Para 24 and 25 
480 Letter dated June 16, 1995 from the Legal advisor to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, para 3. 101 
481 HRC, The grave violations of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territory, particularly due to 
the recent Israeli military attacks against the occupied Gaza strip, UN Doc A/HRC/S-9/2 (2009) 
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around 100 police officers.482 The Commission examined the categorisation 
as civilian of the police under the principles of IHL and whether Israel had 
respected the principle of distinction between civilian and military objects and 
persons. The report also discussed the principle of right to life and arbitrary 
killings under IHRL. It concluded that in this case IHRL and IHL were jointly 
applicable. The report also concluded there were violations of the right to life 
under IHRL in relation to individuals who were unlawfully and 
disproportionately killed according to IHL principles.483 In this case the joint 
complementary application of two legal frameworks did not resulted in conflict 
of rules, but rather a mutually reinforcing conclusion.    
The legality of killing outside the context of armed conflict is governed by the 
standards of IHRL. Although these standards are described as law 
enforcement model but they do not specifically apply to police forces. This 
model allows all government officials including police and a state’s military 
and security forces to use lethal force in situations where violence exists, but 
falls short of the threshold for armed conflict.484This regime only allows killing 
if f it is required to protect life and there is no other means, such as capture or 
non-lethal incapacitation, of preventing that threat to life. 485  Thus in 
peacetime, the wilful killing of human beings is illegal and only allowed in self-
defence. Furthermore this regime does not legitimise the killing of civilians 
who die when law enforcement agents use force against suspected terrorists 
attacks as “collateral damage”. In peacetime, even the intentional destruction 
of private property and severe restrictions on individual liberties are generally 
impermissible.486  
                                                        
482 Human Rights in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories, Report of the UN fact finding 
mission on the Gaza conflict, UN Doc A/HRC/12/48 (25 Sep 2009) para 424-429 
483 Ibid para 1923 “The Mission also concludes that Israel, by deliberately attacking police stations and 
killing large numbers of policemen (99 in the incidents investigated by the Mission) during the first 
minutes of the military operations, failed to respect the principle of proportionality between the 
military advantage anticipated by killing some policemen who might have been members of 
Palestinian armed groups and the loss of civilian life (the majority of policemen and members of the 
public present in the police stations or nearby during the attack). Therefore, these were 
disproportionate attacks in violation of customary international law. The Mission finds a violation of 
the right to life (ICCPR, article 6) of the policemen killed in these attacks who were not members of 
Palestinian armed groups” 
484 Alston (n 372) Para 31  
485 Ibid para 32 
486 Rosa Brook, ‘Duck-Rabbits and Drones: Legal Indeterminacy in the War on Terror’ (2014) 
Georgetown University Law Center, 308 
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2.12.1 Extraterritorial applicability of international human rights la  
IHRL has been conceived to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of 
persons within its territory because the territory is the main scope of any 
State’s jurisdiction.487 Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights stipulates that ‘each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the […] Covenant’. A narrow 
interpretation of this provision suggests that states are not responsible for 
human rights violations committed outside their territory. 488  This narrow 
understanding of provision failed to take into account the main purpose of the 
Covenant. The Human Rights Committee clarified it its meaning by stating 
that states ‘must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to 
anyone within the power or effective control of that state Party, even if not 
situated within the territory of the state Party.’ 489  The Committee has 
interpreted that state is not only obliged to protect the rights of individual in its 
territory but also to protect the rights of individuals outside its territory where it 
exercise effective control. This indicated the extraterritorial application of 
IHRL. The ICJ reaffirmed this position in the Armed activities case where it 
held that ‘international human rights instruments are applicable in respect of 
acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own 
                                                        
487 Israel maintain that international humanitarian law do not apply extraterritorially see Human 
Rights Committee, CCPR/CO/78/ISR ; CCPR/CO/79/Add.93 ; CCPR/CO/78/ISR, para. 11 ; US also argues 
that they are not bound by international human rights law outside their territory see Michael J. 
Dennis, ‘ Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and 
Military Occupation ’ (2005) American Journal of International Law, 119 
488 Human Rights Committee, Eighty-seventh session, 10-28 July 2006, International covenant on civil 
and political rights, CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1, 18 December 2006 , the committee showed its concern 
over the point of view of the United States of America expressed in a periodic report to the Human 
Rights Committee and notes that “the restrictive interpretation made by the State party of its 
obligations under the Covenant, as a result in particular of (a) its position that the Covenant does not 
apply with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction but outside its territory, nor in time of war, 
despite the contrary opinions and established jurisprudence of the Committee and the International 
Court of Justice; (b) its failure to take fully into consideration its obligation under the Covenant not 
only to respect, but also to ensure the rights prescribed by the Covenant; and (c) its restrictive 
approach to some substantive provisions of the Covenant, which is not in conformity with the 
interpretation made by the Committee before and after the State party’s ratification of the 
Covenant”) at Para 10 
489 ibid 
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territory’.490 The European Court of Human Rights also refers to the effective 
control of a territory for the application the European Convention: 
Bearing in mind the object and purpose of the Convention, the 
responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a 
consequence of military action, whether lawful or unlawful, it exercises 
effective control of an area outside its national territory491  
Likewise the Inter American Commission of Human Rights has taken the 
following position: 
In principle, the inquiry turns not on the presumed victim's nationality or 
presence within a particular geographic area, but on whether, under 
the specific circumstances, the State observed the rights of a person 
subject to its authority and control492  
However, the exact meaning of the term ‘effective control’ is not yet 
determined. The international case law and the views of UN treaty bodies, 
have intended to interpret it. Different situations have been recognised as 
amounting to effective control, from ‘prolonged’ occupations to situations that 
have lasted for only a short period of time. For instance, the ICJ found in the 
Wall Case that Israel had obligations under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights for its acts in occupied Palestinian territory due to its 
effective control over the territory.493 In the Ilasco and others v Moldova and 
Russia, where the Court was not dealing with an occupation scenario, the 
European Court of Human Rights held that Russia exercised effective control 
on the basis of the presence of a relatively small number of troops.494 This 
situation would not amount to an occupation under IHL as defined in Article 42 
of the 1907 Hague Convention495, but it was found to constitute effective 
                                                        
490 International Court of Justice, Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v. Uganda), ICJ Reports (19 December 2005), at Para 216  
491 European Court of Human Rights, Loizidou v. Turkey, Application no. 15318/89, (18 December 
1996), Para 62  
492 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Coard v. the United States of America, Case 10.951 
(1999), Para. 37  
493 Wall Case [2004] ICJ Rep136, Para 109-111 
494 Ilasco and others v Moldova and Russia [2004] VII Eur. Ct. H.R., Para 392 
495 Art. 42 states ”Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of 
the hostile army” 
The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be 
exercised.  
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control for the application of extraterritorial human rights obligations.496 The 
Court found that the separatist regime had been: 
Set up in 1991-1992 with the support of the Russian Federation, vested 
with organs of power and its own administration, remained under the 
effective authority, or at the very least under the decisive influence, of 
the Russian Federation, and in any event that it survived by virtue of 
the military, economic, financial and political support given to it by the 
Russian Federation.497    
International human rights bodies agree that effective control can be 
exercised over persons, even if this control is only temporary. Some examples 
of control over a person would be abduction, detention or ill treatment. In the 
Chamber judgement in the Ocalan case, the Court held that Mr Ocalan was 
subject to the Turkish authority and control498 after he was arrested and then 
physically returned to Turkey by Turkish officials. In the Lopez Burgus case, 
concerning the detention and ill-treatment of the victim by Uruguayan agents 
in Argentina, the Human Rights Committee noted that Art 2(1) ‘does not imply 
that the state party concerned cannot be held accountable for violations of 
rights under the Covenant which its agents commit upon the territory of 
another state, whether with the acquiescence of the Government of that state 
or in opposition to it’.499According to the UN Human Rights Committee: 
States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to 
ensure the Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their 
territory and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction…state party must 
respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone 
within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not 
situated within the territory of the State Party…This principle also 
applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a 
State Party acting outside its territory..500  
                                                        
496 Cordula Droege, ‘The Interplay between IHL and HR in situations of armed conflict’ (2007) Israel 
Law Review 310, 331  
497 Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy 
(OUP 2011) 140 
498 ECtHR 12 March 2003, Ocalan v Turkey (Chamber) no 46221/99, Para 93 
499 Casariego v Uruguay, UNHR Comm No 56/1979, 29 July 1981, Para 10.1-10.3 
500 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States 
Parties to the Covenant, (29 March 2004) Para 10  
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Therefore states are bound to comply with their human rights obligations in 
respect of all persons under their jurisdiction, irrespective of whether they are 
in their territory. This criterion does not resolve many complex cases and the 
case law is fragmented. Particularly problematic is the application of IHRL to 
operations conducted by air, including bombing from a distance or a targeted 
missile launched from unmanned aerial vehicles. The jurisprudence of 
European Court of Human Rights has provided some guidance in this issue. 
For instance, in the case of Bankovic, the Court held that aerial bombardment 
is per se excluded from the human rights framework, because it is effective 
control of the territory in question that is key for the application of human 
rights law and aerial bombardment does not constitute effective control 
because there are no troops on the ground.501 
2.13 Conclusion  
The view that states can use force preventively has relatively little support, 
even in the post September 11 era. There can be little doubt that traditional 
concepts of armed conflict are increasingly subject to question post 11 
September 2001. But the view that the US is engaged in a global boundary-
less armed conflict with Al-Qaeda has no legal recognition. Moreover, the war 
rhetoric used by the US justified the application of IHL and lowered the 
standards of protection to individuals.502 Ambiguity allows the manipulation of 
the law and the selective application of rules when it suits the states. This lack 
of clarity on the applicability of legal standards directly hinders accountability 
and affects rule of law. It has been seen that reinterpretation of certain legal 
terms have been possible by arguing that the post 9/11 era raises new kinds 
of challenge. This new war theory has enabled governments to implicitly or 
explicitly challenge the legal regimes governing the use of lethal force against 
                                                        
501 Bankovic ́and others v Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, Appl. no. 52207/99, 12 December 
2001, Para 70, 71 
502 For instance use of targeted killing in undeclared war zones has been justified by claiming we are in 
an armed conflict with Al-Qadea and associated forces so we can target them anywhere in the world. 
This has allowed US to use force outside the context of armed conflict and to avoid accountability of 
civilian casualties by arguing we are operating during the time of war and under international 
humanitarian law collateral damage that satisfies the principles of law of war is justified. However on 
the other hand under international human rights law targeted killing can never be justified because 
force cannot be used as a first resort.  
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terrorist threats. The threat of terrorism has repeatedly invoked to marginalise 
the role of human rights in the name of security.503  
Although human rights law continue to apply during armed conflicts, the role 
of IHL as the lex specialis has granted primacy to the rules governing war. 
The lex specialis principle is remarkably vague and its broad scope allows 
multiple and divergent interpretations.504 The US and Israel, have argued that 
in situations of armed conflicts humanitarian law applies exclusively thus 
displacing or excluding human rights law framework.505 However the UN fact-
finding report of Gaza highlighted that the complementary application of 
humanitarian law and human rights principles is practicable and can ensure 
greater protection of individual rights when applied in such a way that 
respects the specifities of each field, where humanitarian law and human 
rights law apply to complete each other. There is no one-size-fits all solutions 
and complementary application of humanitarian law and human rights law can 
only develop if each case is handled according to its situation.506   
                                                        
503 Secretary General, Addressing Council Meeting On Counter-Terrorism, Says UN ‘Stands Four-
Square’ Against Scourge (18 Jan 2002), SG/SM/8105-SC/7277  
504 Lex Specialis principle has been interpreted to mean that depending on the situation at hand 
either one of the legal framework could be the more specific one see (Report of the Office of the High 
Commissioner on the outcome of the expert consultation on the issue of protecting the human rights 
of civilians in armed conflict, UN Doc A/HRC/14/40 (2 June 2010) at p. 14; Some interpret it as a 
combined application of two legal frameworks For instance in the context of targeted killing David 
Kretzmer suggested “the applicable system must be a mixed model, which incorporates features of 
international human rights law”, See David Kretzmer, ‘Targetted killing of suspected terrorist: Extra-
judicial executions or legitimate means of defence?’ (2005) EJIL 171, 171; Marco Sassoli and Laura M 
Oslon, ‘The relationship between International humanitarian law and international human rights law 
where it matters: Admissible killing and internment of fighters in non-international armed conflicts’ 
(2008) IRRC 599, 626; Not everyone agrees with mutual applicability of international humanitarian 
law and international human rights law. Shany highlighted the challenges with the mixed model 
approach see Yuval Shanny, Human rights and humanitarian law as competing legal paradigms for 
fighting terror in Orna Ben-Naftali, International humanitarian law and international human rights 
law (Oxford University Press 2011) 13    
505 These arguments were rejected by Human Rights Commission See Human Rights Commission, 
Concluding observations United States of America ‘ UN Doc CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (18 Dec 2006); 
Human Rights Commission, Concluding Observations, Israel, UN Doc CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3/ (3 Sep 2010) 
All these documents are from the Human Rights Committee, not the ‘Human Rights Commission’; 
Franco̧ise Hampson and Ibrahim Salama, Working paper on the relationship between human rights 
law and international humanitarian law, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/14, 21 June 2005, para 69 ; 
Philip Alston, Jason Morgan and William Abresch, ‘The Competence of the UN Human Rights Council 
and its Special Procedures in relation to Armed Conflicts: Extrajudicial Executions in the 'War on 
Terror'’ European Journal of International Law 2008, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 183–209 ; Droege, Cordula, 
‘Elective affinities? Human rights and humanitarian law’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2008, 
vol. 90, no. 871, pp. 501–548 
506 Noam Lubell and Nanice Prud’homme, impacts of human rights law in Rain Liivoja, Tim 
McCormack, Routledge Handbook of the Law of Armed Conflict, (Routledge, 2016), 120  
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Chapter 3: Targeted killing and use of lethal force by states  
3. Introduction 
After the 9/11 attacks President Bush not just invaded Afghanistan but 
authorised a campaign of missiles and bomb attacks beyond a specific armed  
conflict zone. In November 2002, the US carried out the first drone strike far 
from the battlefields of Afghanistan in Yemen.507 In 2004, the US carried out  
the first targeted killing attack in Pakistan using a drone.508 Then in 2011, 
similar attacks began in Somalia.509 These attacks were launched by using 
the new technology of unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly known as drones. 
The drone campaign conflicts with fundamental international law and the 
proclaimed US policy opposing targeted killing. In response to the Israeli 
practice of targeted killing, the US Ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, stated 
on the Israeli television in July 2001: ‘The United States government is very 
clearly on the record as against targeted assassinations. They are 
extrajudicial killings, and we do not support that.’510 However, the US has 
carried out targeted killings in the past. In 1981, President Ronald Reagan 
signed an executive order following up on a ban instituted by President Gerald 
Ford that barred the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from assassinations.511 
Though, there is evidence that covert anti-terrorist operation conducted by the 
                                                        
507 BBC News, ‘CIA 'killed al-Qaeda suspects' in Yemen’ (5 Nov 2002) < 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/2402479.stm > accessed15 July 2016 (America's Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) carried out an attack by using armed drones in Yemen that killed six suspected members 
of Osama Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda network, according to US officials. This was first time the US had 
carried out such an attack outside conflict zone of Afghanistan) 
508 ‘The Bush Years: Pakistan Strikes 2004-2009’(Bureau of Investigative Journalism,10 August 2011) < 
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/08/10/the-bush-years-2004-2009/ > accessed 15 July 
2016 (On 18 June 2004 US conducted first drone strike in FATA which killed 5–8 people including 
militant Nek Muhammad Wazir) 
509 Chris Wood, Sudden Justice, America's Secret Drone Wars (Oxford University Press 2015) 215 (The 
first known JSOC drone strike in Somalia came with an attempt to kill Bilal al Birjawi in June 2011) 
510 Joel Greenberg, ‘Israel Affirms Policy of Assassinating Militants’ (New York Times, 5 July 2001) < 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/05/world/israel-affirms-policy-of-assassinating-militants.html > 
accessed 15 July 2016 
511Executive Order 12333 United States Intelligence Activities, Para 2.11 states “No person employed 
by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in or conspire to engage in 
assassination” 
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CIA may have involved assassinations.512 In the mid-1990s there were reports 
that a CIA agent, Robert Baer, had initiated a plot to kill Saddam Hussain, 
which was blocked by Clintons National Security Affairs advisor.513  In 1998, 
President Bill Clinton took the first major step towards undermining the ban. 
He authorised the CIA to carry out the covert killing of Osama bin Laden. The 
Clinton Administration believed that the targeted killing of Bin Laden fell 
outside the ban on assassination given in Executive Order 12333. Christopher 
Kojm, a former U.S. Department of State’s official claimed that ‘[s]enior legal 
advisors in the Clinton administration agreed that under the law of armed 
conflict, killing a person who posed an imminent threat to the United States 
was an act of self-defence, not an assassination’.514  
After 9/11, President George Bush expanded President Clinton’s 
authorisation, issuing a presidential ‘finding'; while its contents remain 
classified it has reportedly reiterated President Clinton’s 1998 position that 
Executive Order 12333 allowed the CIA to kill terrorists, specifically Bin 
Laden, with the approval of the President.515Within days of taking office in 
January 2009, President Barack Obama dramatically increased the number of 
drone strikes. The Obama administration ordered more than 500 drone strikes 
between 2009 and 2016.516 In addition to strikes targeting subjects whose 
identities are known (personality strikes) the Obama administration also 
authorised ‘signature strikes’, targeting a large group of people whose 
identities are not known but who display patterns of behaviour that render 
                                                        
512 Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987 (Simon & Schuster 2005) 393-397; The 
two journalists, Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, claim that CIA was involved in the broad conspiracy 
surrounded Nicaraguan rebel activities in Costa Rica, including an assassination attempt, drug-dealing 
and gun-running see Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, Plaintiffs-appellants, v John Hull and others, 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991) 18 June 1991 < 
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/932/1572/289229/ > accessed 15 July 2016;  
Joan McCord and John H. Laub, Contemporary Masters in Criminology (Springer 1995) 48  
513 Dan Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict: U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq (Stanford 
University Press 2011) 156  
514 Craig R. Whitney, ‘In a War on Terror, Not All the Rules of War Apply’ N.Y. TIMES (28 March 2004) 
< http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/28/weekinreview/in-a-war-on-terror-not-all-the-rules-of-war-
apply.html?ref=&_r=0 > accessed 18 July 2016; Micah Zenko, Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete 
Military Operations in the Post-Cold War World (Stanford University Press,  2010); Christopher A. Ford 
and Amichai Cohen,  Rethinking the Law of Armed Conflict in an Age of Terrorism, (Lexington Books, 
2012), 231 
515 Avery Plaw, Targeting Terrorists: A License to Kill? (Routledge, 2008), 100-123 
516 The Bureau of investigative journalism, Get the data: drone wars <  
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/ > ; International 
Security data site < http://securitydata.newamerica.net/ > accessed 15 July 2016  
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them suspicious.517This shift entails the killing of all males of a certain age in 
pre-determined locations.518 President Obama also authorised the killing of 
Americans. The confirmation came from the then Director of National 
Intelligence, Dennis Blair, during a congressional testimony in February 2010. 
Blair said, ‘being a US citizen will not spare an American from getting 
assassinated by military or intelligence operatives overseas if the individual is 
working with terrorists and planning to attack fellow Americans’.519  
Since then, new drone bases have been established around the world, raising 
the expectation of future drone attacks beyond armed conflict zones. 520 
Drones are used by both the US military and the CIA in warzones 521 
(Afghanistan and Iraq) but also outside active battlefields in counterterrorism 
efforts in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. The Obama administration 
                                                        
Bradley Jay Strawser, Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military (Oxford 
University Press, 2013) 
517   Murtaza Hussain, ‘Pakistan's legal fight to end the drone war’ (Al-Jazeera, 15 Dec 2011) <  
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/12/20111213112743546541.html > accessed 22 
July 2016   
518 Derek Jinks, Jackson N. Maogoto and Solon Solomon, Applying International Humanitarian Law in 
Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies: International and Domestic Aspects (T.M.C. Asser Press; 2014), 68  
519 111th Congress 2D Session, H.R. 6010, To prohibit the extrajudicial killing of United States citizens, 
and for other purposes, Para 3 < http://fas.org/irp/congress/2010_cr/hr6010.pdf > accessed 15 July 
2016 
520 Helen Duffy, The ‘War on Terror' and the Framework of International Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2015) 414; The Washington Post, ‘US building secret drone bases in Africa, Arabian Peninsula 
officials say’ (20 Sep 2011) < https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-building-
secret-drone-bases-in-africa-arabian-peninsula-officials-say/2011/09/20/gIQAJ8rOjK_story.html > 
accessed 15 July 2016 (Officials report that US is building new bases in Africa and the Arabian 
Peninsula); Another report suggests that the US operates fifty-seven drone bases : Nick Turse, 
‘Mapping Americas shadowy drone wars’ (Tom Dispatch, 16 Oct 2011) < 
http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175454/tomgram%3A_nick_turse,_mapping_america's_shadowy
_drone_wars/ > accessed 15 July 2016 ; Nick Turse, ‘Revealed: The Full Extent of America’s Secret 
Empire of Drone Bases’, (AlterNet, 6 Feb 2015) http://www.alternet.org/world/revealed-full-extent-
americas-secret-empire-drone-bases > accessed 15 July 2016     
521 Warzones mean active battlefield, places in which US is involved in an armed conflict. “The armed 
conflict between the US and Afghanistan began as an international armed conflict (IAC). Everyone 
agrees on that. However, I think the US government position is that once the Taliban were defeated 
and removed from power, the conflict transformed into a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) 
between the new government of Afghanistan and the Taliban acting as a non-state actor. The U.S. is a 
party to this conflict as a co-belligerent fighting alongside the “new” government of Afghanistan, 
helping them to fight their NIAC against the Taliban” see Jens David Ohlin, ‘The Nature and Scope of 
the War in Afghanistan’ (Opinio Juris, 2015) < http://opiniojuris.org/2015/05/28/the-nature-and-
scope-of-the-war-in-afghanistan/ > accessed 22 July 2016; Mary O’ Connell said drones are lawful 
battlefield weapons and their lawful use includes countries like Iraq and Afghanistan see  Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, ‘Lawful Use of Combat Drones, Congress of the United States House of Representatives, 
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Hearing: Rise of the Drones II: Examining the 
Legality of Unmanned Targeting’ (28 April 2010) < 
https://fas.org/irp/congress/2010_hr/042810oconnell.pdf > accessed 22 July 2016  
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escalated targeted killings through a rapid increase in drone strikes against 
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and through expansion of US special operations’ 
kill/capture missions.522 The successful killing of Osama bin Laden in a US 
Navy SEAL raid, in May 2011, is prime example of this trend.523  
Since 9/11, the US government has given multiple legal justifications for 
targeted killings. These justifications have appeared in official governmental 
speeches and documents, as well as in the writing of scholars sympathetic to 
the practice. This includes the following argument:  
1) The Bush administration declared that the US is engaged in a ‘global 
war on terrorism’ meaning that entire world is a battlefield and 
members of certain groups could be targeted anywhere.524 The Obama 
administration continued Bush’s policy but used the term ‘armed 
conflict against Al-Qaeda, Taliban and associated forces’ that began on 
9/11.525  
2) The US governments targeted killing program is a valid exercise of the 
United States inherent right of self-defence provided for in Art 51 of the 
UN Charter.526 
3) The US is targeting terrorist suspects in states, which have consented 
to the drone strikes.527 
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Battlefields (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2015) 121-127 
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4) The US is targeting terrorist suspects in states, either ‘unable or 
unwilling’ to quell the threat at issue.528   
Rather than providing one wholly sufficient exception to the general 
prohibition on the use of force, the US has opted for a strategy that provides 
multiple arguments to gain a greater accumulated affect. According to 
Professor Mary O’Connell, this reliance on multiple arguments may suggest 
that the policy is on weak legal grounds.529 This chapter will assess whether 
or not the above-mentioned justifications stand up to the scrutiny of 
international law.     
3.1 Genealogy of drones 
‘The pilot of the future will not even need to leave home to wage a foreign 
war’530 
After the Air War a new form of warfare will appear much as the Air 
War succeeded the Ground War. We can call it the Remote War 
(where)…. one side loses people the other side loses toys. All that is 
left is the shooting and dying … and toys don’t die...531 
The purpose of this section is to review the genealogy of the predator and to 
examine the policy standards and procedures for the use of drones in 
targeted killing.  The technology enabling the use of drones can be traced 
back to the First World War.532 Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV) were the 
earliest ancestor of modern aerial drones. Dumb drones were used to test and 
train combat pilots, missile men, and antiaircraft gunners. This is possibly the 
most salient example of the impact of technology on rules of engagement 
during armed conflicts. The technology underpinning the RPVs first utilised 
during the 1975 Vietnam War has evolved in the intervening decades and has 
                                                        
528 ibid 
529 Mary O’Conell, ‘International law and drone attacks beyond armed conflict zone’, in David 
Cortright, Rachel Fairhurst and Kristen Wall, Drones and the Future of Armed Conflict: Ethical, Legal, 
and Strategic Implications (University of Chicago Press 2015) 64-65  
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532 Ian G.R. Shaw, ‘The Rise of the Predator Empire: Tracing the History of U.S. Drones’ < 
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now forever altered the nature of war. It will not be wrong to say that drones 
are now the future of war. As Peter Singer reveals, ‘there is not a single new 
manned combat aircraft under research and development at any major 
Western aerospace company, and the Air Force is training more operators of 
unmanned aerial systems than fighter and bomber pilots combined.’533 The 
US drones have been the key tool in the counterterrorism fight in Pakistan, 
Somalia and Yemen and have also taken centre stage in the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Drones can be either controlled remotely by pilots from 
the ground or autonomously following a pre-programmed mission. 534  The 
development of drones has been closely connected to warfare. For military 
purposes, drones are used to achieve two main objectives: reconnaissance 
and surveillance, on one hand; and on the other, for targeted killing, when 
they are armed with missiles and bombs. They have been particularly popular 
with the US military and also with the CIA during the global war against 
terrorists. During the Vietnam War the US military used an estimate 147 
drones535 for reconnaissance purposes and nicknamed as ‘lightning bugs’.536 
Many of the aerial views of Vietnam appearing in the US press were captured 
by drones.537 Until November 2001 the drones were machines for intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance. Even in 1999, in the context of the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo, the US deployed drones with the specific aim of 
filming targets and illuminating them by means of lasers, allowing the F-16 
planes to strike; they were conceived as ‘eyes’ rather than weapons.538 
                                                        
533 Peter W Singer, ‘Do Drones Undermine Democracy?’ The New York Times (21 Jan 2012), < 
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piloted remotely and can be expendable or recoverable” See US Department of Defence, Unmanned 
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3.1.1 Drones in the fight against terrorism 
Until 2001 drones were used for reconnaissance only and lacked the ability to 
fire a weapon.539In September 2000, when the CIA began flying drones in 
Afghanistan for surveillance purposes, it quickly became apparent a 
weaponised version was needed after spotting Osama Bin Laden at a training 
facility. At that time Bin Laden was wanted for his complicity in facilitating a 
terrorist attacks against American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998. 
Therefore the decision to weaponise drones is connected to their use for 
surveillance, when drones flown by the CIA from Uzbekistan to Afghanistan 
spotted a man resembling or allegedly believed by senior US security analysts 
to be Bin Laden.540 The inability to kill Bin Laden on the spot in 2002 triggered 
the interest in armed drones. Drone-fired missiles can travel faster than the 
speed of sound and are thus able to strike a target before people on the 
ground hear it.541 Conversely, cruise missiles used in 1998 to target Obama 
bin Laden542 had serious limitations, and required reliable intelligence and 
maps, a heavy time-investment, and above all, their efficacy was subjected to 
the enemy staying in one place. The 1998 operation on Bin Laden required 
four to six hours to analyse the intelligence, obtain presidential authorization, 
program the missiles, and fly them to the target.  
It is unsurprising that armed drones have emerged as the platform of choice in 
the counterterrorism mission.  
In military operations, these drones are highly capable and sought after 
by ground forces. They cost roughly $4-5M versus a modern fighter’s 
$150M. They persist on station for 15-20 hours without refuelling, 
versus 1-2 hours for fighter attack aircraft. They consume 100 gallons 
of fuel per flight versus 1,000-3,000 gallons for an unrefuelled fighter 
attack aircraft. Their optics provides full motion imagery at far greater 
distances and altitudes than the human eye, and the crews are not 
                                                        
539 Mark Mazzetti, The way of knife, the CIA, a secret army and a war at the ends of the earth (Scribe 
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540 Jarrett Murphy, ‘Infighting delayed Osama hunt’ CBS News (25 June 2003) < 
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distracted or disabled by the constant duties of flight. Their sensor 
information can be distributed to fixed and mobile users in real time.543  
On a technical level drones’ main advantage in comparison to 
traditional military means of fighting terrorism (Special Operation 
raids 544  or conventional aerial bombings) is their ability to conduct 
continuous surveillance of suspected targets.545 
Compared to other military tools, the advantages of using drones are many 
but a chief factor is that they avoid risks to US forces. Drone pilots sit safely, 
thousands of miles away from physical danger of the war they are fighting. 
Drones have literally divided the war theatre between the ‘hostile area’ and 
the ‘safe area’.546 All this helps to understand the rationale leading to the US 
to adopt them as their main weapon of choice in the fight against terrorism 
after 9/11.   
3.2 Targeted killing or assassination? 
Before the emergence of drones, individual hit teams undertook 
assassinations. However, the use of drones for killing enemies in a third state 
enabled the governments to engage in targeted killing operations from 
thousands of miles away while sitting at a computer terminal. This raises 
important legal and policy questions like, what constitutes an assassination 
and what may be deemed a permissible targeted killing. It is worth noting that 
the term ‘targeted killing’ is often confused with ‘assassination’. For instance, 
the term ‘assassination’ was used to describe the killing of Osama bin Laden 
by many major American and world news outlets.547 There are important legal 
differences between these two terms. 
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3.2.1 Assassination 
Opponents of targeted killings tend to describe it as extrajudicial execution or 
assassination.548 Extrajudicial killing reflects a government’s policy to kill its 
opponents not for operational or self-defence purposes but as a mean to 
punish adversaries of the state. It reveals a regime that prefers to eliminate 
individuals even where  capture and arrest is possible.549 In contrast, the 
targeted killing conducted in accordance with international law only targets an 
individual whose arrest is not feasible. The primary objective of lawful targeted 
killing is the prevention of a terrorist act intended to kill innocent civilians.550   
Assassination is generally defined as ‘any unlawful killing of someone for 
political purposes’.551Targeted killing is different from assassination.552One of 
the most problematic aspects of the regime governing assassination is 
defining the term itself. Many laws refer to assassination but few defined it.553 
For instance, the Executive Order 12333554 prohibits the United States from 
conducting assassinations, yet it does not define or specify what constitutes 
an ‘assassination’. 555 Colonel W. Hays Parks wrote in the Memorandum on 
Executive Order 12333, that an ‘assassination involves murder of a targeted 
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555Executive Order 12333, United States intelligence activities, 2.11 states “No person employed by or 
acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, 
assassination” 
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individuals for political purposes’.556According to this description, a ‘victim 
need not to be a political leader or public official. As long as there is a political 
motive, an assassination can be committed against a private person’. 557 
Whatever conceptual framework is used these killings don’t find justification 
under the rules governing self-defence in international law. 558 The 
assassination ban does not include lawful acts of self-defence, as explained 
by Koh:  
[U]nder domestic law, the use of lawful weapons systems consistent 
with the applicable laws of war for precision targeting of specific high-
level belligerent leaders when acting in self-defence or during an 
armed conflict is not unlawful, and hence does not constitute 
assassination.559 
Scholars also differentiate between peacetime and wartime killings, while 
acknowledging that both are illegal.560’The criteria for determining each type 
of assassination are slightly different. Peacetime assassination involves the 
murder of a specifically targeted person for a political purpose. Wartime 
assassination, on the other hand, requires the murder of a targeted individual 
by using treacherous means.’ 561  Wartime killing can only be considered 
assassination when it involves treacherous means; the political intent is 
irrelevant, 562  since ‘once a war begins, every death can be viewed as 
politically motivated because it is difficult to discern political intent from other 
                                                        
556 Colonel W. Hays Parks, Memorandum On Executive Order 12333 And Assasination, Department Of 
The Army Office Of The Judge Advocate General Of The Army (2 November 1989) see Annex A < 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/targetedkilling/papers/ParksMemorandum.
pdf > accessed 18 July 2016 
557 Matthew C. Wiebe, ‘Comment, Assassination in Domestic and International Law: The Central 
Intelligence Agency, State-Sponsored Terrorism, and the Right of Self-Defence’ (2003) TULSA J. COMP. 
& INT'L L. 363, 365-66   
558 Major Tyler J. Harder, ‘Time to Repeal the Assassination Ban of Executive Order 12,333: A Small 
Step in Clarifying Current Law’ (2002) 172 MIL. L. REV 1, 2 
559 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, ‘U.S. Department of State, The Obama Administration and 
International Law’ (25 March 2010) < http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm > 
accessed 22 July 2016 
560 Daniel B. Pickard, ‘Legalizing Assassination? Terrorism, the Central Intelligence Agency, and 
International Law’ (2002) GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 6 (Pickard stressed that the legality of 
assassination typically depends on whether the act is committed during peacetime or wartime) 
561 Major Tyler J. Harder, ‘Time to Repeal the Assassination Ban of Executive Order 12,333: A Small 
Step in Clarifying Current Law’ (2002) MIL. L. REV. 1, 4 
562 Mark Vincent Vlasic, Cloak and Dagger, ‘Diplomacy: The U.S. and Assassination’ (2000) GEO. J. 
INT'L AFF 95, 98  
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acts’. 563  Treacherous killing, defined as ‘breach of confidence’ 564  includes 
some form of deceiving the victim, for instance using a false protected status 
or a bounty. 565Treacherous attacks are however different from a-surprise 
attack. Not all acts that involve trickery or deception are illegal surprise 
attacks are generally considered legitimate/legal battlefield tactics. 566 
According to Article 23(b) of the Hague Convention IV of 1907 it is forbidden 
‘to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or 
army’.567 Although the phrase ‘wounding treacherously’ is not defined, this 
provision has been interpreted as the first international attempt to codify the 
law prohibiting assassination. 568 Therefore, in wartime, the targeting of a 
specific individual is not assassination providing treachery is not utilised.569 
Assassination is usually linked to a political motive, such as removing a leader 
from its position when policies are objectionable. The term targeted killing 
may be used for the same purpose. The major difference is in the means of 
force used. Targeted killing is used to describe intentional killing when the 
                                                        
563 Nathan Canestaro, ‘American Law and Policy on Assassinations of Foreign Leaders: The Practicality 
of Maintaining the Status Quo’ (2003) B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 12  
564 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘State-Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law’ (1992) 
YALE J. INT'L L. 609, 633 (quoting War office, The law of war on land, being part III of the manual of 
military law, Art. 155 (1958))  
565 (Treachery requires a breach of confidence. According to one scholar, "it is the essence of 
treachery that the offender assumes a false character by which he deceives his enemy and thereby is 
able to effect a hostile act which, had he come under his true colours, he could not have done. He 
takes advantage of his enemy's reliance on his honour.") See Michael N. Schmitt, ‘State-Sponsored 
Assassination in International and Domestic Law’ (1992) YALE J. INT'L L. 609, 633, footnote 118 
(quoting J.M. Spaight, War Rights On Land 86, 87 (1911)); The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) states 
that Art 23(b) of Hague Convention IV has been construed as prohibiting “assassination, proscription, 
or outlawry of an enemy, or putting a price upon an enemy’s head, as well as offering a reward for an 
enemy “dead or alive” see United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-13, International law-The conduct 
of armed conflict and air operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, s 8-2; Matthew C. Wieber, 
‘Comment, Assassination in Domestic and International Law: The Central Intelligence Agency, State-
Sponsored Terrorism, and the Right of Self-defence’ (2003) TULSA 
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 363, 366 
566 Ibid, 388 (Wieber said that treachery does not include placing a bomb in a compound, or using 
sniper to kill a victim from a hidden location. Treachery is when one deliberately wear enemy’s 
uniform to look like him and then kill him deceptively); Lieutenant Commander Patricia Zengel, 
‘Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict’ (1995) MIL. L. REV. 123, 132 (Zengel stated that 
treachery arises when soldiers disguise as civilians and kill enemy combatants by deceiving them)  
567 Laws of War:  Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV); October 18, 1907  
568 Brenda L. Godfrey, ‘Comment, Authorization to Kill Terrorist Leaders and Those Who Harbour 
Them: An International Analysis of Defensive Assassination’ (2003) SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 491, 492 and 
495  
569 Air Force Pamphlet 110-13, International law-The conduct of armed conflict and air operations, US 
Department of the Air Force, 1976, s 8-2 (Art 23(b) of the Hague Convention IV prohibits treacherous 
acts but “it does not preclude lawful attacks by lawful combatants on individual soldiers of officers of 
the enemy”) 
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military force is deployed. By contrast, assassination belongs to the category 
of extrajudicial intentional killing of a person regardless of the means used to 
attack.570  Assassination is as such illegal, whereas other modes of killing 
including targeted killing may be legal or illegal, depending on how it is 
analysed based on the international law of armed conflict and the use of force 
test.  
3.2.2 Targeted killing  
 
The term targeted killing is not defined in international law. The literal meaning 
of targeted killing implies that lethal force is directed against a specific target. 
Violence carried out by state officials or non-state officials on behalf of state 
can result in targeted killings.571 Most frequently, the terminology is used to 
describe lethal force directed against individuals involved in terrorism. 572 It 
became widely used during the 2000 Palestinian uprising against Israel (the 
‘Second Intifada’) when Israel made public its long-standing policy of killing 
alleged terrorists in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and elsewhere.573 At 
that time, the US rejected Israeli targeted killings and categorised them as 
‘assassinations’ and ‘extrajudicial killings’.574  
This discourse changed following the 9/11 attacks, when the US described 
the term targeted killing as an intentional killing involving the use of military 
force.575 Some international law scholars, such as Nehal Bhuta, persuasively 
argues that there is no important distinction in international law between the 
terms ‘targeted killing’ and ‘assassination’,576 but others such as Nils Melzer 
                                                        
570 Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘International law and drone attacks beyond armed conflict zones’, 63 in 
David Cortright, Rachel Fairhurst and Kristen Wall, Drones and the Future of Armed Conflict: Ethical, 
Legal, and Strategic Implications (University of Chicago Press 2015) 
571 Steven R. David, ‘Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing’ (2003) Carnegie Council on Ethics and 
International Affairs 111, 112 
572 ibid 
573 Christine Gray, ‘Targeted Killings: Recent US Attempts to Create a Legal Framework, Current Legal 
Problems’ (2013) 75, 76 
574 Mary O’Connell (n 570) 
575 Harold Koh, ‘US Legal Adviser, The Obama Administration and International Law’ (25 March 2010)< 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm > accessed 18 July 2016 (US State 
Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh has argued that ‘targeting of specific high level belligerent 
leaders when acting in self-defence or during an armed conflict is not unlawful, and hence does not 
constitute “assassination”)  
576 Nehal Bhuta, ‘States of Exception: Regulating Targeted Killing in a “Global Civil War”’, in Human 
rights intervention and the use of force (Philip Alston and Euan MacDonald eds., 2008), 243, 246 
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asserts that ‘the term 'targeted killing' denotes the use of lethal force 
attributable to a subject of international law with the intent, premeditation and 
deliberation to kill individually selected persons who are not in the physical 
custody of those targeting them.’577  
Unlike the term targeted killing, the term assassination does not reveal 
whether the lethal force has been carried out by a state agent or a non-state 
agent on behalf of a state, or by non-state agents operating on their own 
without any state involvement.578Another difference between assassinations 
and targeted killing is that assassinations represent illegal conduct. Peacetime 
definitions of assassination define it as murder or unlawful killing while 
wartime definitions of assassination describe it as the killing of a specific 
person by treacherous means. As discussed, assassinations can never be 
legal, the legality of a particular targeted killing must be determined by looking 
at the applicable legal framework. Possible frameworks include the law of self-
defence, international humanitarian law, and human rights law. The following 
section will assess the legality of drone strikes under these frameworks.  
3.3 Drone strikes and Jus ad Bellum 
Drones have become an everyday reality in the war on terror and a weapon of 
choice for militaries across the globe. The proliferation of drones seems 
inevitable and, within a decade, it is predicted that almost every single country 
on Earth will have its own armed drones. 579  At the time of writing, nine 
countries including the UK, USA, Pakistan, Turkey, Israel, Iraq, Iran, Nigeria 
and Azerbaijan are using armed drones in combat.580 On 20th April 2018, the 
                                                                                                                                                              
footnote 20. (Her assertion is not followed by majority of states and states practice show that 
targeted killing is considered unlawful only if it fails to satisfy the laws of war) 
577 Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing in international law (Oxford University Press 2008) 5 
578 Schmitt (n 565) 632 
579 Defence one, ‘Every Country Will Have Armed Drones Within 10 Years’ (6 May 2014) < 
http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/05/every-country-will-have-armed-drones-within-
ten-years/83878/ > accessed 19 July 2016; The armed drones club has grown exponentially See Clay 
Dillow, ‘All of These Countries Now Have Armed Drones’ (Fortune, 12 Feb 2016) < 
http://fortune.com/2016/02/12/these-countries-have-armed-drones/ > accessed at 19 July 2016;  
seven countries have used armed drones in combat: the United States, Israel, the United Kingdom, 
Pakistan, Iraq, Nigeria, and Iran See New America, ‘World of Drones: Military’ < 
http://securitydata.newamerica.net/world-drones.html > accessed 19 July 2016 
580 New America, “Who has What: Countries with drones used in combat”, <  
https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/world-of-drones/2-who-has-what-countries-drones-used-
combat/  > accessed 7 Jan 2017 
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Trump administration announced a new drone export policy designed to make 
it easier for the US companies to export armed drones.581  
The rapid proliferation of drone technology among states and militant groups 
alike poses a new threat to the international community. Several non-state 
actors including ISIS, Hamas, Hezbollah, or Houthi rebels, have incorporated 
drones into their operations.582 Supporters hail it as an effective and precise 
military weapon. Independent of the potential benefits the use of drones 
require a renewed perspective on the issue of legality and legitimacy. Legality 
of drones is a controversial issue and the debate of the last decade suggests 
that drone strikes fail to fit in established patterns of legal argument. Concerns 
about the legality of drones have been raised by Professor Philip Alston, 
former UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary 
Executions. In his 2010 report he stated that targeted killing by drones had led 
to a ‘highly problematic blurring…. of the boundaries of the applicable legal 
frameworks’ the result of which ‘has been the displacement of clear legal 
standards with a vaguely defined license to kill’.583 
The use of drone strikes raises further questions under laws of war and 
human rights law. However, this section will not engage with IHL and IHRL. It 
addresses the question of whether a state can use force in self-defence in 
undeclared war zones at all. The rules governing e legality of the use of 
armed force, have proven insufficient in previous decades to regulate wars for 
national liberation, or alleged humanitarian interventions. Drones used in the 
context of the war on terror present a fresh challenge. This section will assess 
to what extent the current jus ad bellum permits the use of drone strikes 
against terrorists in undeclared warzones. The section will begin by assessing 
the UN Charter general regime regulating inter-state force. The focus is on the 
main exception to the use of force, namely the right to act in self-defence. 
                                                        
581 Michael C. Horowitz and Joshua A. Schwartz, ‘A new U.S. policy makes it (somewhat) easier to 
export drones’ (The Washington Post, 20 April 2018) < 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/04/20/a-new-u-s-policy-makes-it-
somewhat-easier-to-export-drones/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ee8237576d2b > accessed 24 April 
2018 
582 New America, ‘Non-State Actors with Drone Capabilities’ < https://www.newamerica.org/in-
depth/world-of-drones/5-non-state-actors-drone-capabilities/  > accessed 24 April 2018 
583 Philip Alston, ‘Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, “Study on 
Targeted Killings,”’ (28 May 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.6   
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3.3.1 Prohibition against the use of force and drone strikes  
Prohibition against the use of force is considered the ‘cornerstone’ of the UN 
Charter 584 , and is ‘the most important principle in the contemporary 
international law to govern inter-state conduct’. 585 The general prohibition 
against the use of force is given in Art 2(4) of UN Charter.586However this 
prohibition is not absolute, Art 42, 43 and 51 of the Charter recognise two 
exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force; most important one 
is the ‘inherent’ right of individual and collective self-defence and enforcement 
measures involving the use of force sanctioned by the Security Council under 
Chapter VII thereof.587 A third exception not provided for in the UN Charter is 
the consent of the territorial state. Article 20 of the Draft Articles of State 
Responsibility recognises that ‘[v]alid consent by a state to the commission of 
a given act by another state precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation 
to the former state to the extent that the act remains within the limits of that 
consent.’588 It is indisputable that one state may employ force in another state 
with the consent of that state.589The lawfulness of a state’s allowing other 
states to use force on their territory was explicitly affirmed by the ICJ in Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo.590   
When applying the prohibition against the use of force to the problems of 
drone strikes, two questions need to be answered: 1) Does a drone strike 
violate the prohibition against the use of force? 2) Can a drone strike be 
justified under these exceptions? 
                                                        
584 Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) 
Judgement, (2005), Para 148 (ICJ stated that “The prohibition against the use of force is a cornerstone 
of the United Nations Charter”); C Joyner, International law in the 21st century (Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2005), 165  
585 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v USA), (2003) P. 161  
586 Art 2(4) obliges UN members to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” 
587 UN Charter, CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE 
PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION Art 39-51  
588 United Nations, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with 
commentaries (2001) 
589 Alston (n 372) para 35 
590Armed Activities on the territory of Congo (n 214) 198-199; Antonio Cassese, International law 
(Oxford University Press 2005) 370-371  
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The answer of first question is straightforward. A drone strike amounts to the 
use of military force and therefore involves Art 2(4) of the UN Charter.591Art 
2(4) bans not only full-scale military operations but also all uses of force.592If a 
drone strike is directed against a terrorist in a foreign state, it will violate the 
prohibition on the use of force, irrespective of whether the target is a non-state 
actor not state.593The UN Security Council has not authorised the US to use 
force in undeclared warzones. However, the US may invoke state consent, 
self-defence or both. 
The challenges posed by terrorism are not new, but the legal regime 
governing counterterrorism measures have changed substantially. In the 
1980s and 1990s, terrorism was treated as a problem of criminal law that 
would be addressed through law enforcement methods. 594  When states 
asserted a right to use military force against terrorists in foreign states by 
invoking the right to self-defence, the UN Security Council rejected their 
claims. For instance, Israel’s raid on the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
Headquarters in 1985 was condemned by the Security Council as an ‘act of 
armed aggression…in flagrant violation of the Charter of the UN’. 595  The 
General Assembly strongly condemned the US raid on targets in Libya in 
1986 and described it as ‘a violation of the Charter of the UN’.596And the 
                                                        
591 Predator and Reaper drones are used in the war on terror “Predator drones carried only two air-
to-surface Hellfire rockets…Reaper drone can carry up to four hellfire missile and two laser-guided 
bombs and 500 lb munition making it the most heavily armed drone to date” see US Air Force, MQ-1B 
Predator, published (23 Sep 2015) < 
http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104469/mq-1b-predator.aspx > 
accessed 19 July 2016; US Air Force, MQ-9 Reaper, published (23 Sep 2015) < 
http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper.aspx > 
accessed 19 July 2016 
592 Although the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of other states 
is explicitly banned but “any other use of inter-state force by states for whatever reason is banned, 
unless explicitly allowed by the state” See Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and self-defence 
(Cambridge University Press 2011) 87-88; (“Art 2(4) prohibits the threat and actual use of armed force 
in all its forms: wars, reprisals or all other kinds of use of arms, including of course acts of aggression”) 
Chantal Meloni and Gianni Tognoni, Is There a Court for Gaza?: A Test Bench for International Justice 
(T.M.C. Asser Press 2012) 63   
593 Dapo Akande, ‘Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts’ (2012) Legal Research 
Paper Series, Paper No. 50, 58-60  
594 Stuart Oskamp and P. Wesley Schultz, Attitudes and Opinions (psychology 2014) 364 (one 
exception was 1986 bombing attack on Libya by US)   
595 See SC Res 586(1985) 
596 See General Assembly Res. 41/38  
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Security Council unanimously rejected South Africa’s claim that they had a 
right of hot pursuit against offenders across borders.597 
3.3.2 Restrictive approach to Jus ad bellum       
It has been explained in previous sections 598that the International Court of 
Justice has adopted an interpretation of the terminology ‘armed attacks’ 
restricting it to the most grave forms of the use of force. This threshold is 
crucial because terrorist attacks are more likely to be of lesser intensity than 
attacks carried out by state forces, and therefore would typically not trigger a 
right of self-defence. Additionally, where non-state actors or terrorists operate 
from foreign territory, their conduct has been traditionally attributed to 
territorial state only if the armed attack was carried under ‘effective control’ of 
the territorial state.599 The ‘effective control’ test was reaffirmed in Articles 5 
and 8 of the International Law Commissions text on State Responsibility.600  
The ICJ jurisprudence has also firmly established that the right to self-defence 
cannot be used to punish the aggressor but only to repel a current or 
imminent armed attacks against a state.601Moreover, the customary law on 
the right to self-defence, constructed around the ‘Caroline Case’ obliges 
states to fulfil the principles of ‘necessity’, ‘proportionality’ and ‘immediacy. 602 
Essentially, under this traditional understanding of self-defence states cannot 
use force against distant or vague threat of terrorism.  
However, this traditional approach has come under increased pressure when 
the world faced the threat of global terrorism and state practice began to 
influence the interpretation of the jus ad bellum.    
                                                        
597 See Security Council Res. 568 (1985) and Security Council Res. 527 (1982)    
598 See section 2.2 prohibition of the use of force in international law 
599 Nicaragua (n 205) Para 109,115, 195 
600International Law Commission, Articles on State Responsibility, International Law Commission 
Report, A/56/10 August 2001, Art 5 states “The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of 
the State… shall be considered an act of the State under international law, provided the person or 
entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance.”; Art 8 states “The conduct of a person or 
group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group 
of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in 
carrying out the conduct” 
601 Enzo Cannizzaro, ‘Contextualising proportionality: Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Lebanese 
War’ (2006) International Review of the Red Cross 779, 782 
602 Letter from Mr. Webster to Lord Ashburton, Dep of State, Washington, 6th Aug 1842, (the right to 
“self-defence do exist, those exceptions should be confined to eases in which the "necessity of that 
self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation.") 
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3.4 Threat of global terrorism and the changing law of self-defence 
against non-state actors  
Although terrorism has deserved international attention since the 1970s603 the 
events of 9/11 resulted in a drastic shift. Few weeks after the attack, the 
Security Council passed Resolution 1373 and called on states to freeze 
terrorist financing, pass anti-terrorism laws, prevent suspected terrorists from 
traveling across international borders, and order to screen asylum seekers for 
possible terrorist ties. It was an unprecedented move under the rubric of 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, thereby making these dictates binding under 
international law. 604 Several commentators have indeed questioned the 
legitimacy of the self-endowed powers of the Security Council to impose 
legislative and executive counter terrorism actions on UN state members.605 
Nonetheless, a substantial body of international law on terrorism emerged 
which continue to grow at a frantic pace. 606 Most recently, the UNSC 
                                                        
603 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, annexed to G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 
U.N. Doc. A/1883 (Oct. 24, 1970) (stating every State’s duty to refrain from organizing, participating, 
or acquiescing in any acts of civil strife or terrorism in another State); Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their 
Independence and Sovereignty, annexed to G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), U.N. Doc A/1408 (Dec. 21, 1965) 
(stating that no State shall incite terrorist activities for the purpose of regime change);  G.A. Res. 3034 
(XXVII), U.N. Doc. A/2114 (Dec. 18, 1972). In this resolution, adopted shortly after the attack at the 
Munich Olympics, the General Assembly, “deeply perturbed over acts of international terrorism 
which are occurring with increasing frequency,” invited states to become parties to the existing anti-
terrorism conventions and to “take all appropriate measures at the national level with a view to the 
speedy and final elimination of the problem.”; International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999); International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings, G.A. Res. 52/164, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/653 (Dec. 15, 1997); Declaration on Measures to 
Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, UN Doc. A/RES/49/60 (Dec. 9, 1994);      
604 Resolution 1373 (2001) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on 28 September 
2001 
605 Stefan Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’ (2005) 99 American Journal of 
International Law 175-193; Eric Rosand , 'The Security Council as Global Legislator: Ultra Vires or Ultra 
Innovative' (2005) 28(3) Fordham Int'l LJ 542 
606 Protocol Amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, May 15, 2003, 
EUROP. T.S. NO. 190. 44. Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, May 16, 2005, EUROP. T.S. NO. 
196. 45. Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (8 July 2004) 
< http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/treaties.htm ; African Union [AU], Plan 
of Action of the African Union High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and 
Combating of Terrorism in Africa, AU Doc. Mtg/HLIG/Conv.Terror/Plan.(I) (14 Sep 2002). 46. 
Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (6 Jan 2004) < 
http://www.saarc-sec.org/data/summit12/additionalprotocolterrorism.pdf  > 47. ASEAN Convention 
on Counter-Terrorism, (13 Jan 2007) < http://www.aseansec.org/19250.htm > ; Ass’n of Southeast 
Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, (Nov. 5, 2001) < 
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Resolution 2249 (2015) on Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) is an 
expression of longer term legal developments that started in 2001. 607The 
UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 2249 in the aftermath of the ISIL 
bombing of a Russian jetliner over the Sinai desert on October 31, 2015, and 
ISIL attacks on a Paris stadium and concert hall on November 13, 2015.  The 
Resolution stated that ISIL is ‘a global and unprecedented threat to 
international peace and security’, and called for ‘all necessary measures’ to 
‘eradicate the safe haven [ISIL] established’ in Syria.608 Resolution 2249 did 
not provide a new stand-alone legal basis or authorisation for use of force 
against ISIL in Syria.609 It was not adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter 
and is not legally binding.610 Arguably, even if it is not legally binding it can still 
‘have an important function in relation to general international law as it applies 
to the issue at hand’.611 It is constructed in such a way that it can be used to 
provide political support for military action.612The wording of the Resolution 
has given broader right to states to use force in self-defence: 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.aseansec.org/5620.htm > 48. Org. of the Islamic Conference [OIC], Kuala Lumpur 
Declaration on International Terrorism (Apr. 3, 2002) < http://www.oic-
oci.org/english/conf/fm/11_extraordinary/declaration.htm > 49. Org. for Security and Co-Operation 
in Eur. [OSCE], Decision No. 1 on Combating Terrorism, OSCE Doc. MC(9).DEC/1 (4 Dec 2001) < 
http://www.osce.org/item/2229.html >; OSCE, Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, 
OSCE Doc. MC(9).DEC/1 Annex (Dec. 4, 2001) < http://www.osce.org/item/851.html >; OSCE Charter 
on Preventing and Combating Terrorism, OSCE Doc. MC(10).JOUR/2 (Dec. 7, 2002), < 
http://www.osce.org/item/1654.html >50 . COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS, REPORT OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM (CCT): COMMONWEALTH PLAN OF ACTION (2001), 
<http://www.thecommonwealth.org/document/181889/34293/35144/35145/report_of_the_commo
nwealth_co mmittee_on_terrorism.htm> ; INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST TERRORISM, 
AG/RES. 1840 (XXXII-O/02), < 
http://www.oas.org/xxxiiga/english/docs_en/docs_items/agres1840_02.htm >; International 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, G.A. Res. 59/290, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/59/290, (Apr. 13, 2005) See comment later about format for dates. 
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In confirming that ISIS represent a permanent and active threat of 
further attack, the Council appears to relieve individual states from 
having to fulfil the criteria for self-defence when considering armed 
action in Syria.613 
Although the UNSC Resolution 2249 legitimises use of force against ISIL, it 
pays due regard to state sovereignty. Intervention and use of force is allowed 
only in geographic areas controlled by ISIL in Iraq and Syria.614  
3.4.1 State practice after 9/11 
State practice has evolved since the September 11 attacks and acts that were 
considered unlawful in the 1980s are now being accepted and practiced by 
various states. Examples include:  
 Turkey has consistently invoked the right to self-defence for its military 
interventions against the PKK in Northern Iraq in 2007 and 2008.615 
 The Russian army has invoked the right to self-defence and entered 
Georgia officially to combat Chechen terrorists who had taken refuge 
there.616 
 Israel has always supported a broad right of self-defence and used 
force against Damascus and Lebanon in 2003 and 2006 
respectively.617 
 Colombia airstrikes against FARC terrorist camp in 2008 inside 
Ecuador’s border, killing the FARC’s second-in-command, Raul 
Reyes.618 
 The use of force by Ethiopian armed forces against the ‘Islamic Courts’ 
terrorist group which had been conducting a series of cross-border 
attacks from Somalia in 2006.619 
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 The Killing of Osama bin Laden by US Navy Seal in 2011 at his secret 
compound in northern Pakistan.620 
 The Kenyan incursion into Somalia in response to cross-border attacks 
by the Al-Shabaab terrorist group in 2011.621 
 The use of force by the US and coalition partners in Syria against 
ISIS.622 
The state practice is at odds with the ICJ jurisprudence establishing that the 
use force in response to attacks by non-state actors is unlawful unless those 
acts can be attributed to the state and actors are effectively controlled by the 
territorial state.623 However, some ICJ separate opinions demonstrates that 
few judges are highly critical of the ICJ’s continued stance that self-defence is 
only available in situations where the attack by non-state actors can be 
attributed to the territorial state. For instance, in the context of the Wall Case, 
Judge Higgins has said, ‘there is, with respect, nothing in the text of Article 51 
that thus stipulates that self-defence is available only when an armed attack is 
made by a State’.624In a separate opinion formulated by, Judge Koojimans in 
the Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo Case, stressed that in the 
era of Al-Qaeda, it is ‘unreasonable to deny the attacked State the right to 
self-defence merely because there is no attacker state’.625Likewise Judge 
Simma concluded in his separate opinion in the Congo case that ‘Security 
Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) cannot but be read as 
affirmations of the view that large-scale attacks by non-State actors can 
qualify as ‘armed attacks’ within the meaning of Article 51’. 626  While the 
majority decision in the two cases (Armed Activities in the territory of the 
Congo and Legal Consequence of the Construction of a Wall) confirm former 
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jurisprudence of the ICJ, the issues addressed are substantially different.627 In 
the Wall Case, the ICJ stressed that the right to self-defence under Article 51 
of the UN Charter only applies to attacks coming from another state and did 
not apply to attacks coming from within the Occupied Territories, because the 
area was occupied and controlled by Israel so Israel did not have right to use 
force in self-defence.628 In Congo629, as in Nicaragua630 states used force not 
only against the attacking terrorist group itself but also throughout the 
territorial state.  
Therefore, the ICJ approach seems in conflict with state practice developed 
since 2001. The absent reaction from many states suggest a gradual shift 
from a narrow interpretation of the right to use force in self-defence to a 
broader application of the right to use force in self-defence against terrorists in 
foreign territories.631 Professor Gray argues that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 
have broadened the scope of armed attack to cover acts by non-state actors 
even if there is no state.632 The UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 
1373 and Article 5 of NATO’s collective self-defence provision adopted in the 
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aftermath of 9/11 have been interpreted as unequivocally acknowledging the 
right of self-defence against terrorist attacks. 633  In addition, the UNSC 
Resolution 2249 forcefully strengthens the view that a customary international 
law rule has emerged allowing the self-defence against non-state actors 
whose acts are not attributable to a state.634 
In the light of these conflicting trends, the law relating to use of force in self-
defence against non-state actors in foreign territories remains unsettled. 
Although the law related to state consent and unable or unwilling doctrine has 
been mentioned briefly in this chapter, in the case of drone strikes in 
undeclared warzones this area of law requires greater attention and will be 
discussed in chapter four in detail. 
3.4.2 Drone strikes and law of self-defence   
The United States regularly use drones to target members of Al-Qaeda and its 
‘associated forces’635 in ‘active battlefields’636 including Afghanistan637, Iraq, 
Syria638 and outside active battlefield in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.639 The 
US argues that their use of drone strikes do not violate the prohibition on the 
use of force because they are acting in accordance with international law 
relying on its inherent right to self-defence.640 The US claims that drones are 
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justified if directed against ‘leaders of Al-Qaeda or an associate force who 
present an imminent threat of violent attack against the US’.641  The term 
‘imminence’ is key here because the US drone policy is premised on a flexible 
understanding of ‘imminence’. Brennan has argued that the term imminent 
has to be ‘broadened in light of the modern-day capabilities, techniques, and 
technological innovations of terrorist organisations’.642 In a 2011 draft White 
Paper, the Department of Justice defined imminence loosely: 
The condition that an operational leader present an ‘imminent’ threat of 
violent attack against the United States does not require the United 
States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on US persons and 
interests will take place in the immediate future.643  
The White Paper contended that the requirement of imminence is obsolete 
because terrorist war did not involve massive attacks across the globe or a 
one off isolated attack. It was rather a protracted and persistent sporadic 
pattern of attacks therefore, it is extremely difficult to know when or where the 
next incident would occur.644 The White Paper further asserts that ‘the US 
government may not be aware of all Al-Qaeda plots as they are developing 
and thus cannot be confident that none is about to occur’.645 
The notion of imminence is being broadened beyond recognition in order to fit 
the targeted killings policy of the US government. A literal interpretation of the 
White Paper means that imminence should be understood as a general 
presumption of future attacks where the US can always act pre-emptively by 
presuming that a threat could occur because there is no reassurance that Al-
Qaeda will not attack. Indeed, the US government has claimed that it faces a 
‘continuing, imminent threat’ from terrorists that gives them continuing right to 
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use force in self-defence to avert attacks.646 The key point that emerges from 
this discussion is that the US has sought to defend the legality of drone strikes 
through a particular interpretation of the term imminent.  
Following the track record left by the former administration, The Obama 
administration widened this term beyond its traditional meaning by rejecting 
any ‘immediacy’ requirement. The Bush administration insisted after 9/11 that 
the US ‘must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and 
objectives of today’s adversaries’647which has come to be known as the ‘Bush 
doctrine’. The  ‘Bush doctrine’ advocates for preventive self-defence against a 
threat that is rather potential than immediate.648 In 2002 the National Security 
Strategy asserted the need to revisit the rules of self-defence need given the 
new security threats presented by ‘rogue states and terrorists’.649 The 2002 
National Security Strategy stated: 
Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy 
of pre-emption on the existence of an imminent threat most often a 
visible mobilisation of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to 
attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the 
capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries…..The greater the 
threat, the greater is the risk of inaction and the more compelling the 
case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if 
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack….. 
We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by… using all the 
elements of national and international power and by identifying and 
destroying the threat before it reaches our borders…. we will not 
hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence 
by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from 
doing harm against our people and our country650  
                                                        
646 President Obama, ‘Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy 
Commencement Ceremony’ (28 May 2014) < https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-commencement-ceremony > 
accessed 22 July 2016 
647 US National Security Strategy 2002 (2006 rev’n) at 15  
648 Hill, ‘The Bush Administration Pre-emption Doctrine and the Future of World Order: Remark’ 
(2004) ASIL Proceedings, 329–31  
649 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Part V’ (The White House 2002) 14 
650 Ibid p. 6, 15 
 136 
The document stresses the need to revise not only the concept of imminence 
but also the to use lethal force in self defence against the threat ‘even if 
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack’.651 This 
broader definition of the self-defence is at odds with Caroline test. This new 
type of pre-emptive self-defence was used as a basis to invade Iraq. This 
approach is extremely controversial and has attracted widespread criticism 
from legal scholars.652  
While the Obama administration was reluctant to use the term pre-emptive 
self-defence, the official rhetoric of the precedent years permeated the 
interpretation of imminence by its administration following a similar logic to the 
2002 National Security Strategy. Indeed the dramatic increase in the use of 
drone strikes, outside Afghanistan during the Obama Administration manifests 
that it followed the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence. Other states in 
the International community seem willing to accept that force can be used to 
stop future attacks if the responding state possesses reliable information of 
their imminence.653 The UK Attorney-General (Lord Goldsmith) has stated that 
‘international law permits the use of force in self-defence against an imminent 
attack but does not authorise the use of force to mount a pre-emptive strike 
against a threat that is more remote’.654The traditional view that the right to 
self-defence would only emerge if an armed attack has occurred has lost 
support. The UN High Level Panel report made it clear that a threatened state 
can take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent .655  
This is central to this thesis because the legality of the drone strikes largely 
depends on the interpretation of ‘imminence’. Elizabeth Wilmshurs notes that 
‘forcible response (against an imminent, future attack) lies at the limits of an 
already exceptional legal category, and therefore requires a correspondingly 
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high level of justification’. 656  According to this criterion, there must be 
‘circumstances of irreversible emergency’ for self-defence against an 
imminent attack to be lawful: ‘any further delay in countering the intended 
attack will result in the inability of the defending state effectively to defend 
itself against the attack.’ 657  This interpretation of imminence reflects the 
rationale of the Caroline test that understands imminent threat as ‘instant and 
overwhelming’ need for action that left ‘no moment for deliberation’.658 It may 
be the case that some drone strikes fit these circumstances. Shah argues that 
drone strikes fail to fulfil the requirement of imminence.659 Targeted killings 
have taken place before the alleged planned attacks had reached anything 
close to being imminent. The US targeted killing with drones is based on 
intensive intelligence gathering and deliberation that last for years.  
Worryingly, the 2018 Amnesty international reveals that the US lethal drone 
programme relies on Signals intelligence (SIGNIT), which is an interior form of 
intelligence, gathered through the monitoring of electronic communications 
such as mobile phones and computers. According to Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, 
who was Head of the Defence Intelligence Agency from July 2012 to August 
2014, ‘SIGINT is an easy system to fool and that’s why it has to be validated 
by other INTs — like HUMINT [human intelligence]’. This information was 
gathered with the help of European States. UK, Germany, the Netherlands 
and Italy had been sharing intelligence with the USA that was used to locate 
and identify targets for US drone strikes, as well as metadata from mobile 
phone networks (for example, the time a call was made, its location, the 
duration of the call, the originators and recipients of calls) that could then be 
used for targeting.660 This policy raises fundamental questions about the level 
of risk -measured as instant or overwhelming threat to the US- posed by 
individuals under surveillance. Shah argues that: 
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These attacks are in fact pre-emptive strikes that aim to weaken Al-
Qaeda and the Taliban in the long-term by neutralizing their leadership, 
and thus, are just one of the many measures that the United States 
undertakes to achieve its inchoate long term objectives that have little 
to do with self-defence as recognized under international law.661 
Furthermore, the use of force even against imminent threat will only be 
justified if it is necessary and effective in countering that threat, and also if the 
use of force is proportionate to the threat.  
3.4.3 Necessity and Proportionality 
 
Necessity and proportionality are core requirements for a valid act of self-
defence as stated by Webster in Caroline case. 662 These principles were 
reaffirmed in Nicaragua v US663; the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons664; the Oil Platforms case665; and Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Uganda) 666 . These 
requirements apply whether a nation is acting in self-defence against an 
attack that has already occurred or acting in anticipatory self-defence. 667 
These requirements are not expressly enshrined in the UN Charter, but are 
part of customary international law. It is generally agreed that necessity and 
proportionality means that self-defence must not be punitive.668 Necessity in 
the context of self-defence usually refers to two distinct but related concepts. 
First it refers to the existence of an on-going armed attack or imminent and 
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obvious threat of armed attack.669 Necessity may imply immediacy, the longer 
the time lapse, the more difficult it becomes to justify the necessity of 
unilateral action. In the Nicaragua case the ICJ held that the measures taken 
by the USA against Nicaragua were not necessary because they were taken 
months after the major offensive of the opposition against the government of 
El Salvador had been completely repulsed.670 Second, it requires that force is 
used as a last resort where no alternative response is possible. 671  The 
principle of necessity also requires states to use force in self-defence with the 
purpose of averting the threat. If the use of force in self-defence increases the 
threat then it becomes unnecessary and consequently.672  
Proportionality and necessity are intertwined concepts.673 If a use of force is 
not necessary, it cannot be proportionate and, if it is not proportionate, it is 
difficult to see how it can be necessary.674 Targeting state institutions when 
the state is not responsible for an armed attack may also violate the principle 
of necessity and proportionality.675 
As discussed above state practice has opened up the right to self-defence to 
terrorist attacks in foreign territory against terrorists when those attacks 
cannot be attributed to a state. Irrespective of the recent state practice, 
international law continues to impose important limitations on the use of self-
defence: armed attacks must be of a significantly large scale to trigger a right 
to self-defence; force can only be used against future attacks if they are 
imminent and present circumstances of irreversible emergency; and the use 
of force must be ‘necessary to halt an armed attack and must be 
proportionate to that aim’,676 having the sole objective of bringing to an end 
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the immediate threat.677 The willingness to broaden the right to use force 
beyond these restrictions risks crossing the fine line between reprisals and 
self-defence.678 
The following section will assess the legality of drone strikes under the 
framework of international humanitarian law. 
3.5 Drones under International humanitarian law  
Drones are not as such illegal weapons and are not expressly prohibited 
under IHL or considered to be inherently indiscriminate or perfidious.679 The 
‘use of drones is no different from a pilot dropping a bomb from a fighter jet, or 
a soldier firing a gun’.680 From legal point of view the use of drones during an 
armed conflict does not differ to launching a missile from any other manned 
platform. 681  While drones are not unlawful in themselves, their use must 
comply to international regulations governing weapons. In its Advisory 
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ 
confirmed that the entire law of armed conflict ‘applies to all forms of warfare 
and to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, those of the present and those 
of the future’.682 
While the term ‘global war on terror’ was abandoned in 2009, the US 
continues to consider itself engaged in an on-going armed conflict against Al-
Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces based on its inherent right to self-
defence and the domestic Authorisation for the Use of Military Force.683 In the 
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US government’s view this armed conflict is global in scope, recognises no 
boundaries and provides authority for the use of lethal force outside 
warzones. Combatants, as well as civilians directly participating in this armed 
conflicts are treated as carrying the armed conflict wherever they move.684The 
US government’s official position is that any US operation against Al-Qaeda 
and associated forces would be part of a NIAC even if it takes place outside 
active warzone. A US Department of Justice White Paper leaked to the press 
confirms the US government’s position that: 
The United States retains its authority to use force against al-Qaeda 
and associated forces outside the area of active hostilities when it 
targets a senior operational leader of the enemy forces who is actively 
engaged in planning operations to kill Americans.685 
 
This position has been heavily criticised. In his report to the General 
Assembly, Ben Emmerson identified a number of legal issues on which there 
is currently no clear international consensus, or where current practices and 
interpretations appear to challenge established legal norms. 686  The US is 
criticised for distorting and rendering meaningless the boundaries of the 
armed conflict. The legality of the use of drones revolves around the 
geographical scope of the laws of war.687 Vogel has noted that controversies 
surrounding drone warfare are not really about the weapon itself but, inter 
alia, ‘defining the battlefield in a conflict with a transnational non-state 
actor’.688 The geographic scope of the laws of armed conflict has become 
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extremely controversial when it refers to US drone strikes in undeclared 
warzones since 9/11.689  
Today’s conflict pit states against non-state entities that do not have any 
territorial control but go wherever they can find safe haven from government 
intrusion. Although the US has officially ended its combat mission in 
Afghanistan, some scholars suggest that the US may remain a participant in 
an armed conflict in Afghanistan for some time both by independently 
engaging in military operations against the Taliban/AQ, and also by providing 
military support to the Afghan government in the conflict between Afghanistan 
and the Taliban/AQ.690 The ‘global war on terror’ is not limited to Afghanistan 
but it is challenging to identify when other areas become warzone as a result 
of terrorist attacks. The table below shows the major terrorist attacks after 
9/11 in a wider geographical scope:  
 
Countries Year Civilian Casualties 
Bali attack (Indonesia)691 2002 200+ 
Madrid train bombing692 (Spain) 2004 191 
London Subway (UK)693 2005 52 
Mumbai attack (India)694 2008 166 
Christmas day bombing 
695attempt  ( Holland) 
2009 0 
Failed Time square Bomb 696 
(USA 
2010 0 
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After the US invasion of Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda began to retreat from this 
country and spread to other territories. The table below shows the presence of 
Al-Qaeda around the globe:697 
 
Countries Al-Qaeda groups 
Pakistan FATA region 
Iraq Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
Yemen Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
Syria Al-Nusra 
Somalia Al-Shabab 
Mali & Nigeria Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
 
In 2004, the then-Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, signed a secret 
order giving the US military authority to strike at Al-Qaeda targets anywhere in 
the world.698 The reaction of  the US to the geographical expansion of Al-
Qaeda and its associates posits the challenge of whether or not there is an 
armed conflict between the US and Al-Qaeda, and thus, whether IHL is 
applicable 
3.5.1 Is there an armed conflict between US and Al-Qaeda? 
As discussed in previous chapters, international law recognises two types of 
armed conflicts, IAC and NIAC. This categorisation is elusive when it involves 
transnational terrorist organisation such as Al-Qaeda. In Security Council 
debates, the most common approach is a general call for adherence to 
international law, including human rights law and humanitarian law.699 This 
does not help to clarify the classification of armed conflicts between the US 
and Al-Qaeda. The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
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arbitrary executions has noted the difficulty of claiming the existence of a 
conflict with Al-Qaeda outside Afghanistan and Iraq.700  
The armed conflict between the US and Al-Qaeda is not international in 
nature because IAC must be between two (or more) states. This conclusion is 
based on the fact that according to article 2 of the Hague Regulations701 and 
article 2 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Conventions apply to 
armed conflicts between contracting parties.702 Since Al-Qaeda, as a non-
state actor, cannot be a contracting party to these treaties, it follows that these 
treaty rules will not apply to armed conflicts between it and the US.703 
3.5.2 A Non-International Armed Conflict with Al-Qaeda and 
associates? 
IHL cannot apply in the absence of an armed conflict, and the determination 
of whether an armed conflict exists is based upon the intensity of the violence 
and the organisation of the forces involved, as laid out in the Tadic case.704 
Moreover, NIAC are geographically restricted and apply only if the minimum 
threshold of violence that defines an armed conflict is met within that 
geographical area. If the Tadic threshold is not met the laws of armed conflict 
(IHL) do not apply and IHRL will apply. A conflict between a state and 
transnational non-state entities may only qualify as armed conflict when it 
crosses a required threshold of intensity of hostilities and organisation of the 
non-state actors participating in the conflict705 Main indicator of the group 
organisation are their control over military forces, the existence of 
headquarters, designated zones of operations, the ability to procure, transport 
and distribute arms, the existence of a command structure, disciplinary rules 
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and mechanisms, control of territory, the existence of recruits, military training, 
military strategy and tactics, and the ability to speak with a unified voice.706  
 After 9/11 the US justified its targeted killing policies by arguing that the 
armed conflict is more capacious and goes where the participants go, as it did 
in World War II.707 The US government has also defended that the conflict 
extends both in space and time, 708  despite scholarly opposition to this 
stance. 709  Indeed the scale of the 9/11 attacks comfortably fulfilled the 
intensity requirement.710 This was endorsed by the United Nations Security 
Council.711The Security Council’s invocation of Article 51 necessarily implies 
that it classified the September 11 attacks to be an armed attack.712The issue 
here is not whether the 9/11 attacks categorised as an armed attack but 
whether Al-Qaeda is still capable of being a party to conflict. Fifteen years 
later, particularly after bin Laden’s death, Al-Qaeda’s activity had slowed 
down; arguably it no longer posed a serious military threat, nor it possesses a 
centralised military command structure. There is no current evidence that the 
worldwide attacks that allegedly were attributed to Al-Qaeda occurred under 
its leadership’s control.713 
The problematic question is whether the violence of Al-Qaeda or its 
associates still meets the intensity requirements associated to a lawful use of 
armed force in self-defence. In his report to the UN Human Rights Council, 
the Special Rapporteur Philip Alston concludes, ‘even when there have been 
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terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda or other groups claiming affiliation with it, the 
duration and intensity of such attacks has not risen to the level of an armed 
conflict’.714  
The isolated terrorist attacks in various parts of the globe may not reach to the 
required level of intensity to be classified as an armed conflict, unless their 
numbers around the globe are aggregated. This perspective raises the 
question of the source of the attacks that should remain the same if they must 
be considered as an amalgamation meeting the required intensity threshold.  
The fundamental purpose of requiring a certain level of intensity is to 
differentiate between situations where law enforcement suffice to deal with the 
unrest and others allowing the use of military armed force in response. When  
violence is spread out geographically, if the required level of intensity is 
absent in each territory then international humanitarian law does not apply; 
instead domestic law and IHRL provide the normative framework to address 
the situation.715  
To satisfy the second prong of the test is even more daunting. A NIAC can 
only exist if the parties to an armed conflict are ‘organised armed groups’. Al-
Qaeda does not display the characteristics of an ‘organised armed group’ as 
laid out by ICTY in Ramush. 716  This demands a centralised command 
structure, membership, and the capability of abiding by the rules of IHL.717 Al-
Qaeda is a vague and secret enemy and little to date is known about its 
organisation. Until 2001, Al-Qaeda could be identified as an organisation with 
a ‘clear leadership, territorial control, training camps and headquarters’.718 But 
the US invasion of Afghanistan destroyed Al-Qaeda organisation. Professor 
Fawaz Gerges explains, ‘Al-Qaeda central no longer exists…senior leaders 
like Osama bin Laden and Ayman al- Zawahiri are more preachers of global 
jihad than field lieutenants who give direct orders.’719 The organisation is now 
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‘decentralised in nature’. 720  The Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
(SIAC) judgement stressed that the image that emerges of ‘Al Qaeda is that of 
a series of loosely connected operational and support cell’.721 According to Dr 
Andrew Silke, a criminologist and forensic psychologist on the UN Roster of 
Terrorism Experts, Al-Qaeda lacks ‘a clear hierarchy, military mind set and 
centralised command’. From the evidence available, it appears that Al-Qaeda 
is a loose network of associated groups that share same religious and 
ideological backgrounds but sparingly interact. Al-Qaeda is less an 
organisation than a ‘state of mind’ encompassing ‘a wide range of followers 
and members who can differ dramatically from each other’.722 Lubell has also 
suggested that Al-Qaeda lacks the characteristics of a party to a conflict and 
resembles a ‘network of networks’ and an ‘ideology rather than an entity’.723 
Even the US government has confirmed that Al-Qaeda’s structure has 
changed and rather than being a centralised group, the ‘franchising of Islamic 
extremism has resulted in decentralising control in the network’. 724  The 
London Tube bombings, Madrid bombings, Mumbai attacks all appear to be 
carried out by perpetrators who share the same ideology of Al-Qaeda but this 
lacks any concrete evidence demonstrating that Al-Qaeda which carried out 
9/11 was responsible for them.725Another category of home grown extremists, 
are self-radicalising, self-funding and self-executing. They have no formal 
affiliation with Al-Qaeda but they are inspired by its ideology. The case of 
Faisal Shehzad shows that although he was inspired by the ideology but had 
no affiliation with Al-Qaeda.726  
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Overall, it cannot be credibly claimed that all the military operations under 
taken against the world are a part of a single armed conflict with Al-
Qaeda.727The threshold of violence and identity of the party to the conflict are 
linked. If various incidents across the globe could be attributed to Al-Qaeda it 
could be potentially possible to argue that the threshold for recognising the 
existence of an armed attack/conflict has been crossed. The scenario is 
different if separate and distinct groups that lack unified command and control 
structure have carried out these attacks. It becomes then difficult to aggregate 
this violence as evidence of an existing conflict.  
Al-Qaeda defies categorisation as an organisation an ideology or a distinct 
local, regional, national or individual manifestation of a broad ideology. The 
matter is further complicated with the assertion that unknown and unidentified 
Al-Qaeda ‘associates’ are also party to this armed conflict. The United States 
claims to be in a ‘global’ armed conflict with Al Qaeda and its affiliates. it also  
claims that these affiliated armed groups are connected, part of the same 
conflict and, collectively, constitute a threat to the US which is global in reach. 
There is no firm basis to sustain that these internal, or even regional conflicts, 
amount to a global armed conflict. It is not even possible to prove that these   
affiliated groups are, in fact, part of the same conflict that spread out across 
multiple States. In most cases these affiliated groups are engaged in entirely 
separate conflicts.728 For example, the majority of fighting conducted by Al-
Qaeda affiliates such as ‘Al Shabaab’ in Somalia is internal in nature. Al 
Shabaab’s interests and targets are predominantly local.729  
The US describes these allegedly associate groups as ‘enemy combatants’, 
enabling the US to claim anyone that virtually anyone can be an Al-Qaeda 
associate. Even under this premise, the US government has no legal basis to 
target individuals who share Al Qaeda’s ideology. Dehn has argued that the 
focus should not be on ‘ideological alignment with al Qaeda, but on their 
coordinated activity’. 730 It is highly plausible that the ‘enemy’ is ‘a new 
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generation of Islamic terrorists who act alone, abetted by jihadi websites’.731 
The attacks that are associated with Al-Qaeda appear sporadic, individual, 
unpredictable and lacking any responsible command.732 As Alston contends, 
‘Al-Qaeda and other ‘alleged associated’ groups are often loosely linked if at 
all’.733 Al-Qaeda affiliates include Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), 
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in Iraq.734 Can it 
be claimed that the terrorist attacks committed since 9/11 constitute a global 
NIAC even when distinct armed groups have carried them out? Arguably, 
whether these armed groups form a single party to a conflict depends on how 
connected they are. A declaration of allegiance to an armed group (such as 
was the case with Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in 2012)735 is insufficient to 
determine that the affiliated group is part of the similar armed conflict.736 To be 
part of the same armed conflict the affiliate group must fall under a 
responsible command of a party to the conflict. Therefore, armed groups 
pledging allegiance or changing does not suggest that they have become part 
of Al Qaeda’s command structure.737 The violence of AQAP is not directed 
against the United States so it is not part of the same conflict.738 Thus there is 
a good reason to conclude that Al-Qaeda and associated groups lack the 
unity to consider their actions as originating from the same group. Separately, 
they do not meet the threshold for an armed conflict under IHL, and there is 
no transnational armed conflict between the US and Al-Qaeda.  
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The status of persons targeted in drone strikes is another important issue and 
has significant impact on the principle of distinction and proportionality. The 
principle of distinction dictates that all parties to a conflict distinguish between 
those who are fighting and those who are not, and direct attacks are aimed 
exclusively at those who are participating in hostilities. The principle of 
proportionality seeks to minimize the incidental casualties during war and 
limits the methods and weapons to be lawfully used. It prohibits from attack in 
which the expected civilian casualties will be excessive in light of the 
anticipated military advantage gained. The principle of military necessity 
recognises that military has a right to use measures acceptable in IHL to 
completely defeat the enemy.739 
3.6 Who can be targeted? 
Enemy leaders look like everyone else; enemy combatants look like 
everyone else; enemy vehicles look like civilian vehicles; enemy 
installations look like civilian installations; enemy equipment and materials 
look like civilian equipment and materials740 
 
Legal Advisor Koh has confirmed that the US drone strikes are limited to 
‘military objectives’ and that ‘civilians shall not be the objects of the 
attack’. 741  These words reiterate international humanitarian law’s key 
principle of distinction. The ICJ has described the principle of distinction as 
the ‘cardinal rule’ of IHL.742 Art 51(2) of Additional Protocol asserts, ‘The 
civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians shall not be the 
object of attack’.743Drone strikes in countries including Pakistan, Yemen 
and Somalia take place in the context of a NIAC. 744  The principle of 
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distinction applies in both IAC and NIAC.745 In NIAC two categories of 
individuals are targetable, namely, members of organised armed groups 
and civilians who take direct part in hostilities.746 
The concept of what constitutes direct participation is highly subjective.747 
Because there is no commonly accepted definition of direct participation in 
hostilities,748 it has been left open to states’ own interpretation.749The US has 
not disclosed its criteria for establishing which groups or persons are taking 
direct participation in hostilities. As acknowledged elsewhere ‘this is deeply 
problematic because it gives no transparency or clarity about what conduct 
could subject a civilian to killing. It also leaves open the possibility that States 
will unilaterally expand their concept of direct participation beyond permissible 
boundaries’.750 The fact that US is targeting drug traffickers in Afghanistan 
who have links to the insurgency shows that their criteria is much more 
expansive than that set out by the ICRC.751Although the US claims that they 
target high-level Al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks, evidence 
suggests otherwise. According to various sources people killed in US drone 
strikes are mainly low-level combatants. Providing testimony to the US 
Congress, Peter Bergen claimed that Obama killed foot soldiers in drone 
attacks.752 Similarly, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism has claimed that  
the US drones killed just 4% of  Al-Qaeda members.753 After reviewing copies 
of top-secret US intelligence reports, McClatchy concluded that drone 
operators ‘weren’t always certain who they were killing’. These unknown low-
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level suspected terrorists were described as ‘other militants’ or ‘foreign 
fighters’.754  
On which criterion US is targeting low-level combatants is yet unknown. Is 
government targeting these individuals because they indirectly support 
militants by providing logistics, weapons or other support? If the government 
is using continuous combat function criterion then how it assesses whether an 
individual has regained civilian status by leaving combat role unequivocally? 
Ambiguity on these questions complicates any assessment on US compliance 
with the principle of distinction. 
Civilians sharing geographical location with militants become particularly 
vulnerable when there is no possibility of knowing what constitutes ‘direct 
participation’. Christopher Rogers has highlighted this issue by noting that: 
Residents of areas in which drones operate do not know what kind of 
conduct or relationships could put them at risk. Offering indirect support 
to militants such as food or quarter or political or ideological support 
would not formally qualify under international norms as “direct 
participation in hostilities.” However, it is entirely possible that the US 
considers many people to be combatants, owing to their relationships 
to known militants, when they are legally civilians.755  
Under IHL the US can legally target individuals whose identities are not 
known but their conduct explicitly shows that they are plotting against US 
interests and are involved in planning military attacks against the US.756 The 
US may also lawfully target individuals who are involved in transporting 
weapons in a vehicle to be used in an armed attack against the US. The 
elimination of such individuals offers a definite military advantage so it also 
fulfils the principle of military necessity.757 Drone strikes against individuals 
who are involved in bomb making or unloading ammunitions that are to be 
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used against the US is also legal under principle of distinction. Al-Qaeda 
compound and training camps are lawful targets because their destruction 
clearly provides military advantage to the attacker. However, if civilians are 
also present in the compound the use of drone strikes is particularly restricted 
by the principle of proportionality. 
There are some drone strikes that may never satisfy the principle of 
distinction. The inclusion of any male fit for military service in the vicinity of 
drone strike a lawful target is inconsistent with the principle of proportionality. 
According to the legal framework explained above, an individual can only be 
targeted if they belong to an organised armed group or are participating 
directly in hostilities, not simply because they happen to be present near 
terrorists.  
The US targeting killing policy still adheres to ‘either with us or against us 
policy’ by targeting individuals who are ‘consorting with known militants’.758  
The link-analysis method adopted by the US to add people on kill lists 
involves including any person in contact with militants. Membership to the 
group is established from the number and frequency of contacts, regardless of 
their nature.759 As one officer has noted, ‘If we decide someone is a bad 
person people with him are also bad’. 760  Sympathising, collaborating or 
supporting the ideology of known terrorist should not result in making a 
person targetable because that individual unless she is planning attacks 
against the US and her consorting is designed to have adverse impact on US 
military operations.761 Likewise, carrying guns and weapons in an area where 
insurgents live does not licence the US to use drone strikes.762 
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In tribal areas of Pakistan and Yemen, it is customary for most male to carry 
weapons.763The US routinely targets civilian buildings on the bases that areas 
controlled by militants are used by military purposes, failing to justify the 
military advantage their destruction involves.764  
There is no evidence that the surveillance and technology underpinning US 
decisions are enough to identify members of organised armed groups and 
civilians directly participating in hostilities.765Some argue that life analysis 
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities of drones help to distinguish 
between a civilian and militant. Drones allow commanders to track and 
analyse the daily activities of suspected militants, helping to ensure that 
civilians are not mistakenly targeted.766Schmitt argues that, ‘high resolution 
imagery usually transmitted in real time to a drone crew…helps to…. monitor 
the potential target for extended periods before engaging it with precision 
weapons…the result is often a significantly reduced risk of…attacking the 
wrong target.’767 However a CIA drone operator admits that a drone camera 
cannot distinguish shapes precisely because ‘You can only see so much from 
20,000 feet.’768 Americans jokingly say that, ‘When the CIA sees three guys 
doing jumping jacks, the agency thinks it’s a terrorist training camp’.769 
Arguably the US drone surveillance is not that accurate and excessive 
reliance on quantitative data has on numerous occasions resulted in the death 
of civilians.770 For instance, the US targeted a traditional Jirga in Pakistan 
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because a meeting observed from sky resembled terrorist behaviour.771 On 2 
September 2010, the US announced that they had killed an important Taliban 
leader in Afghanistan. It was later revealed that the strike killed ten civilians 
including Zabet Amanullah, a civilian engaged in an electoral campaign.772In 
another incident the US drone strike accidently killed two Westerners in 
Pakistan in April 2015.773This suggests that US is willing to conduct targeted 
killing on the basis of evidence that is far from definitive. 
The distinction between organised groups or civilians directly participating in 
hostility carries little weight in the decision-making leading to strikes. As noted  
earlier, the US considers any male who consorts with terrorists or military age 
male in an area of known terrorist activity, targetable. The double tap drone 
strikes may violate the principle of distinction. It may not be feasible for US to 
establish in these strikes that a person who came to rescue survivors is a 
member of an organised armed group. The violation of the principle of 
distinction resulting from targeting rescuers under the presumption that these 
males are engaged in a continuous combat function has been highlighted by 
several commentators. It their 2012 Report, ‘Living Under Drones’, scholars 
from two academic centres at Standford University and New York University 
Schools of Law, stressed, ‘The short time between first and second strikes at 
rescue sites… raises questions over how an individual’s lawful target status 
could be properly determined’.774 While the US insists that its targeting killing 
is not solely based on drone surveillance but also supported by ‘signals 
intercepts’ and ‘human sources’,775 media reports have reveal that the primary 
                                                                                                                                                              
Under-Drones.pdf > ; Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic, ‘The Civilian Impact of Drones’, 
(September 2012) 34 < 
http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/The_Civilian_Impact_of_Drones_w_cover.pdf 
> accessed 19 July 2016   
771 Salman Masood and Pir Zubair Shah, ‘C.I.A. Drones Kill Civilians in Pakistan’, The New York Times 
(17 March 2011) < http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/asia/18pakistan.html > accessed 28 
July 2016 
772 Kate Clark, ‘The Takhar attack and Targeted Killings: the Legal Challenge’, Afghanistan Analyst 
Network (12 August 2012) < https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-takhar-attack-and-targeted-
killings-the-legal-challenge/ > accessed 28 July 2016 
773 CNN News, ‘U.S. drone strike accidentally killed 2 hostages’ (24 April 2015) < 
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/23/politics/white-house-hostages-killed/ > accessed 22 July 2016 
774 Living Under Drones (n 770) 115  
775 G. Miller, ‘White House Approves Broader Yemen Drone Campaign’ The Washington Post (26 April 
2011) < 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/whitehouseapprovesbroaderyemendronec
ampaign/2012/04/25/gIQA82U6hT_story.html > accessed at 22 July 2016  
 156 
method to locate targets are not human intelligence but controversial 
metadata analysis and cell-phone tracking technologies.776 Moreover, drone 
strikes take place in remote areas where even the host states do not have full 
access, therefore it is unlikely for the US to have useful informants, such as in 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan and in Yemen.777In 
practice, there is no realistic way for the US to establish with certainty if the 
targeted individual is a militant who is a permanent member of armed 
organisation.  
 3.6.1 Proportionality    
In Afghanistan, the US military has set itself a maximum collateral damage 
threshold of 10 percent, and, has claimed to achieve an ‘actual collateral 
damage rate of 1 percent’.778  By contrast, in Pakistan -according to data 
collected by the New American Foundation- 23 percent of CIA strikes caused 
collateral damage, a percentage that seems excessive following the US 
military’s proportionality threshold.  
However to base the proportionality analysis on this data is problematic 
because the 23 percent figure is obtained by combining civilian casualties and 
unknown casualties, that can include 779  civilians or militants. 780 For many 
years, official data on drones-related casualties was unavailable. On 1 July 
2016, the Obama administration released a two and a half page report with 
official data on civilian casualties outside areas of active hostilities. The US 
government report confirms that drone strikes killed between 64 and 116 ‘non-
combatants’ in 473 counter-terrorism strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and 
Libya between January 2009 and the end of 2015.781 The gap between the 
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US figures and other estimates including those provided by New America 
Foundation, Long War Journal, and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism is 
striking. These three organisations have reported that strikes carried out 
during the Obama administration killed 4,189 persons, an estimated 474 of 
whom were civilians. 782 Unfortunately, the official release of data has 
generated renewed controversy and criticism.783In the absence of any reliable 
data it is it is impossible to reach firm conclusions about the proportionality of 
the attacks. 
The surveillance, intelligence gathering and the fact that drone can hover for 
days provides commander ample information to avoid civilian casualties.784 As 
discussed earlier an obvious problem with the drone strikes is their 
dependence on potentially unreliable intelligence.785In Tribal areas citizens 
lack unity and are divided into various tribes who are hostile towards each 
other. There is an obvious risk that a local informant may provide intentionally 
misleading information against member of other tribe for any number of self-
serving purposes.786 
In line with the US official position, John Brenan lauded in 2012 the ability of 
drones to conform to the principle of proportionality because drones succeed 
in killing terrorists while minimising the collateral damage.787 Proponents of 
drones mainly try to satisfy the standard of proportionality by comparing 
drones with other weapons. For instance Anderson asserts: 
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The [drone] technology provides force protection to (one side’s) 
combatants; it provides greater protection to civilians through precision 
targeting. What’s not to like? No weighing up of perplexing values 
needs to take place, because everything is on the plus side, win-win.788 
To further establish his point Anderson has compared the estimates of civilian 
casualties caused by drones to the history of civilian deaths in war. The 
argument is that the proportionality of US drone warfare should be assessed 
by comparing it with the horrors of Second World War.789 However, the UN 
Charter and rules of law restricting the means of warfare were introduced 
precisely to avoid the horrors of WWII. Therefore referring to an armed conflict 
where the allies intentionally targeted civilian population to weaken German 
morale is methodologically flawed and will justify the gratuitous use of 
force. 790  Another scholar Plaw also carried out his research on civilian 
casualties and concluded that ‘the civilian casualty rate of the drone strikes 
looks significantly better than alternative actions’.791 His data showed that the 
US non-drone operations (commando raids and precision artillery strikes) and 
the Pakistani Army operations in FATA have killed a much higher proportion 
of civilians than drones. 792  But others argue that this comparison is 
problematic because it is based on two different operations where military 
objectives of parties are different, so the proportionality calculus employed is 
also widely divergent. For example, Pakistani Army conducted a 
counterinsurgency operation against Taliban in FATA with a clear objective of 
reclaiming the province.793Whilst on the other hand US is targeting individuals 
on the basis of mere suspicion who may or may not pose any direct or 
imminent threat to US. Additionally, quantitative analysis of comparing the 
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number of civilians killed or wounded to the numbers of insurgents killed or 
wounded is an inappropriate way to measure proportionality. Whether or not 
an attack is proportionate depends on the military advantage gained from the 
attack that resulted in collateral damage.794 
The objectives of the US drone operations in undeclared war zones are ‘to 
decimate the al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership core, and to deny safe haven 
to members of these groups in order to disrupt the planning and execution of 
terrorist attacks’.795It is important to consider proportionality in two contexts, 
that is, strikes targeting high-value targets (HVT) and strikes targeting low-
level militants. It is understandable that government would consider high 
civilian casualties in targets that kill Al-Qaeda or Taliban leaders 
proportionate. The military advantage gained from killing a HVT lies in 
eliminating their expertise, leadership, command and experience. According 
to Peter Bergen however, drones have killed only 2% of HVT in Pakistan.796 
The US drone program has also targeted suspected militants who are low-
level combatants, may be affiliated to Al-Qaeda or its associates and might 
pose little or no threat to the US or its interests. The main reason advanced to 
justify the targeting of suspected militants has been the ability to disrupt their 
plans and plots before they can carry out an attack.797The constant hovering 
of drones create fear amongst low level combatants and makes it hard for 
them to plot against US, preventing the creation of terrorist safe heavens. The 
24/7 humming of drones also scares civilians and cause numerous 
psychological problems.798  Striking low-value targets in public areas where 
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collateral damaged is assured makes the military advantage debatable when 
confronted to almost any test of proportionality.  799  
On one hand the use of drones has arguably diminished the capabilities of Al-
Qaeda and its affiliates. On the other hand, the targeting of low level 
combatants and 24/7 hovering of US drone strikes has reportedly had ‘serious 
social and political repercussions that tangentially affect the proportionality 
calculus’.800 As Sauer and Schörnig warn, drone strikes are protracting the 
conflict rather than bringing it closer to termination.801Dr Paul Gill’s 2015 
report highlighted that the indirect impact of US drone strike in Pakistan is 
overwhelming. Although the use of drones directly might meet the 
proportionality test in the short term, the ‘terrorist reprisals following a drone 
strike are disproportionally more likely to target civilians’.802 Another report by 
Dr Wali Aslam concluded that drones have not eliminated HVT from tribal 
areas of Pakistan; they have relocated them in settled areas of the country.803 
This raises doubt on whether the use of drones by the US meets the 
proportionality criteria when apparently rhetoric of drone proportionality is 
leading to problematic strategies.  
3.6.2 Military necessity 
The principle of military necessity bans the use of force if the military 
advantage pursued can be only achieved at some unforeseen time in the 
future.804 It is plausible that the US military will gain military advantage by 
killing Al-Qaeda core members; however, targeting anyone involved with Al-
Qaeda with the view that it is convenient and capture is difficult may not 
satisfy the principle of military necessity. The law of war allows using force 
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against enemy but this should not be taken as a licence to kill.805 The military 
necessity standard requires that US drones target individuals who are 
involved in combat functions instead of those who are propagandist, share 
ideology of Al-Qaeda or are financing the organisation.806The use of drone 
strikes must therefore demonstrate a high level of certainty in targeting to 
satisfy the principle of military necessity. 807 Suspicion on the status of a 
combatant may not be enough to meet the threshold. 
For the reasons explained above, the current US practice of targeting anyone 
linked with Al-Qaeda may not satisfy the core principles of IHL. The lack of 
access to actual US policy hinders any attempt to evaluate its conformity with 
the rules governing the conduct of hostilities. The US should make public the 
criterion on which it decides membership of individuals to an armed group and 
disclose the data of civilian and militant deaths to make it feasible to assess 
the legality of its actions. It is unlikely that the US will stop using drones as a 
counterterrorism tool in the near future. A more constrained approach to 
drone strikes which takes into account these principles would make the US 
drone strike program much more acceptable.  
3.7 US drone strikes and Human Rights Law 
A number of human rights organisations have alleged that the US drone 
strikes violate basic principles of IHRL. 808  The US has resolved this by 
rejecting the applicability of IHRL to its drone strikes. With notable exceptions, 
the United States has always adopted a strict interpretation on the extra-
territorial applicability of human rights law.809 US has repeatedly argued that 
provisions enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights 
and other human rights instruments have no extraterritorial application. 810 
With regard to the application of human rights law during armed conflicts, the 
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US Defence of Department stated in 2003 that the Covenant ‘does not apply 
outside the United States or its special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, and 
that it does not apply to operations of the military during and international 
armed conflict’.811 The US also resorted to the lex specialis argument and 
found the application of human rights law was precluded by humanitarian 
law.812  
The US official position is that it is involved in a global NIAC with Al-Qaeda, 
Taliban and associated forces, and thus its drone strikes must comply only 
with IHL. 813 As discussed previously the categorisation of the conflict is 
disputed. Noam Lubell has concluded that the attacks against US facilities or 
its personals are ‘isolated and sporadic violence’ that does not rise to the level 
of NIAC.814The lack of centralised command structure between these groups 
means that the US on-going ‘war’ with Al-Qaeda cannot be classified as a 
global NIAC.815  
The legality of killing outside the context of an armed conflict is governed by 
IHRL.816This regime only allows execution only if they are required for the 
protection of life and no other means are available for preventing an imminent 
threat to life.817Thus in peacetime, the wilful killing of human beings is illegal 
and only allowed in self-defence. For instance, law enforcement bodies 
cannot bomb a building where suspected criminals are sleeping. 818 
Furthermore, IHRL does not provide legal cover for the killing of civilians who 
die when law enforcement agents use force against suspected terrorists as 
‘collateral damage’.819 Alston concluded that under IHRL a US targeted killing 
by drone strikes ‘cannot be legal because, unlike in armed conflict, it is never 
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permissible for killing to be the sole objective of an operation’.820 Conversely, 
during an armed conflict, an enemy combatant is a legal target, based on his 
status rather than the activities involved.821 Collateral damage is generally 
accepted during wartime providing it is consistent with the principles of 
necessity, humanity, proportionality, and distinction.822 Thus actions that are 
considered immoral and illegal in peacetime are permissible during wartime. 
The U.S. drone strikes nicely illustrate the high stakes involved in the choice 
of legal paradigms. If the United States is at war with al Qaeda and its 
associates, and a U.S. drone strike kills an individual suspected of being a 
terrorist combatant, the killing is presumptively lawful under the law of armed 
conflict. If the United States cannot be said to be ‘at war’ with al Qaeda and its 
associates, the same act becomes an extrajudicial execution—or, to put it 
more bluntly, a simple murder.823  
The US has always, as stated earlier, rejected that IHRL applies 
extraterritorially. It claims that drone strikes legality are governed by IHL or by 
domestic US law, in particular the Authorisation for the Use of Military 
Force.824 When lethal force is used outside an armed conflict IHRL applies 
and US domestic law becomes irrelevant because international law 
framework is applicable.825 It is accepted that IHRL apply extraterritorially but 
only binds governments’ vis-à-vis their relations with individuals within their 
jurisdiction or control.826The Inter-American Court has also established the 
extraterritorial applicability of human rights in the case of Alejandrre v Cuba. 
Court stated that ‘when agents of a state, whether military or civilian exercise 
power and authority over persons outside national territory, the state’s 
obligation to respect human rights continues.’827In other words IHRL only 
applies where government effectively controls the territory or persons. The 
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‘effective control over territory does not require detailed control over the 
policies and actions of the authorities in question rather, ‘effective overall 
control’ is sufficient’.828 Also jurisdiction is not just confined to territories it is 
believed that state also has jurisdiction whenever it exercises ‘authority or 
control over an individual’.829 States exercise effective control over individuals 
who are in their custody. But question here is about the US drone strikes can 
it be said that the drone operators who are not on ground have effective 
control over individuals who are their targets? Although, ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence does not apply to the US, nevertheless it provided some 
guidance in this issue for instance in the case of Bankovic. The ECtHR upheld 
that aerial bombardment does not constitute effective control because there 
are no troops on the ground.830In the light of Bankovic judgement it has been 
suggested that:  
While the ability to kill is ‘authority and control’ over the individual if the 
state has public powers, killing is not authority and control if the state is 
merely firing missiles from an aircraft. Under this reasoning, drone 
operations in Yemen or wherever would be just as excluded from the 
purview of human rights treaties as under Bankovic.831 
Frau has suggested that use of unmanned drones is different from fighter jets 
because unlike a plane that flies over the area and just spends about a 
moment above the individual, drones hover over an individual for days. Within 
that time frame drone operator is free to fire missile as he pleases. So there 
may not be any troops on ground but there are ‘troops in the air’ capable of 
shooting individuals anytime. Also government do have authority to kill 
someone so taking life can be considered to be ‘ultimate public power’.832 
Moreover ECtHR has stated that effective extraterritorial control exists when 
the sending state ‘through the consent, invitation …of the Government of that 
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territory…exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised 
by that Government.’833  
In Yemen, the US is conducting drone strike with the consent of the 
Government so arguably according to this understanding human rights Law 
do apply to such situation.834 Unlike Yemen, the case of Pakistan is complex 
because apparently Pakistan condemns US drone strikes but secretly 
endorses and facilitates them.835Human rights law applies in both situation, if 
Pakistan consents the US has effective extraterritorial control and if Pakistan 
does not consent and the US is not in an armed conflict with Pakistan then 
also human rights law applies. The US targeted killing under human rights law 
may never be legal because how it can be established that individuals in 
Pakistan or Yemen pose an imminent threat to the US? Further, IHRL 
requires that an opportunity to surrender be offered before lethal force is 
employed.836 Because drones use force as a first resort and are incapable of 
offering surrender before utilising lethal force they may never be legal under 
IHRL.837This absolute prohibition does not apply to other forces which are 
operating on the ground, because it is possible for them to give enemy the 
opportunity to surrender and thus can operate within the parameters of IHRL. 
All the law enforcement agents including police officers, armed forces and 
Special Forces can adapt their operating procedures to comply with IHRL 
requirements. Armed drones simply cannot. 838  Finally, the human rights 
regime does not accept the death of civilians as collateral damage.839 The 
killing radius of a Hellfire missile is 15 metres and the wounding radius is 20 
metres so even if drone strike precisely, in order to kill a militant, civilian may 
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be executed. Therefore, the strike will always violate IHRL.840 David argued 
that: 
The problem with the law-enforcement model in the context of 
transnational terror is that one of its fundamental premises is invalid: 
that the suspected perpetrator is within the jurisdiction of the law-
enforcement authorities in the victim state, so that an arrest can be 
effected. What is the situation when, according to our premise, the 
terrorist is in the territory of another state? The victim state may not 
arrest or apprehend that person without the active assistance and 
support of that other state. But what if that state is either unwilling to 
arrest the suspected terrorist or incapable of doing so? Leaving aside 
issues of state sovereignty, and relying solely on the duty of the victim 
state under international human rights law to respect the right to life, 
could it not argue that it has no choice but to resort to force against the 
suspected terrorist? That force is absolutely necessary to protect its 
civilians against unlawful violence?841 
Counter argument could be that in situations where territorial state is unwilling 
to help force could only be applied providing there is credible evidence that 
the threat is imminent. 
3.8 Conclusion 
When the boundaries between war and peace, combatants and civilians have 
eroded, both law and morality lose their power. The in depth analysis of 
different legal frameworks highlight that if we cannot figure out whether or not 
there is a war or the geography of war, or who is a combatant and who is a 
civilian in this war we will have no way of deciding which law applies. Most 
importantly if we cannot have clear rules governing this conflict how will we 
decide the most important question of this war who lives and who dies? A war 
which is shrouded in secrecy where government have ‘secret policies’ how 
can one imagine of any sort of public scrutiny and accountability? How to talk 
about proportionality when the official data of civilian casualties created more 
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doubts? How can we establish that government is not violating the principle of 
distinction when it does not make its targeting policy public? How to argue 
that US is in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda when we do not even know what 
Al-Qaeda is? Do we want to live in a world where the globe is a battlefield and 
there is a war that will never end? Perhaps not, if we do not want to live in 
permanent state of exception then we have to decide what kind of legal and 
institutional framework serves best in this type of conflict? Because the US 
refuses to make public its drone policy it is extremely difficult to assess the 
legality of its strike program. What we do know, however, creates significant 
cause for concern. First the US claim that it is in a global armed conflict with 
Al-Qaeda is incorrect-post 9/11 the alleged Al-Qaeda’s attack against US are 
sporadic and do not amount to armed attack, then Al-Qaeda is not an 
organised group so IHL outside active battlefields is inapplicable. Second, US 
drone strikes in undeclared war zones are unlawful under IHL because the 
strikes fail to satisfy core principles of law of war that is distinction, 
proportionality and necessity. Third if not all most of the US strikes conducted 
outside of armed conflict would violate IHRL prohibition on arbitrary 
deprivation of the right to life. Fourth the US use of force in self-defence 
outside of armed conflict is also controversial because it fails to satisfy the 
core requirement of ‘imminence’. Taken together, those concerns indicate that 







Chapter 4: US drone strikes in Pakistan 2004-2018 
4. Introduction 
US drone strikes in Pakistan are extremely controversial and raise many 
legal, moral and strategic issues. Scholars have focused on the violation of 
Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty and the infliction of collateral damage. The 
centre of attention has been mostly unidimensional, addressing the role of the 
US actions but largely ignoring the role played by Pakistan, in particular, the 
military violence of the Pakistani military in the tribal areas.  
The tribal areas hold a special status in Pakistan that has allowed the US to 
conduct drone strikes without any accountability. This chapter will endeavour 
to highlight how the collective military violence of US military, the Central 
intelligence agency (CIA) and Pakistan’s military has turned the tribal areas of 
Pakistan into something similar to a ‘state of exception’.  
4.1 Pakistan dragged into a quagmire 
The section will begin explaining how the US has resorted to drone strikes in 
tribal areas of Pakistan. The presence of Al-Qaeda or extremist groups in 
tribal areas of Pakistan is a result of Islamabad’s Afghan foreign policy of the 
1980s. Pakistan’s Afghan policy played a crucial role in shaping its domestic 
politics and created an Islamic fundamentalist backlash at home. Pakistan 
interfered in Afghan politics to such an extent in the 1990s and early 2000s 
that both countries’ fate became closely intertwined. 842  The origins of the 
phenomenon of radicalisation and extremism in Pakistan cannot be found in 
the events of 9/11 but in the support of the Pakistani military and intelligence 
agencies along with the CIA to Mujahedeen in Afghan-Soviet war of the 
1980s.843 By supporting the Afghan Mujahedeen844 in concert with the West, 
                                                        
842 Ahmad Rashid, Pakistan and the Taliban in William Maley, Fundamentalism reborn? Afghanistan 
and the Taliban (New York University Press 2001) 72-89 ; Tim Judah, ‘The Taliban papers’ (2002) 
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 69   
843 M. Ehsan Ahrari, ‘China, Pakistan, and the "Taliban Syndrome"’ (2000) Asian Survey 658 ; Mujtaba 
Rathore & Abdul Basit, ‘Trends and Patterns of Radicalization in Pakistan’ (2010) 1; Bahir Ahmad, 
‘Radicalization In Pakistan And The Spread of Radical Islam In Pakistan’ (2015) International Journal Of 
Scientific & Technology Research, 291-292 
 169 
and later facilitating the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 1994-5, Pakistan 
created a space for religious radicals.845As the war in Afghanistan protracted 
the US set up a CIA arms pipeline through Pakistan to funnel aid to the 
resistance.846 Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate managed 
the aid and was responsible to train Mujahedeen groups. The strategy was to 
‘integrate guerrilla training with the teachings of Islam and, thus, create 
Islamic guerrillas’. 847  Historically, the US security establishment have not 
regarded the Islamic jihad and even Bin Laden’s terror networks as a negative 
phenomenon. Prince Turki al Feisal, the then head of Saudi intelligence to 
organise resistance in Afghanistan, recruited Bin Laden with the US approval 
at the highest level.848 This approval does not imply that the US established or 
created Al-Qaeda. The US authorities did not maintain a direct relationship 
with Bin Laden but knew that Bin Laden was playing active role in the jihad 
against the Soviet Union. For instance, in 1986, Bin Landen was involved in 
building the Khost tunnel complex that, funded by the CIA, was used ‘a major 
arms storage depot, training facility, and medical centre for the Mujahedeen, 
deep under the mountains close to the Pakistan border’.849 The US financed, 
armed and trained all these terror networks only because they were fighting 
against the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan.850 According to Ahmed Rashid, 
the active encouragement of the CIA and Pakistan’s ISI, that sought ‘to turn 
the Afghan jihad into a global war waged by all Muslim states against the 
Soviet Union’851resulted, between 1982 and 1992, on approximately 35,000 
Muslim radicals from 43 Islamic countries joining the Afghan Mujahedeen. 
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Eventually, the Afghan jihad attracted more than 100,000 foreign Muslim 
radicals.852  
The USA spent millions of dollars to glorify the jihad. Textbooks filled with 
violent images and militant Islamic teachings were developed in the early 
1980s under an AID grant awarded to the University of Nebraska and its 
Centre for Afghanistan Studies. The CIA spent $51 million between 1984 and 
1994. 853  These books remained part of the Afghan school system’s core 
curriculum for the rest of the 20th century. Interestingly, after 9/11 even the 
Taliban used the American-produced books to sell their radical ideology.854 
The motivation of Pakistan to participate in the war was different. Rather than 
pursuing the defeat of the Soviet Union by assisting Afghan groups involved in 
the conflict, it sought to strengthen its military position against India by 
favouring tribal groups based in Peshawar rather.855  In the short run, the 
religious card played by the CIA and ISI paid off well; the holy war against the 
Soviet Union united the Muslims from all over the globe and eventually 
Moscow was embroiled in an unwinnable quagmire.856  
Unfortunately, the Soviet Union’s withdrawal did not mean the end of the 
conflict but its transformation into a national civil war.857 Several factors lead 
to the deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan. Firstly, the Soviet continued 
its covert support to the Afghan regime; secondly, there was no unity amongst 
the resistance groups; and finally, the US support for the mujahedeen 
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declined drastically. 858  Another blow for the mujahedeen was the 
assassination of their major supporter General Zia-ul-haq, in August 1988.859  
In the early 1990s, the fragmentation of the mujahedeen groups became 
deeper. The lawlessness and ever escalating and continued political instability 
and violence in Afghanistan frustrated Pakistan because it affected its trading 
prospects and influence in Central Asia. Moreover, the impact on Pakistan felt 
from both the narcotic smuggling and the klashinkovisation was 
overwhelming. Arms were supplied to the Afghan Mujahedeen by Western 
states but many of these arms were smuggled and sold to local population in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan at bargain prices. This increased armed robberies, 
kidnappings for ransom and gun-battles between rival groups, particularly in 
tribal areas of Pakistan.860 To address this situation, Pakistan felt compelled 
to play a leading role in the stabilisation of Afghanistan. Since the 
mujahedeen failed to accomplish that aim, Pakistan moved away from its 
traditional client, Hekmatyar 861 , towards a new actor: the Taliban. 862  The 
Taliban shared the same Islamist ideology but were closer to the tribesmen 
who were residing in Pakistan.863 In August 2000, the Pakistani President, 
General Musharraf, openly announced military support for the Taliban 
because they shared the Pashtun ethnicity with Pakistani who resides in tribal 
areas of Pakistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa KPK and Baluchistan.864  
Following this logic, both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia started supporting a new 
movement known as the Taliban in 1994. The Taliban were Afghan refugees, 
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and war veterans based in rural and tribal areas of Pakistan. Most of the 
Taliban were graduates of madrasah funded by Saudi Arabia.865 They grew 
up and socialised in a purely conservative religious environment. They had 
never been exposed to any alternative religious views and had a naive 
opinion on world affairs. They had rigid views about other religions, religious 
sects within Islam, society and the West from a very young age.866 When the 
Taliban emerged in the political landscape of Afghanistan they enjoyed 
massive public support in the beginning because there was a perception 
amongst the Afghan public that the movement leaders were extremely pious, 
not involved in any corruption, against opium trade and devoted to create a 
just Islamic state.867  
The Afghan public was repulsed by the civil war amongst mujahedeen for 
personal gains and accepted the Taliban; perhaps because they had no 
alternative.868 A factor largely ignored relates to the ethnic forces that backed 
the Taliban movement.  The Taliban did not face any resistance in the 
Pashtun parts of Afghanistan. All the Pashtun warlords had a strong 
resentment against Tajiks869 who got powerful during the war. The Taliban 
provided organisation and financial resources to Pashtuns who did not enjoy 
these benefits until then, making it easier to support them.870In addition, funds 
channelled to the Taliban from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Gulf countries and 
Osama Bin Laden also contributed in their success.871  
Saudi Arabia has been the major financial supporter for the Taliban. In July 
1996, a trip to Pakistan by Prince Turki al-Faisal Saud, Head of the Saudi 
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General Intelligence Agency, proved to be decisive in making Saudi Arabia 
the main financial supporter of the Taliban.872 However, following Bin Laden’s 
involvement in the 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Tanzania873, the US 
pressurised Saudi Arabia to break diplomatic contact with the Taliban.874 The 
US also pressed Saudi Arabia to stop funding the Taliban. Official Saudi’s aid 
reportedly stopped but Saudi money continued to support the Taliban through 
private contributors.875 According to information released by WikiLeaks, the 
Saudi support to Islamists is ongoing. In a leaked 2009 memo, Hilary Clinton 
is shown as having stated that, ‘Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial 
support base for al-Qaeda, the Taliban, LeT [Pakistan based Lashkar-e-
Taiba] and other terrorist groups’.876 
The role played by Pakistan in the emergence and military success of the 
Taliban cannot be dismissed. Pakistan equipped, financed and guided the 
Taliban movement for advancing its own geostrategic interests.877 Pakistan 
has supported the Taliban movement to checkmate its regional rivals and 
keep itself a strong and influential regional player. For decades, the Pakistani 
governments’ policy has been to keep a foothold in Afghanistan to balance 
India. Pakistan's interest in the Taliban government was not ideological but 
pragmatic.878 They were strong enough to provide stability in the Pashtun 
areas of Afghanistan, which was important for maintaining security and 
stability in Pakistan’s Pashtun dominated areas. Furthermore, a friendly 
government in Afghanistan was crucial to maintain a gas pipeline from 
Turkmenistan and trade with Central Asian states.879  
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The Taliban enjoyed widespread support within the Pakistani government, the 
military and some private actors in society. Although the Pakistani 
government and its army have denied, until today, that they ever supported 
Taliban’s activities, evidence reveals that since 1994 various Pakistani actors 
have continued to provide support to them. Pakistan’s assistance to the 
Taliban has included direct and indirect military involvement, training, financial 
aid, logistical support, recruitment and diplomatic recognition.880  
The Pakistani authorities had no check on the cross-border movement of 
ammunition or movement of men in either direction. According to Human 
Rights Watch reports in 2001, around 30 trucks carrying ammunitions and 
fuels entered Afghanistan from the Pakistani border every day.881 A 1997 UN 
Secretary-General report indicated that vehicles full of fuels arms and 
ammunition were transported from foreign countries to Taliban-controlled 
land. 882  Pakistan’s porous border with Afghanistan facilitated the illegal 
transportation of men and goods.883 
 The tribal areas of Pakistan are semi-autonomous regions and governed with 
the help of political agents.884 The Taliban are not former Mujahedeen neither 
they are simple religious students; they are well trained to fight a war using 
sophisticated weapons because ISI has recruited thousands of Pakistani 
youth since 1994 mainly from Madrassa’s to fill Taliban ranks.885 Apart from 
the Pakistani government, other religious political parties, such as Jamat-e-
Islami, or the more radical Islamist organisations Lashkar-e-taiba, Hizbul 
Mujahedeen, and Harkatul-mujahedeen supported with recruits the Taliban in 
Afghanistan.886  
 On balance, Pakistan failed to obtain the geostrategic benefits it expected 
from the Taliban, but supporting them proved a costly endeavour at domestic 
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and foreign policy levels. On the domestic front, the religious parties in 
Pakistan introduced militant version of Islam amongst their followers which 
radicalised Pakistani youth and strengthened the political religious groups.887 
In the arena of foreign policy, the strategic partnership with Taliban proved to 
be fraught with problems. Pakistan’s relations with Iran, Kyrgyzstan and other 
central Asian states deteriorated to unmanageable levels. 888   The 
International Community rejected Taliban’s medieval, brutal and harsh 
treatment of women, minorities and non-Muslims.889 In Resolution 51/108, 
adopted in December 1996, the General Assembly called on all the Afghan 
parties to, ‘fully respect and act in accordance with all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, regardless of gender, ethnicity or religion’.890  Taliban 
government’s refusal to hand over Osama Bin Laden to the US was totally 
unacceptable to international community.891Pakistan's association with them 
caused major damage to its world image.        
The social policies, rigid interpretation of Islamic law and inappropriate 
behaviour towards women led to the marginalisation of the Taliban by most of 
the International community. World leaders such as UN Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the heads of UNICEF, UNESCO, UNHCR and the 
European Commissioner for Human Rights criticised Taliban for hanging 
former President Najibullah and the harsh treatment of women.892 In 1996, the 
Taliban captured Kabul and since became de facto government of 
Afghanistan.893 Only the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan 
temporarily recognised Taliban as the government of Afghanistan.894 But the 
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rest of the world has continued to recognise the Rabbani regime as the 
legitimate government of Afghanistan.895 The US rejected Taliban because of 
their willingness to provide safe haven and training facilities to Islamic 
militants who were working under Bin Laden. Bin Laden was wanted for his 
involvement in the June 1996 bombing of American barracks in Saudi Arabia 
and for his bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 
1998.896  
In 1996, Bin Laden moved to Afghanistan and subsequently created his own 
terrorist organisation, Al-Qaeda, which became closely associated to the 
Taliban.897 The Taliban leader, Mullah Omer gave Al-Qaeda sanctuary to train 
terrorists and plan operations in return of getting trained fighters to fight 
against the Northern Alliance.898 In November 1999, the UN Security Council 
imposed sanctions on Taliban because they failed to turn Osama Bin Laden 
over to the US for his alleged involvement in terrorist activities.899 The Taliban 
became notorious globally for granting refuge to separatists and extremists in 
their land, including Uzbek and Krgyz anti-government Islamist rebels.900 In 
2000, the UNSC imposed new sanctions on Taliban because they were not 
prepared to give up Bin Laden who was complicit in bombings of the USS 
Cole in Aden and Yemen.901  The Taliban could not giving up Bin Laden 
because it was an important source of financial support. Their credibility would 
have also been damaged for handing   over a Muslim jihadi to an ‘infidel’. 
Mullah Zaeef, Taliban’s ambassador to Pakistan, categorically rejected the 
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US demands and stated ‘we have not given shelter to Osama bin Laden so 
we can make a deal to hand him over . . .’ because this would ‘amount to 
giving a kind of superiority to non-Islamic laws over Islamic laws . . .’902 Even 
after the US started bombing Taliban, they refused to hand over Bin Laden 
because -in Zaeef’s words- that was an ‘issue of faith’.903  
These factors dragged the Taliban into unnecessary fight with the US. Abu-ul-
Wahid, who worked closely with Mullah Omar, has claimed that there were 
internal rifts amongst Taliban related to the issue of Bin Laden. He has argued 
that Bin Laden overburdened the Taliban rule and his controversial 
statements and terrorist actors made them more enemies than friends. This 
would have been particularly true regarding their relations with Saudi Arabia, 
their biggest financial contributor. Despite the widespread condemnation over 
their policies the international community was willing to engage in a dialogue 
with them until 9/11. 904  According to Steve Coll, the Saudi’s mistakenly 
believed that, gradually, the Taliban would evolve into a responsible state, but 
Taliban’s refusal to hand over Bin Laden and harbouring of Al-Qaeda, proved 
that their policy of supporting Taliban was short-sighted.905 Following 9/11 
Saudi Arabia severed ties with Taliban for strategic reasons claiming that, ‘the 
Taliban government has paid no attention to the calls and pleas of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to stop harbouring, training and encouraging 
criminals.’906 
Pakistan has over the years adopted controversial policies toward 
Afghanistan, exploiting its vulnerabilities as a weak state to its advantage. 
Pakistan’s policy of supporting the Taliban in the post-Soviet war era gave 
rise to internal rivalries that further destabilised Afghanistan. Subsequently, 
this policy of supporting militias proved to be venomous in the long-term and 
Afghanistan's internal strife has had a negative impact on Pakistan’s security.  
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The situation became precarious for Pakistan when it emerged that Al-Qaeda 
was involved in 9/11. Al-Qaeda and Taliban, despite their alliance, remain 
separate entities. While Al-Qaeda has kept a global agenda, the Taliban’s 
ambitions have always been local. 907  The Taliban provided shelter to Al-
Qaeda but were not directly involved the in 9/11 attacks. Indeed, the US never 
claimed the Taliban were responsible for such attacks beyond their 
permissible attitude towards Al-Qaeda operations within the territory under 
their control contribution. 908 Bin Laden never involved Taliban in any of his 
activities.909  Neither Taliban nor Pakistan foresaw a full-scale war against 
Afghanistan.  
4.2 General Musharraf’s security policy 1999-2008 
General Musharraf entered Pakistan’s politics in 1999, after toppling Nawaz 
Sharif’s government in a military coup. 910  The failure of Nawaz Sharif’s 
government has been associated to his willingness to withdraw support for the 
Taliban, under international pressure.911 The relationship between the civil 
and military arms of the government has always been complicated in Pakistan 
as demonstrated in this context. The military believed in the importance of 
maintaining close relationships with the Taliban as the most reliable allies in 
Afghanistan.912 Sharif was willing to change its foreign policy towards the 
Afghan regime. In order to overcome the opposition of the military and assert 
his constitutional authority, he removed the army chief.913 By mounting the 
coup against the Sharif’s government, the army demonstrated that they 
remained the most powerful institution of the state. Following the coup, 
General Musharraf imposed the fourth Martial Law in the short history of 
Pakistan. All religious parties backed General Musharraf because his actions 
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were directed against a Prime Minister who had expressed dissatisfaction with 
the previous policy of Pakistan toward the Taliban and was perceived as pro-
India and pro-Washington; he was also portrayed as willing to betray Islamic 
Jihadi’s in Kashmir.914 However, the army’s decision to support the Taliban 
ignored its international isolation. The International Community persistently 
pressurised Musharraf to distance his government from the Taliban, but the 
Pakistani government emphasised the control over the territory of the Taliban 
as a reason to defend the need to engage with the group.915This continued 
until 2001, when realising the severity of 9/11 incident Pakistan took a U-turn 
in its Afghan policy and became a major ally of the US in its war against 
terrorism.  
After 9/11, Bush chose to pursue counter-terrorism not only by law-
enforcement and intelligence measures, but also through a muscular military 
response. No distinctions were made between terrorists and those who 
harboured them.916 Pakistan had only two options. It either perpetuated its 
alliance with the Taliban facing wrath of International community or it 
supported the US led coalition against terrorism. The Bush’s policy of ‘either 
with us or against us’ meant that there was no neutral ground left for Pakistan. 
General Musharraf acknowledged in his memoir that: ‘He had no choice after 
the Sept 11 attacks but to switch from supporting the Taliban to backing the 
US-led war on terror groups or face an American ‘onslaught’.’917 He claimed 
that America would surely ‘react like a wounded bear’ and ‘if the perpetrators 
turned out to be Al-Qaeda then that wounded bear would come charging 
straight toward us’.918 It was a strategic move and by supporting International 
community in the war against terror Pakistan became a frontline state. 
Afghanistan did not have any significant military power but its geographical 
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location affords it protection. Afghanistan is surrounded by states with which 
US had no close relations. Pakistan was a key and a natural ally in this war 
against terror because being a neighbour state they were familiar with Afghan 
culture. Woodward aptly wrote that Pakistan was the ‘linchpin for any strategy 
to isolate and eventually attack Al-Qaeda and the Taliban’.919 Pakistani army 
and intelligence officials nurtured Taliban and had very close ties with the 
Taliban leader Mullah Omer. Mullah Umar escaped the Afghanistan in 
December 2000 and established a leadership council in 2003 in the Pakistani 
city of Quetta to run the movement. 920  The US also required accessing 
Pakistan’s territory to conduct any military operation from sea. Within this 
context, one day after the 9/11 attacks Musharraf approved the US seven 
demands to Pakistan, namely:921 
1. Stop Al-Qaeda operatives at the border, intercept arms shipments 
through Pakistan and end all logistical support for Bin Laden; 
2. Blanket overflight and landing rights; 
3. Access to Pakistan naval bases, air bases and borders; 
4. Immediate intelligence and immigration information sharing; 
5. Condemnation of the September 11 attacks and curbing of all domestic 
expressions of support for terrorism; 
6. Cutting off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban, and stopping the 
Pakistani volunteers from travelling to Afghanistan to join the Taliban. 
7. Should the evidence strongly implicate Osama Bin Laden and the Al-
Qaeda network in Afghanistan, and should the Taliban continue to 
harbour him and his accomplices, Pakistan had to break diplomatic 
relations with the Taliban regime and assist the U.S. in the 
aforementioned ways to destroy Osama and his network.922 
General Musharraf knew that ‘Pakistan faced a stark choice it could either join 
the US coalition that was supported by the UNSC923, or expect to be declared 
                                                        
919 Bob Woodward, Bush at war (Pocket Books 2003) 58 
920 John W. Young and John Kent, International relations since 1945 (Oxford University Press 2013) 
562   
921 Zahid. Hussain, Frontline Pakistan the Struggle with Militant Islam (Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd. 2007) 
35-36 
922 Bob Woodward, Bush at war, (Pocket Books 2003) 25 
923 UN S/RES/1373 (2001) Security Council; UN S/RES/1368 (2001) Security Council 
 181 
a terrorist state, leading to economic sanctions’.924 Furthermore, the military 
understood that a stance of non-cooperation with the US government would 
enhance the Indian position.925 Even states that were hostile towards the US, 
like Russia and Iran offered their full assistance against the Taliban. Tehran 
had long opposed both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 926 Therefore, on 19th 
September 2001, Musharraf addressed the nation and revealed that he had 
offered his full cooperation to the US in its war against terrorism. Musharraf 
insisted that this move aimed at securing Pakistan’s strategic assets, assist 
Pakistan in its Kashmir cause, prevent Pakistan from being declared a 
terrorist state, prevent the possibility of an anti-Pakistani government coming 
to power in Kabul and improve Pakistan’s global image.927  
Pakistan took a ‘historical U-turn in its policy towards Taliban’ and assured the 
US its unconditional support in the war on terror.928 Musharraf reshuffled the 
army officials and removed officials who were sympathetic towards 
Islamists. 929  The military ‘top brass now bore a totally new and liberal 
image’.930 The commitment to the Taliban movement was never ideological. 
The Pakistani military supported Islamists to enhance national security. After 
9/11, the Generals concluded that the Islamists had become a liability instead 
of a valuable asset. Ironically, in 1979, the Pakistani military along with the US 
glorified the concept of jihad and then in 2001 it again joined US to destroy 
the forces that emerged because of that jihad. Musharraf’s unlimited support 
to Washington in this war against terrorism received appraisal from the 
international community. However, the religious segment in Pakistan 
vehemently opposed Musharraf’s pro-West policies.931Contrary to Musharraf’s 
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expectations, the pro-war on terror policy proved as short-sighted as the 
previous pro-Taliban policy.  
Musharraf insisted that supporting the US in war on terror would benefit 
Pakistan. Unfortunately Pakistan’s political, strategic, economic and security 
issues deteriorated progressively. The emergence of numerous militia groups 
in Pakistan, unprecedented series of terrorist attacks against civilians and 
Government officials, created a growing sense of uneasiness, insecurity, and 
perplexity amongst the international community. According to an internal 
national security document ‘from 2001 to November 2013, 48,994 people 
were killed in the country including 5,272 personnel of the law-enforcement 
agencies, a large number of them (17,642) having been killed in just three 
years from 2011 to 2013 including 2,114 personnel of the law-enforcement 
agencies’.932 The general perception became that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals 
were not secure and could fall into the hands of extremists.933  
Domestic terrorism problems related to Kashmir were also on the backbench. 
The presence of Bin Laden in Abbottabad just few kilometres away from 
military academy and cross border movement of Taliban and Al-Qaeda 
members between the Afghan-Pakistan border, made Pakistan an unreliable 
ally in the fight against terrorism.934 Pakistan’s controversial involvement in 
Afghan domestic politics since the 1980s left ‘Pakistan with fewer friends and 
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more enemies in Afghanistan’935, particularly among non-Pashtuns. Pakistan’s 
previous ties with Taliban and religious militias undermined its credibility. 
Hamid Karzai, leader of the Afghanis between 2001 and 2014, was not 
satisfied with Pakistan’s performance in securing its ungoverned tribal areas. 
Pakistan was also accused of playing double games. It was believed that 
some retired ISI officials and right-wing Army generals were assisting Taliban 
and Al-Qaeda fighters.936  
Washington adopted a carrot and stick approach towards Pakistan. On 12 
February 2007, the then US Defence Secretary Robert Gates travelled to 
Pakistan and expressed appreciation towards its constructive role in fighting 
the battle on the border.937 However, in the context of a surprise and unusual 
secret tip to Pakistan, Dick Cheney, expressed his concerns to General 
Musharraf about the reorganising of Al-Qaeda and Taliban in the tribal region 
of Pakistan. He further warned of a possibility of linking Pakistan’s aid to its 
effectiveness in combating both Al Qaeda and the Taliban. 938  Pakistan 
wanted to be front line state in the fight against terrorism to compete with 
India but its efforts failed. When President Bush visited Pakistan in 2006, he 
lectured General Musharraf on the need to ‘do more’ to securing its border 
and getting tougher with Al-Qaeda.939 Conversely, India was praised as an 
emerging world power and was awarded with a civilian nuclear deal.940 Hamid 
Karzai went a step further and called Pakistan ‘more than a boss’ of the 
Taliban and accused Pakistani state elements of directly supporting them.941 
General Musharraf even tried to fence the Pakistani-Afghan border to put an 
end to the accusations of cross-border infiltration. The Afghan government 
rejected this proposal because allowing Pakistan to fence the area would 
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mean that Afghanistan has accepted the Durand line. 942  The international 
pressure made General Musharraf halt the plan of fencing or mining the 
border. He categorically denied that any intelligence agent was helping 
Taliban, but admitted that some border security forces guards might have 
allowed Taliban militants to cross into Afghanistan.943  
Unfortunately both pre-9/11 and post-9/11 Pakistani policies were imprudent 
and had their own repercussions. Where supporting Islamist isolated Pakistan 
from the International community and Islamised a few sections of society, 
supporting the US-led war on terror further divided the country, gave rise to 
terrorist groups like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and radicalised the 
youth. The Pakistan’s complicity in the US war on terror helped fuel the 
growth of radical Muslim groups within Pakistan especially in tribal areas and 
in Baluchistan. TTP emerged with a program of violence aimed at the US, the 
Pakistani military and at the liberal forces in Pakistan. 944  Days after 9/11 
General Musharraf addressed the nation and highlighted the possibilities of 
unilateral US attacks if Pakistan failed to support them in this war. Overall, 
Pakistan became a key state in this war against terrorism; however its 
controversial and opportunist policies failed badly to protect the country from 
the unilateral military attacks of the US. 
4.2.1 Rise of drones strikes in Pakistan under General Musharraf      
In 2004, the first CIA drone strike hit Pakistan, starting a never ending 
bombing campaign that would span two US presidencies and three Pakistani 
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administrations945. On 17th June 2004, a CIA drone strike hit Nek Muhammad 
a senior Pakistani Taliban leader.946 Nek Muhammad was targeted with the 
drone when Pakistani military was about to sign Shakai peace agreement with 
him.947 This fuelled the popular perception that the US did not seek peace in 
Pakistan and was trying to sabotage any attempt of a peace deal between 
Pakistan and the Pakistani Taliban. The US was perceived as an imperial 
state targeting a powerless country.  
Pakistani military’s experience in tribal areas has been dreadful and they have 
suffered heavy loss and hamstrung by sniper attacks and ambushes.948 The 
tribesmen who opposed the deployment of Pakistani military in Wazirastan 
became furious and anti-Military. The attacks against Frontier Corps 
increased and regular Pakistani-army began looking for alternative to boots 
on ground in tribal areas. Thus the Pakistani Army, exasperated with the 
shenanigans of the Pakistani Taliban, allowed the CIA to conduct drone 
strikes against Pakistani Taliban militants in FATA. The consent to this 
operation was conditional. 949  In particular, the CIA was to conduct these 
strikes as a covert operation, enabling the US to neither confirm nor deny 
these strikes and Pakistan to either take credit for these strikes or remain 
silent. General Musharraf did not see this as a problem and told one CIA 
official, ‘In Pakistan things fall out of the sky all the time’.950 Nek Muhammad 
was an easy target for the CIA because, unlike other militants, he was not 
hiding. He gave interviews to various news channels and Americans were 
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regularly tracking his movement through his phone via satellite; eventually, he 
was attacked one day after he spoke to BBC in his compound. 951  The 
Pakistani Army was quick in taking responsibility for Nek Muhammad’s killing 
and said that reports of American involvement were ‘absolutely absurd’.952 
 In May 2005, another CIA drone killed Haitham-al-Yamani, an Al-Qaeda 
member in North Wazirastan. This time the CIA refused to comment over this 
issue and the Pakistani foreign minister denied that such incident took 
place.953 According to Coll, General Musharraf urged the Bush administrations 
officials to give the drones to Pakistan but the US declined because of high-
technology transfer restrictions. In 2004 Pakistani Army intensified military 
operations in tribal areas and as violence spread Musharraf allowed CIA to 
conduct drone strikes to support Pakistani military action. A CIA drone 
operator told Coll that all the drone strikes were carried out with the prior 
approval from ISI. Pakistani intelligence officers were shown the feed from 
predators circling over the targets by the CIA.954  
Initial drone strikes in Pakistan did not attract much media attention due to the 
low level of collateral damage. But on 30th October 2006, a deadly drone 
strike on a madrassa took Pakistanis by surprise. The strike resulted in the 
death of 82 people including 70 children. The attack was damaging for 
Pakistan not only because of excessive collateral damage but also because 
on that day local militants were expected to sign a peace agreement with 
Islamabad.955 While the Pakistani military was comfortable until this point with 
US drone strikes because they were targeting Al-Qaeda leaders or a few 
Pakistani Taliban leaders who were creating nuisance for Pakistan. However, 
the scale of this strike resulted in senior military leaders realising that the 
drone war carried serious risks for Pakistan’s war against the Pakistani 
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Taliban. The Pakistani Military’s outlook towards the US drone war changed 
when it became clear that the US was unilaterally targeting insurgents who 
were willing to make peace a deal with Pakistan and who were against the Al-
Qaeda and TTP’s war against Pakistani army. Former ISI chief, General 
Durrani, denounced the United States deception and said that the Bajaur 
Madrassa strike ‘effectively sabotaged the chances for an agreement’. That 
was ‘a very clear message’ from the CIA not to enter into any more such 
peace agreements.956 Roggio has suggested that the main motivation behind 
the strike was to disrupt the peace accord because the US deemed peace 
with militants a major threat to the security of both Afghanistan and nuclear 
Pakistan.957 This one incident irreparably damaged the credibility of General 
Musharraf. He faced fierce criticism at national level because rather than 
condemning the US he ordered the Pakistani military to take complete 
responsibility for the incident.958      
4.3 Escalation in drones under General Kyani    
General Kayani became Pakistan’s army in chief on 29 November 2007.959 
Pakistan’s national security policy during Kayani’s era continued Musharraf’s 
policies. He continued denying Pakistan’s complicity in drone strikes and 
persistently condemned US for violating Pakistan’s fictional national 
sovereignty. Initially, the US and Pakistan cooperated and developed a joint 
list of targets for drone strikes.960 The situation changed when Michael V. 
Hyden became CIA Director in May 2006. Under Hayden, the Agency stopped 
the practice of notifying the Pakistanis before launching strikes primarily 
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because the CIA believed that Pakistan's intelligence agencies were 
undermining the program by tipping off would-be targets.961 The CIA began 
operating unilaterally and more broadly and the trajectory began to change: 
from 2 drone strikes in 2006 to 36 in 2008.962 In addition, the CIA introduced 
extremely controversial ‘signature strikes’. 963  Previously, the agency could 
only strike targets that were identified and had needed confirmation of the 
presence of an approved Al-Qaeda target before it could shoot. Conversely, 
signature strikes allowed the CIA to attack militants based solely on their 
patterns of behaviour. Thus with permission from the White House, the CIA 
began hitting suspected militant gatherings.964 Drone strikes further intensified 
when Obama became President of the US.  
Meanwhile, Islamabad continued to issue pro forma statements against the 
drones but, behind closed doors, Pakistani civilian leaders endorsed US 
drone strikes.965 For instance WikiLeaks cables reveal that Pakistan’s former 
Prime Minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani, suggested that he would protest the 
attacks in parliament while ignoring them in practice.966 Likewise, President 
Zardari publicly rebuked drone strikes to be counterproductive but secretly 
told Americans that ‘Kill the seniors. Collateral damage worries you 
Americans. It does not worry me.’967 Peter Bergen summed up Pakistan’s 
duplicity in regards to the US drone strikes:  
For Pakistani politicians, the drone program is a dream come true. 
They get to posture to their constituents about the perfidious 
Americans even as they reap the benefits from the U.S. strikes. They 
are well-aware that neither the Pakistani Army's ineffective military 
operations nor the various peace agreements with the militants have 
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done anything to halt the steady Talibanisation of their country, while 
the U.S. drones are the one sure fire way to put significant pressure on 
the leaders of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. This is called getting to have 
your chapati and eat it too.968 
It wasn’t just Musharraf who gave the US a blank cheque to operate drone 
strikes in Pakistan; General Kayani was equally seduced by the drones. 
WikiLeaks cables show that Kayani asked for more, rather than less, drone 
strikes. According to cables referring to operations carried out in 2008 and 
2009, tie Pakistani military requested in numerous occasions for greater back 
up for its own military operations to the US.969 The Pakistani military never 
accepted the US soldiers on the ground because ‘it would not be politically 
acceptable’. 970  In July 2008, President Bush authorised the US Special 
Operation Forces to conduct ground raids in Pakistan without the approval of 
the Pakistani government.971 On 3rd September 2008, 24 US Navy Seals 
landed on Pakistan’s soil and killed dozens of people within a targeted house. 
The political objective was to defeat and deter Al-Qaeda from using Pakistani 
soil to plan operations. The operation failed and resulted in the killing of a few 
militants and several civilians, including children. 972  The Pakistani military 
reacted fiercely and General Kayani vowed to protect Pakistan ‘at all cost’.973 
This time Pakistan was really serious and those were not hollow words. The 
Pakistani military ordered its forces to open fire on any US troop found 
entering the country covertly. 974  Reportedly, twelve days after that 
controversial raid, the US military tried again to enter Pakistani soil but 
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Pakistani border troops fired them. Threats from the Pakistani military, civilian 
casualties and the operation’s failure deterred US forces from deploying 
ground forces in Pakistan.975 
This incident reveals that the Pakistani military had no objections in any 
mutual military operations, but had no patience for unilateral attacks from the 
US. According to leaked cables, a sea change in Pakistan’s policy means 
that, since 2009, the military had no objection in the deployment of US Special 
Forces in providing support to Pakistani military operations.976 But no strategy 
worked for very long because the US-Pakistan relationship was based on 
mutual mistrust. Malicious interests, pursued by both sides, from the onset, 
contaminated the relationship. There was never a genuine agreement 
between them in regards to drone strikes or deployment of Special Forces in 
Pakistan. When the Pakistani military reacted harshly to US boots on 
grounds, the Bush administration decided to rely heavily on armed drones. 
Bush ordered the CIA to expand its drone attacks. Furthermore, the US 
government discontinued the practice of notifying Pakistani officials before 
strikes and conducted attacks against militants without obtaining their 
permission.977 Later the Bin Laden’s raid caused an irreparable damage to 
US-Pakistani relationship. The US Navy Seals invasion on 2nd May 2011 
resulting in the killing of Osama Bin Laden humiliated the Pakistani military 
globally. Washington showed its deep mistrust towards the Pakistani 
government or its military by not giving any advance notice.978  
Before the Bin Laden’s raid, on 27 Jan 2011, the CIA-spy Raymond Davis 
killed two civilians in Lahore. Generally ‘Pakistanis saw the episode as more 
evidence of imperialistic arrogance ‘.979 While there has always been anti-
American sentiment in Pakistan it peaked after the Raymond Davis 
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incident.980 The final nail in the coffin was the NATO attack on the Pakistani 
check-post in Salala that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers.981 It is hard to say with 
surety what actually happened there because both sides blame each other. 
According to NATO, Pakistani forces fired first and it was a retaliatory action 
from their side; the Pakistani military denied this and argued that the strike 
was unprovoked. Whosoever was at fault it was a costly mistake and the 
Pakistani military shut down NATO supply routes into Afghanistan in 
retaliation for the attack.982 Pakistan demanded an official apology from the 
US over this incident when the US apologised, Pakistan reopened NATO 
supply lines into Afghanistan following seven month of blockage.983  
This was not the first time that NATO had attacked Pakistani soldiers. On 30th 
September 2010, NATO helicopters crossed the Afghan border and shelled 
an area for about 25 minutes that resulted in the death of 3 Pakistani soldiers. 
Pakistani officials immediately blocked all NATO supply trucks for ten days 
from crossing the border checkpoint to Afghanistan in apparent retaliation.984 
Pakistan did not only block NATO supply route but also ordered the US to 
leave Shamsi airbase within 15 days.985The constant violation of Pakistan’s 
sovereignty and the United States unilateral and unauthorised drone strikes 
and boots on grounds indicated that US-Pakistani relation were at an all-time 
low. Realising the severity of the circumstances, Obama administration 
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tightened its drone rules and agreed to give Pakistani leaders advance notice 
about operations. In addition, the CIA and the State of department became 
more selective in strikes against militants.986 The diagram below shows the 
gradual decline in CIA drone strikes after 2010.987 It is uncertain who was 
actually killed in those strikes but data shows low number of civilian casualties 
in 2012 and 2013.988 
 
 
Reports also suggest that there was a division between the CIA and State 
Department regarding the issues of drone strikes. Many senior officials began 
to question CIA’s aggressive methods. Military officials argued that killing low-
level militants was counterproductive. One of the official said ‘You can kill 
these foot soldiers all day, every day and you wouldn't change the course of 
the war’.989Washington decided to use drone strikes more judiciously because 
they wanted to avoid a situation where Pakistan decided to stop the drones. 
Islamabad never wanted a blanket halt on these strikes but an equal say on 
who to be targeted which they achieved, at least nominally, after blocking the 
NATO’s route. As one CIA official described ‘It's not like they took the car 
keys away from the CIA, there are just more people in the car.’990    
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CIA Strikes Obama Total Drone strikes Total Killed Civilians Killed 
2009 52 465-744 100-210 
2010 128 755-1108 89-197 
2011 75 363-666 52-152 
2012 50 199-410 13-63 
2013 27 109-195 0-4 
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4.4 General Raheel Sharif and Drones  
General Raheel Sharif took over after General Kyani completed his term.He 
adopted hard line approach against ‘all militants’ and, in June 2014, launched 
a long awaited military operation -known as Operation Zarb-e-Azab in North 
Wazirastan.991The future of the US-Pakistan relations is still uncertain but 
Pakistan’s policies towards the US drone strikes are becoming clearer. In 
November 2014, top US Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson acknowledged the 
effectiveness of operation Zarb-e-Azab and said that Haqani Network had 
become  ‘fractured like the Taliban’ with a weakened ability to launch attacks 
on Afghan territory.992 However, a few months later, in October 2014, Gen 
Anderson’s report played down the findings in the Pentagon’s report on 
‘Progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan’ and stated that: 
Taliban attacks in Afghanistan launched from sanctuaries in Pakistan 
remain a serious problem. These sanctuaries exist primarily in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Baluchistan…. 
Pakistan uses these proxy forces to hedge against the loss of influence 
in Afghanistan and to counter India’s superior military….993  
In January 2018 President Trump directly threatened to cut aid to Pakistan for 
allegedly lying to the US and offering ‘little help’ in hunting ‘terrorists’ in 
Afghanistan. 994  Therefore, the US rhetoric’s on blaming Pakistan has not 
changed but rules on drones have become progressively stricter due to 
diplomatic sensitivities. As a result, the number of drone strikes has dropped 
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sharply. The table below shows a dwindling number of drone strikes and 
single-digit civilian casualty.995 
 
Unlike previous Prime Ministers, the Nawaz Sharif’s (in office June 2013-July 
2018) government did not consent for drone strikes. Within a week of taking 
office Nawaz Sharif bashed the military for lying to Pakistanis about its 
cooperation with the CIA to target militants in tribal areas of Pakistan and 
stated that, ‘The policy of protesting against drone strikes for public 
consumption, while working behind the scenes to make them happen, is not 
on’.996 To further highlight his position internationally, the Sharif’s Government 
sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution demanding more transparency 
and independent investigation of the civilian killings.997  
The situation transformed after the deadly terrorist attack on Karachi Airport 
on 9 June 2014998, Pakistan and the US reached a compromise and expressly 
carried out the first ever-joint drone strike against militants on 12 June 
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Total Drone strikes Total Killed Civilians Killed 
Dec 2013 1 3-4 0 
2014 25 115-186 0-2 
2015 13 62-85 2-5 
2016 3 8-11 0 
2017 5 15-22 3 
2018 1 1-3 0 
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2014.999 But on 23rd May 2016 the US Government violated the agreement 
and conducted a unilateral drone strike against Afghan Taliban chief Mullah 
Akhtar Mansour in Baluchistan.1000 Pakistan reacted publicly on 22 June 2016 
before the United Nations Security Council, condemning the May strikes as an 
unacceptable and blatant violation of Pakistan's sovereignty, the UN Charter 
and international law.1001 The public condemnation of the Sharif’s government 
indicates that Pakistan is no longer complicit in the US drone strikes. Nothing 
indicates there is a secret agreement between the Trump administration and 
Pakistan because the Pakistani government has strongly protested against 
drone strikes carried out under his Presidency.1002 
In addition to other legal justifications discussed in previous chapters, the US 
has tried to legitimise drone strikes in Pakistan by claiming that either 
Pakistan has consented to these strikes or it is unable or unwilling to suppress 
terrorists in its tribal area.1003 Available data reveals that previous Pakistani 
governments have provided at least tacit consent for US drone strikes. More 
problematic is to determine the scope of such consent. The following section 
will examine the theory of state consent in international law and will apply it to 
the case of Pakistan.  
4.5 Consent in international law and the use of force 
Under international law a state can consent to acts otherwise contrary to its 
sovereignty. Art 2(7) of the UN Charter states, ‘Nothing contained in the 
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters 
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which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’. The Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility, that are widely considered as codifying 
customary law, recognise the state’s right to consent to the use of armed 
force by a third state’.1004  
Various US officials have invoked the consent doctrine on different occasions 
as legal basis for the use of armed force in other territories. For instance, in 
2012, the US Attorney General Eric Holder argued that the use of force in 
states where US is not at war is ‘consistent with international legal principles if 
conducted…with the consent of the nation involved’.1005 Brennan repeated 
Holder and stressed: ‘There is nothing in international law that bans the use of 
remotely piloted aircraft for this purpose or that prohibits us from using lethal 
force against our enemies outside of an active battlefield, at least when the 
country involved consents’. 1006  Similarly the US Department of Justice 
emphasised that use of force ‘would be consistent with international legal 
principles of sovereignty and neutrality’ where state gave its consent. 1007 
These official statements show that the doctrine has been key to the use of 
drones by the US.  
The International Law Commission has stressed that the validity of consent 
requires that it, ‘must be actually expressed by the State rather than merely 
presumed on the basis that the State would have consented if it had been 
asked’.1008  This confirms that consent must be clear and exhibit the true 
intention of state. There are conflicting opinions amongst International law 
scholars as to what amounts to valid consent. Professor Mary O’ Connell has 
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stressed the need for the consent to be express and public.1009 On the other 
hand, Sean Murphy has argued that secret, consent could be valid.1010The 
publicity argument put forward by O’Connell finds no basis on any 
international legal documents, nor does it appear to be supported in practice 
amounting to customary international law. On the contrary, non-public consent 
has acceptance in law. In 1979, the then-Special Rapporteur Roberto Ago in 
his report on state responsibility to the International Law Commission, stated 
that ‘like all manifestations of the will of a State…consent can be expressed or 
tacit, explicit or implicit’.1011 
There are some voices that undermine the requirement of consent in the use 
of force. For instance Jordan Paust says that consent becomes irrelevant and 
is not required at all when state use force in self-defence against non-state 
actors.1012 Arnulf Lorca supports this approach he has argued that consent is 
not required when it involves states in which governments ‘might be willing but 
might be too weak to effectively act against the non-state actor, as in the case 
of Yemen’.1013These views are controversial because they involve a broad 
interpretation of the right to self-defence and encourage actions with weak 
foundation on existing legal frameworks.1014 
4.5.1 Criterion for valid consent 
For the consent to be valid it must be provided by the ‘legitimate government’ 
of a state, 1015  that is, the government determined by the domestic 
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constitutional framework, or de facto government  exercising effective control 
over the territory and the population of a particular state.’ 1016 While most 
countries will have a widely recognised government, the question of control 
over the territory becomes thorny when such control is contested or during 
transitions.1017 Several examples illustrate the practical difficulties. In 1978, 
Lebanon invited peacekeeping operation UNIFIL (United Nations Interim 
Force in Lebanon) when Lebanon army had little control over the capital.1018 
David Wippman has loosely interpreted state control and argued the consent 
of a government is valid as long as it maintains control over the capital 
city.1019    
Whether other actors of the international community recognise a particular 
government as legitimate interlocutor plays a significant role. The events 
following the 2011 uprising against the President of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi, 
illustrates the importance of the recognition of governments when assessing 
whether consent has been provided by the legitimate authority. 
Following its fourth meeting, the ‘Libya Contact Group’, composed of several 
international organizations and 32 States, issued the following statement: 
The Contact Group reaffirmed that Qaddafi regime no longer has any 
legitimate authority in Libya and that Qaddafi and certain members of 
his family must go. Henceforth and until an interim authority is in place, 
participants agreed to deal with the National Transitional Council (NTC) 
as the legitimate governing authority in Libya.1020 
Several states have also recognised the Syrian opposition group National 
Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCS) as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Syrian people, while not removing recognition 
                                                        
1016 International Law Association Committee on the Use of Force, Washington Conference ‘Report on 
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of the Assad’s regime as regular interlocutor. 1021 The European Court on 
Human Rights has had to address the recognition (or lack of) de facto 
regimes in cases involving the Republic of Moldova and Northern Cyprus to 
assert its own jurisdiction.1022 While the case-law and state practices is erratic 
and profoundly influenced by political processes, what entity can be 
considered as government is determined by its effective control on the 
territory and its recognition by the international community.1023 
In practice, heads of states, heads of government and ministers of foreign 
affairs are the governmental bodies whose consent is necessary for a foreign 
intervention.1024 For instance, President Kabila consented to the presence of 
Ugandan troops on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo.1025 The 
US-led coalition operated in Afghanistan with the consent of its elected 
President Hamid Karzai1026. The Iraqi foreign minister requested the US to 
assist in their fight against ISIL.1027 
From an international law perspective, the issue of consent from other 
sources is more problematic. In its draft ‘Report on Aggression and the Use of 
Force’, the Use of Force Committee of the International Law Association 
stated that consent coming ‘from the military/intelligence services rather than 
highest echelons of current government, will not suffice. 1028  Whether they 
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suffice or not, it is a well-accepted rule of customary law that acts of the 
military can be attributed to the state. The difficulties to deny in principle, the 
validity of the consent provided by the military probably explains the change of 
language in the final 2018 Report where it states that: ‘Requests or approval 
coming (…) from the military/intelligence services not authorised to speak on 
behalf of the State, will not suffice.’1029 The consent must be provided before 
the commencement of the armed attack and non-governmental actors cannot 
invite or consent to the use of armed force in the territory of a state.1030 
4.5.2 Pakistan’s consent and US drone strikes  
The first criterion for a valid consent is that it must be ‘clear and manifest the 
true intention of state’. 1031 As discussed above consent can be public or 
secret, implicit or explicit. Several sources have confirmed that former 
Pakistani Presidents (Musharraf and Zardari), Prime Minister Yousaf Raza 
Gillani and General Kyani had expressly given their consent to the Unites 
States in private.1032 Ben Emerson, then UN Special Rapporteur on human 
rights and counter-terrorisms, has highlighted the strength of the evidence 
revealing that between June 2004 and June 2008 remotely piloted aircraft 
strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas were conducted with the 
active consent and approval of senior members of the Pakistani military and 
intelligence service, and with at least the acquiescence and, in some 
instances, the active approval of senior government figures. 1033  Since the 
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consent was not public the territorial scope of the consent as well as the 
groups included in the agreement, is unknown. In the Armed Activities case, 
the ICJ established that the consent to use force in territory is not ‘open-
ended’ and ‘the parameters of that consent, in terms of geographic location 
and objectives, would have remained thus restricted’. 1034 It further 
acknowledged that consent could be withdrawn at any time without following 
specific formalities.1035 According to the ICJ’s jurisprudence, the US did not 
have blanket permission to use drones in Pakistan. Any use of armed force 
outside the scope of the consent provided by the Pakistani authorities would 
constitute an act of aggression and violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty as 
given in Art 2(4) of the UN Charter.  
Some evidence suggests that the consent provided by Pakistani authorities, 
when existent, was not always open-ended. General Musharraf admitted that 
Pakistan consented to drones but he emphasised that Pakistan gave 
permission ‘only on a few occasions, when a target was absolutely isolated 
and [there was] no chance of collateral damage’.1036 This remarks may have 
legal implications on the categorisation of strikes carried out during his tenure 
but not the strikes that occurred after Musharraf stood down in 2008. 
Following the raid that ended with the life of Bin Laden, the relationship 
between the US and Pakistan has fluctuated over time. It remains uncertain 
whether the drone strikes conducted by the Obama administration were 
carried out with Pakistan’s consent. Various events may suggest the explicit 
rescinding of consent.1037 According to Ben Emerson: 
Officials stated that reports of continuing tacit consent by Pakistan to 
the use of drones on its territory by any other State are false, and 
confirmed that a thorough search of Government records had revealed 
no indication of such consent having been given. Officials also pointed 
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to public statements by Pakistan at the United Nations emphasizing 
this position and calling for an immediate end to the use of drones by 
any other State on the territory of Pakistan.1038  
In 2011, Pakistan decided to remove US presence from the Shamsi airbase 
from which drones had been flown.1039 Later in 2013, the Pakistani Parliament 
unanimously passed a resolution against drone strikes.1040 The withdrawal of 
consent was obvious when Nawaz Sharif came into power in 2013 and called 
for an end to the US drone strikes in Pakistan, confirming this position before 
the UNSC.1041 According to reports the US has long tried to expand its drone 
operations to Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan province but Pakistan 
categorically denied any expansion of drone strikes beyond tribal areas.1042 In 
2016, the US targeted Afghan Taliban leader in Baluchistan1043and received 
open condemnation by both civilian and military leadership. This particular 
strike suggests that the US has carried out strikes without Pakistan’s consent.  
Pakistan’s case is primarily complex due to the controversial civil-military 
relationship and balance of power. Democracy is weak in Pakistan and the 
military retains control over security, foreign policy and strategic issues. It has 
been suggested that, in this context, the consent of the Chief of Army would 
override governmental formal opposition.1044According to some sources, the 
military has been making decisions on US drone strikes. For instance, it has 
been reported that the CIA used to send fax to Pakistan's ISI outlining broad 
areas where the US intended to conduct strikes with drone aircrafts, but there 
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is no evidence on whether the US also consulted the Pakistani civilian 
government.1045 As explained above, this raises complicated issues in terms 
of validity of the consent provided by institutional arms of the state beyond the 
head of states, heads of governments or foreign affairs ministers. 
4.5.3 Limitations of consent 
The Article 20 of Draft Articles on State Responsibility favours a narrow 
interpretation of the scope of consent and precludes the wrongfulness of an 
act when it remains within the limits of the assent provided.1046 An action that 
violates the conditions and parameters of the consent is unlawful.1047 Some 
IHL and IHRL are not subject to consent. 1048 Larson and Malamud have 
emphasised this point:  
If Pakistan has consented to the drone strikes, then the United States 
and Pakistan must still ensure the legality of the strike. A finding that 
the cross-border incursion is ‘legal’ does not relieve States from their 
obligations to follow the Law of War.1049  
Similarly, Schmitt has asserted that: 
the [host] state may only grant consent to operations that it could itself 
legally conduct....and cannot lawfully allow attacks that would violate 
applicable human rights or humanitarian law norms, since it does not 
itself enjoy such authority.1050 
In a similar vein Alston explains the consenting state is under the positive 
obligation to ensure that the targeting state uses force lawfully within the 
parameters of international law.1051 If a third state violates IHL or IHRL the 
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host state should ‘seek prosecution of the offenders and compensation of the 
victims’.1052 
Mary O’ Connell argues along the same line: 
even where the US is using drones on the basis of consent from the 
[host] state, that state may not consent to use military force on its own, 
against its own people, except when it is engaged in armed conflict 
hostilities.1053   
In brief, even where a state consents to the use of armed force within its 
territory, it must guarantee the compliance with international law.  
To summarise, there is enough evidence revealing the existence of consent to 
US drones by successive Pakistani governments, although its scope remains 
uncertain due to its secrecy. It is also clear that the Nawaz Sharif’s 
government withdrew such consent and succeeding government has 
maintained this policy. Nonetheless, the US has continued to carry out drone 
strikes, meaning that, at least since 2013, the US has been employing drones 
without Pakistan’s consent. In the absence of consent the US can only legally 
use drones against non-state actors in self-defence providing they pose 
imminent threat to the US.  
The case study of Pakistan illuminates the inherent flaws in this doctrine. It 
shows that the powerful states are in a position to get consent by exploiting 
unstable governments. The US relied on secret consent from a corrupt 
government and military officials. For instance, in Pakistan the US has 
obtained consent by sending the Pakistani intelligence officials faxes about 
drone strikes. 1054  In Yemen the validity of consent is also controversial 
because, the US relies on consent of President Hadi who overstayed his term 
in office, resigned once and even fled to Saudi Arabia for six months in 
2015.1055 Secret consent is legal but morally and politically questionable. It 
generates a culture of impunity and shields the targeting state agents from 
prosecution for human rights abuses. International law allows one state to 
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accept another states consent at face value, targeting state is not obliged to 
ensure that the consenting state is not violating its domestic and international 
obligations.1056 Consent also enables targeted state to make shoddy secret 
deals with a foreign state and escape domestic backlash by publicly 
condemning the strikes. Specifics of consent are important and should not 
generally be kept secret because, ‘states can make their consent conditional 
on certain criteria’.1057The details of consent may also reveal targeted states 
involvement in unlawful act contrary to its own legal obligations. 1058 The 
legitimacy of consent has been especially controversial in states who have 
weak civilian institutions or who are engulfed in a civil war. Consent could 
allow targeted state to circumvent its own domestic laws by authorising the 
targeting to do something it could not do explicitly.1059 These problems could 
be addressed if states are transparent and willing to provide the following 
details: 
 Who communicated consent to the US drone strike? 
 When was consent withdrawn? 
 What is the scope of consent given by targeted state to targeting state? 
For example how long it can conduct drone strike and in which part of 
the country? 
 What does the consent allow and according to what law (domestic and 
international)? 
The US also justifies its drone strikes in Pakistan under unwilling and unable 
doctrine. Arguably, ‘the very concept of ‘unable and unwilling’ calls into 
question the legal framework surrounding the law of self-defence and 
consent’.1060 For instance if a state does not consent or withdraws its consent, 
the targeting state would use force by arguing that the state was unwilling to 
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address the perceived threat. The following section will examine the credibility 
of this claim. 
4.6 Unable or unwilling 
For the purpose of this thesis, we adopt a working definition of the ‘unable and 
unwilling’ doctrine provided by Daniel Bethelhem, is adopted: A state: 
may not take armed action in self-defence against a non-state actor in 
the territory or within the jurisdiction of another state without the 
consent of that state [unless] there is a reasonable and objective basis 
for concluding that the third state is unwilling [or is unable] to effectively 
restrain the armed activities of the non-state actor such as to leave the 
state that has a necessity to act in self-defence with no other 
reasonably available effective means to address an imminent or actual 
armed attack.1061 
The doctrine has been summarised by Ashley Deeks as follows:  
[I]t is lawful for State X, which has suffered an armed attack by an 
insurgent or terrorist group, to use force in State Y against that group if 
State Y is unwilling or unable to suppress the threat.1062  
The US drone strikes in Pakistan, the killing of Osama bin Laden by US forces 
in the territory of Pakistan1063 the bombing campaign of the United States 
against ISIS in Syrian territory,1064 and the August 2015 drone strike of the 
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United Kingdom against two British citizens in Syria 1065 , are examples of 
relatively clear and direct invocation of the principle to justify the use of force.   
A state under imminent or actual attack, can use force against another state 
legally responsible for the armed attack carried out by a non-state actor. This 
qualifies as an act of aggression where non-state actors are send by or act on 
behalf of the State.1066 The ICJ confirmed this position in the Nicaragua case: 
There appears now to be general agreement on the nature of the acts 
which can be treated as constituting armed attacks. In particular, it may be 
considered to be agreed that an armed attack must be understood as 
including not merely action by regular armed forces across an international 
border, but also ‘the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, 
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force 
against another State of such gravity as to amount to’ (inter alia) an actual 
armed attack conducted by regular forces, ‘or its substantial involvement 
therein’.1067 
The position appears to be equally clear where the victim state secures the 
consent of the host state prior to using force within its territory. 1068  This 
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scenario becomes complicated when the host state is either unable or 
unwilling to stop the non-state actor to use its territory for violent purposes. 
Several commentators support the victim states right to use force in self-
defence where the host state.1069 While not the first to address the topic, 
Ashley Deeks was the first commentator to examine the unable and unwilling 
doctrine in detail in an essay published in 2012. Deeks identifies key 
principles and argues that before resorting to lethal force, the victim state 
should: 
i. prioritise consent or cooperation with the host state;  
ii. request the host state to address the threat within a reasonable 
time; 
iii. reasonably assess the host state’s control and capacity in the target 
region; 
iv. reasonably assess the host state’s means to suppress the threat 
and 
assess past dealings with the host.1070 
The requirement of necessity is relevant here because these measures are 
intended to ensure that force is only used if the host state has been given 
ample opportunity to deal with the threat before using force in its territory. 
Similarly, Dinstein identifies the parameters of the test as follows: 
I. The victim state must only use force in response to an armed, and not 
anticipatory; 
II. A repetition of the attack has to be expected; 
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Nijhoff, 2007) 15 (“Shearer describes the unable and unwilling doctrine as highly persuasive”) 
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III. The victim state ‘must verify that … [the host state] is either unable or 
unwilling to take the necessary action within its territory to remove the 
likelihood of such further attacks’; 
IV. The victim state must first seek the consent of the host state, unless 
such request would be futile prima facie; and 
V. The use of force must be the last resort, so that less intrusive remedies 
must first be undertaken.1071 
Under these constraints, the unable and unwilling test looks reasonable and a 
useful addition to international law because it seeks to balance the rights of 
the victim state with the host states. The territorial sovereignty of the host 
state will only be violated if it is unable or unwilling to deal with the threat. 
Moreover, international law obliges states not to aid or abet terrorists.1072 The 
Friendly Relations Declaration provides that states are required to: 
Refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil 
strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities 
within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the 
acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of 
force.1073 
Under these circumstances, other commentators have justified the 
extraterritorial use of force against non-state actors. For instance, Stahn has 
maintained that state sovereignty is compatible with the use of force against a 
host state who is unable or unwilling to act.1074Similarly, Sofaer argues that a 
host state breaches its obligations under international law when it fails to 
prevent attacks emanating from its territory; in that situation the victim state 
has ‘no option for ending the threat … short of violating in some manner the 
territorial integrity of the State that has violated its own international 
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1072 Corfu Channel Case (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, para, 22 (In the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ noted 
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responsibilities’.1075 However, this approach is at odds with Art 2(4) of the UN 
Charter. The Art 2(4) expressly prohibits the use of force and does not 
support forcible action against a state ‘where the non-state actors are not an 
organ of the state, but where the host state has failed to comply with its 
customary law obligations’.1076 Cassese has argued that, even if state has 
failed to prevent an attack from its territory, if the attack is not ‘the State’s 
act…there can be no question of a forcible response to it’.1077  
Some commentators argue that a restrictive reading of Art 2(4) justify the 
‘unable and unwilling’ test. For instance, according to Shearer, Art 2(4) only 
prohibits the use of force against the ‘territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state’, and force used to counter ‘a manifest illegality or 
injustice’, is justified. 1078  Such loose interpretation of Art 2(4) remains 
controversial because it undermines other core articles of the Charter.1079 
Dinstein has expalined that the phrase ‘territorial integrity or political 
independence’ were added for emphasis, not for the purpose of restricting the 
prohibition.1080 
Deeks, a staunch advocate of unable and unwilling doctrine, relies on 
neutrality law to defend it.1081 Neutrality law obliges ‘neutral state to ensure 
that belligerents do not violate its territory. If the neutral state is unable or 
unwilling to prevent violations of its neutrality by a belligerent, then the other 
belligerent is entitled to use force on the neutral state’s territory.’1082  The 
major problem in Deeks reliance on neutrality law is that the laws on neutrality 
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only apply to international armed conflicts between belligerent states.1083 As a 
consequence, it could be argued that neutrality laws provide little or no 
legitimacy to the ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine.1084 
The unable or unwilling doctrine may lead to abuses by strong states, 
Dawood Ahmed has shown how, in the vast majority of cases, there is an 
obvious imbalance of power between the state initiating and the state being 
subjected to the use of force.1085 Tzouwala has argued that, in virtually all 
cases, the state deemed ‘unwilling or unable’ is a state of the Global South, 
strengthening the view that the doctrine is biased.1086 Certainly, there are few 
cases in which non-western states have also invoked the unable or unwilling 
doctrine, but even in these cases a weaker territorial state is targeted.1087  
Additionally, it is important to note that, to date, the UNSC has not endorsed 
the ‘unwilling or unable’ test. Following the 9/11 attacks, the Security Council 
passed Resolution 1373. Its preamble reads: 
The need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused 
by terrorist acts1088  
McDonnell has interpreted the Resolution as not allowing the use of force 
against non-state actors in states that breach the resolution. It simply 
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condemns the attack and states that any force must be used ‘in accordance 
with the Charter’.1089In other words, it is possible to interpret Resolution 1373 
as not adding anything to the international normative framework regulating the 
use of armed force. 
There is not enough state practice to assert that the unable or unwilling 
doctrine has become part of customary international law. In response to the 
terrorist bombing of US embassies in Nairobi and Dares-Salaam, the US 
launched attacks against Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and 
bombed suspected chemical plant in Sudan, in 1998. The US relied on Art 51 
of UN Charter to justify aerial strikes and made no reference to the ‘unwilling 
or unable’ test.1090 The reaction from states was mixed. Most Western states 
and US allies including UK, Germany, Israel and New Zealand supported the 
action. France and Italy showed moderate acceptance. Iran, Russia, Pakistan, 
Iraq and China condemned the action.1091 Turkey has used force against PKK 
militants operating in northern Iraq on numerous occasions.1092Turkey justified 
its actions by explaining that the Iraqi government was unable to prevent PKK 
attacks to Turkey from Northern Iraq; this rationale is close to the unable and 
unwilling doctrine.1093 Turkey’s unilateral action was criticised by Iraq1094, the 
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Arab League and the Non-Aligned Movement.1095 In 2002, Russia explicitly 
justified the use of force against Georgian-based Chechen rebels by 
reference to the ‘unwilling or unable’ test. 1096  The US White House 
spokesman, Ari Fleischer, condemned Russian actions. He stated that: 
United States is deeply concerned about credible reports that Russian 
military aircraft indiscriminately bombed villages in northern Georgia on 
August 23, resulting in the killing of civilians …The United States… 
deplores the violation of Georgia’s sovereignty.1097 
Therefore, the US did not accept Russia’s use of force in the based on the 
unable and unwilling doctrine. Its reluctance in justifying Operation Neptune 
Spear on the grounds of Pakistan’s unwillingness to use force against Bin 
Laden suggests that even US is not convinced that the doctrine is 
legitimate.1098 State practice can only become customary law if it is constantly 
and uniformly applied by relevant states. 1099  The mixed reaction of the 
international community to different use of armed force explained by the 
‘unable or unwilling’ doctrine reveals that it has not gained the status of 
customary international law. 1100  Heller has stressed that, ‘there is no 
                                                        
1095 Gray ibid, 142; Nizar Hamdoon, Identical Letters Dated 14 June 1997 from the Permanent 
Representative of Iraq to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President 
of the Security Council UN Doc S/1997/461 (16 June 1997) 
1096 “The Chechen Republic where international terrorist organisations….has for a long time remained 
a source of extremism and terrorism in our country’s territory. The continued existence in separate 
parts of the world territorial enclaves outside the control of national governments, which, owing to 
the most diverse circumstances, are unable or unwilling to counteract the terrorist threat is one of 
the reasons that complicate efforts to combat terrorism effectively…..” See UN Doc S/2002/1012; 
Gray ibid, 230    
1097 White House Press Release, August 24, 2002, Russian Bombing of Georgia < http://2001-
2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/prsrl/2002/13002.htm > accessed 6 August 2016  
1098 Williams (n 1076) 637  
1099Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru) (Judgment) [1950] ICJ Rep 266, 276–7 (ICJ held that customary law 
requires the ‘constant and uniform usage … by the States in question’)  
1100 Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE rejected Turkey’s repose to PKK. They stated “We strongly 
condemn the repeated actions of Turkish armed forces violating the territorial integrity of Iraq under 
the pretext of fighting guerrilla elements hiding inside Iraqi territory. … We also reject the so-called 
‘hot pursuit’ measures adopted by Turkey to justify such actions that are abhorrent to international 
law and to the norms of practice amongst States” See Ruys (n 1087) 431; Arab League formally 
rejected the “unwilling or unable” test in the context of Israel’s attacks on Hezbollah in Lebanon See 
Ruys (n 1087) 453; Presentation of the Arab League, (13 Sep 2012) < 
http://www.arableagueonline.org/hello-world/#more-1 > accessed at 6 August 2016 (Jordan, 
Bahrain, Qatar and UAE rejected unable and unwilling doctrine after 9/11 as well because they were 
members of Arab League) ; Heller concluded that: “US and UK clearly support the “unwilling or 
unable” test; Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE are likely basing their willingness to attack ISIS in 
Syria on Syrian consent; Iraq has a completely opportunistic approach to the “unwilling or unable” 
test; and France, Denmark, and Belgium seem to reject the test, even if they have not done so 
 214 
‘consistent practice’ that supports the ‘unwilling or unable’ test, and scholars 
need to be careful not to put states in the ‘unwilling or unable’ camp simply 
because they are willing to use armed force against a non-state actor’.1101 
However, it would be disingenuous to ignore the evolution of international law 
and international relations in the face of global terrorism. However, it remains 
uncertain whether the ‘unwilling or unable’ will become a settled customary 
rule in future. There is a possibility that ‘the world reaction to the conflict 
against ISIS in Syria will help resolve the uncertain status of the unwilling or 
unable standard for force against non-state actors in third-party territory’.1102 
In any case, the burden of proof lays on the side claiming the existence of 
new customary law, that is, on those defending the unwilling or unable 
doctrine. They must show sufficient state practice and opinio juris to establish 
that states can use force against other states even if states are not 
responsible for the actions of non-state actors.1103  
It has been argued that the ‘effective control’ test established by the ICJ does 
not reflect current customary law, but some level of attribution, akin to aiding 
and abetting is necessary.1104 In order to rely on the unable and unwilling 
doctrine as legal basis for targeted killing in Pakistan, the US needs to prove 
that Pakistan is supporting or controlling terrorist in its territory who pose an 
imminent threat to the US. Further, the US would also need to establish that it 
is necessary to use force against these individuals in FATA. As discussed in 
previous chapters necessity is linked with immediacy, which means the US 
can only legally use force against non-state actors in foreign state if they pose 
an imminent threat to the US. To date, the US has not provided any clear 
evidence that those targeted in FATA pose an imminent threat to it. As argued 
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above, the US is relying on the ‘unable and unwilling’ doctrine without 
justifying the core requirements. This demonstrates that ‘powerful states 
continue to employ this ill-defined doctrine to forward their interests mostly at 
the detriment of the territorial integrity of other inevitably less powerful 
states’.1105 This blatant undermining of Art 2(4) may gradually lead to the 
erosion of sovereignty and the world order on which the UN Charter is based. 
In order to maintain such order, a possible solution could involve actions of 
the UNSC when the host state does not consent and is unable or unwilling to 
prevent the threat. This would give territorial state the opportunity to contest 
victim state’s allegations; it would force weaker states to improve domestic 
security and would ultimately prevent unilateral abuses by powerful states.1106 
The careful assessment of state consent and unable or unwilling doctrine 
shows that the US has weak legal justifications for using drones in tribal areas 
of Pakistan. Not all of the US drone strikes were illegal as reportedly some 
were carried out with state consent, those carried out without consent of 
Pakistan may have violated Art 2(4) of the UN Charter.  
The mainstream debate focuses primarily on the legal issues related with US 
drone strikes in tribal areas of Pakistan, but remarkably little attention has 
been given to the problems associated with on-going pseudo-colonialism in 
the tribal areas of Pakistan. The violence exercised by the Pakistani state in 
FATA must be address to fully comprehend the US own actions. The US did 
not rely on drones to take out Bin Laden in Pakistan; they used Special 
Forces to kill him. It could be argued that drones were unsuitable because it 
was a kill/capture mission and drones do not give target any opportunity to 
surrender.1107 Another plausible explanation may be related to the geographic 
scope of the consent provided by Pakistan for drone strikes, restricted to tribal 
areas of Pakistan. It has been estimated that between 2004 and 2016, 72 
percent of 392 strikes hit targets in North Waziristan, and 23 percent hit 
targets in South Waziristan.1108 Occasionally, the US extended the scope of 
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strikes and reportedly used drones in settled areas including the Hangu 
district (2013)1109 and Bannu (2008).1110 These strikes, especially in Bannu, 
have been perceived by Pakistan as expanding the ‘theatre of drone warfare’ 
outside the tribal region, making them visible to the general public and subject 
to harsh criticism from citizens and the media.1111 Following the drone strike in 
Bannu, the then US Ambassador Anne W. Patterson issued this blunt (and 
secret) assessment:  
Even politicians who have no love lost for a dead terrorist are 
concerned by strikes within what is considered mainland Pakistan. As 
the gap between private GOP acquiescence for U.S. action and public 
condemnation grows, Pakistani leaders who feel they look increasingly 
weak to their constituents could begin considering stronger action 
against the U.S.…1112 
FATA is governed by rules and administrative arrangement that sets it apart 
from the rest of Pakistan, making its population vulnerable with limited or non-
existent access to justice.1113 The following section will argue that residents of 
FATA continue to be treated as pseudo-colonies six decades after the 
independence of Pakistan.  
4.7 FATA state of exception 
A major development during Raheel Sharif’s tenure was that Pakistan 
became the Fifth country in the World to develop its own armed drones.1114 
The Pakistani Army operations with drones have caused substantial collateral 
damage but, contrary to the hostile reaction to US drone operations, they 
have not been contested domestically. There is no condemnation of 
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disproportionate or indiscriminate killing of people living in FATA. 1115  The 
military has cheerfully labelled drones ‘force multiplier’.1116 This suggests that 
much of the political controversy over drones in Pakistan derives more from 
the US violating its sovereignty than from the technology itself.    
Referring to Israel, the US President, Obama, stated: 
There’s no country on earth that would tolerate missiles raining down on its 
citizens from outside its borders.1117The obvious does not apply to Pakistan, a 
country that has tolerated, and even expressly consented, to missiles raining 
down on its citizens from outside its borders. Pakistan has also become the 
first country whose military has used armed drones to eliminate militants in its 
territory. 1118  With the exception of the 23 May 2016 drone strikes in 
Baluchistan against Afghan Taliban chief Mullah Akhtar, the Pakistani-led 
drone strikes have been confined to FATA.1119 Because there is evidence that 
militants are present in Baluchistan, in the US has repeatedly sought 
permission from Pakistan to use drones in this area, but Pakistan has refused 
any access to areas other than FATA.1120 The most obvious reason is that 
FATA is a semi-autonomous region provides sanctuaries to terrorists have 
serious repercussions for the Pakistan and global security.1121 The extremism 
in FATA as it exists today did not develop overnight but has been shaped by 
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its colonial past and by draconian policies implemented by Pakistan. 
Therefore, any objective discussion about FATA necessitates not only 
understanding of the area, but also requires understanding how FATA 
became a lawless zone.  
The tribal areas in the Northwest are in international limelight due to its 
continuing significance for the political situation in both Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. The flow of Afghan refugees in tribal areas of Pakistan during the 
Afghan-Soviet war has naturally connected this area to the war in 
Afghanistan. FATA received around 3 million refugees fleeing from Soviet 
military operations. Pakistan received financial aid from the US and Saudi 
Arabia to assist with the flow of refugees. This aid was channelled to Mullas in 
madrassas in FATA where Afghan Mujahedeen studied. In addition to this, 
Afghan Mujahedeen residing in FATA received arms from the US, Pakistan 
and Saudi Arabia.1122 The porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan 
allowed them to cross border with no hurdle. When Soviet forces withdrew, 
Afghanistan collapsed and civil wars broke out. The state of lawlessness in 
Afghanistan had a direct impact on FATA because a many Afghan 
mujahedeen who were residing in FATA introduced the culture of gun and the 
heroin trade in the territory.1123A majority of Mujahedeen were trained and 
operated from tribal areas of Pakistan during the 1980s.1124 Various jihadi 
groups, Al-Qaeda and Taliban were formed and trained from FATA.1125 After 
the US invasion of Afghanistan, the Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda militants and 
local Pakistani militants took shelter in the tribal areas.1126 Pakistan’s most 
dangerous militant group Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was officially 
formed in 2007 but its members got involved in an insurgency against US-
NATO troops and against Pakistani army (in 2002) when General Musharraf 
sent Pakistani troops in Khyber Tribal agency for the first time in 55 years.1127  
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4.7.1 The state of governance in FATA from August 1947-May 2018 
A lot of academic work has focused on the situation of marginalisation and 
vulnerability of indigenous peoples and minorities from different 
perspectives. 1128  But no study among the many that exist on the use of 
drones has addressed the link between persons belonging to minorities and 
their consideration as legitimate targets.1129 This section will argue that the 
tribal areas in Pakistan have suffered specially from the consequences of the 
Afghan conflict due to its unique status. Pakistan became a sovereign state 
after 1947 but kept intact the special status of FATA under Articles 246-247 of 
its 1973 Constitution.1130 The area is a part of Pakistan but the state has no 
writ over it and it is governed by so called tribal customary law. As a result 
FATA continues to be governed by the 1901 Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901. 
1131  This special status has turned FATA into something like a state of 
exception. Pakistan has never claimed full sovereignty over the tribal areas. 
According to Article 247 of the Constitution of Pakistan:  
Neither the Supreme Court nor a High Court shall exercise any 
jurisdiction under the Constitution in relation to a Tribal Area, unless 
Majlis-eShoora (Parliament) by law otherwise provides. No Act of 
Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) shall apply to any Federally Administered 
Tribal Area or to any part thereof, unless the President so directs, and 
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no Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) or a Provincial Assembly shall 
apply to a Provincially Administered Tribal Area 
The special legal status of the tribal areas has its root in British colonial rule. 
The British Empire governed FATA with coercion, bribery and regular armed 
intervention. 1132 Britain stationed troops in FATA and governed the area 
indirectly through political agents and tribal elders or Maliks.1133The political 
agent is a senior bureaucrat who conducts judicial and administrative 
functions.1134 The political agent was the most power person in FATA. He 
grants tribal elders the status of Malik and may unilaterally cancel their status. 
Britain funded these agents generously without performing any audits.1135 A 
major share of these funds was allocated to Maliks who controlled their tribes 
either by bribery or force. Robert Bruce the Deputy Commissioner of Derajat 
Division in 1889-1890, selected the Maliks. 1136  The main responsibility of 
Maliks was to follow the orders of British Empire and control local population 
and prevent them from rebelling against the British Empire, in the name of 
peace and tranquillity. Britain also introduced collective punishment; an entire 
tribe could face severe punishments if their leaders (Maliks) refused to obey 
British Empire’s orders.1137This included mass detention, seizure of property 
and forcibly cutting off that tribe from rest of the tribes.1138The political agents 
operated under a draconian legal regime introduced by the British Empire in 
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Press, 2015),85  
 221 
1872 and known as the 1901 Frontier Crime Regulations or FCR.1139 The 
FCR establishes a system of limited government and special powers over 
tribal areas. The FCR, still in force today, deprives the tribes of social, political 
and economic rights recognised under IHRL and domestic legislation. While 
law is meant to protect the welfare of persons, the FCR only imposes 
obligations on people and fails to provide fundamental human right to citizens. 
In place of regular Pakistani law FATA is governed by FCR. Pakistan inherited 
the FCR at its foundation in 1947 and it still operates. The FCR was and 
remains a regressive legislation, designed to keep it a semi-autonomous 
region. FATA region has no police, courts or public services. Trials are 
conducted not in courts but in jirgas, law enforcement is not provided by 
police but by tribal militias.1140 The FCR has no provision for the physical and 
economic safety of the people. The lack of due process under FCR is of 
critical concern. There is no concept of independent judiciary. The political 
agent is the most influential person: he selects the members of the Jirga, but 
the recommendations of Jirga are non-binding on him and he is ‘the ultimate 
authority and final arbiter to initiate trial, prosecute offenders, and award 
punishments’.1141 Women and lawyer cannot appear before Jirga and, since 
independence, people of FATA are judged by a system that permits ‘na wakil 
(no lawyer), na dalil (no argument) and na apil (no appeal)’. 1142  Justice 
Cornelius, in the case Sumunder v State (1954) labelled FCR proceedings as  
‘obnoxious to all recognised modern principles governing the dispensation of 
justice’.1143 The tribal administration is not obliged under FCR to audit its 
accounts and expenditures. Other than corrupt tribal leaders, the Pakistani 
army has become a permanent stakeholder in the FATA region. The Army 
and the government collectively handle funds allocated by the Pakistani 
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Federal government for the development of FATA. Both Army and tribal 
leaders have deprived the people of FATA of their basic rights.1144  
The situation of citizens in FATA deteriorated when the Pakistani military got 
sweeping powers in the area under the action in aid civil power regulation 
2011.1145 The new legislation that was passed in 2008 gave extra-judicial 
powers to the military. The Act authorises the military to detain terror suspects 
indefinitely during its operations in FATA and provincially administered 
areas.1146In 2010, Amnesty International called FATA a ‘human-rights-free 
zone’ where four million tribesmen were trapped under brutal Taliban rule and 
abandoned by central government.1147 In 2012, Amnesty international’s report 
highlighted numerous cases of torture and extrajudicial execution of tribal 
citizens where Pakistani armed forces acted in total impunity.1148 
In this context, the US drone strikes and Pakistan’s military operations against 
militants have resulted in the displacement of millions of people in FATA. In 
her report, Netta Crawford, has highlighted that: ‘millions of Pakistanis have 
been on the move, attempting to escape violence since 2004. In 2009, more 
than 3 million Pakistanis were internally displaced in the northwest region of 
Pakistan, many staying in approximately 30 camps for internally displaced 
people’.1149 According to UNHCR’s estimations, the operation Zarb-e-Azab 
which started in 2014 displaced about a million people only from North 
Wazirastan.1150 After living in camps for months, on 31 March 2015, the first 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) were allowed to return to their area. 
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However, this permission came with unpleasant conditions. Military forced 
tribesmen to accept the so-called 2015 Social Agreement North Waziristan, 
also known as Samaji Mohada NWA 2015, with the political administration. 
The eight-page ‘social agreement’ contains a highly controversial annex that 
has to be signed by each displaced family that wants to return. The 
agreement forces the people of North Waziristan to take an ‘oath of loyalty’ on 
the country’s constitution, as well as to pledge once again their allegiance to 
local customs and especially the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR).1151 This 
agreement resembles the concept of collective punishment of tribes 
introduced by British raj in 1901: ‘British gave tribes freedom to govern 
themselves, but imposed collective retribution for crimes committed by 
individual members. Penalties included the burning of villages, exile of 
tribesmen and economic blockade’. 1152  Likewise the document holds the 
tribes collectively responsible for keeping militants out of their respective 
areas and obliges them to aid the government in chasing ‘anti-state elements’. 
The agreement also makes tribes responsible for protecting their areas by 
forming militias. According to the agreement, the government will strip 
tribesmen of their citizenship if they fail to cooperate with the state in the fight 
against militants. Their homes and businesses may also be seized or 
destroyed.1153 These special laws only apply to tribesmen in FATA, while the 
rest of the Pakistani provinces are regulated under the regular regime that is 
consistent with IHRL. FATA citizens were unfairly and criminally segregated. 
They were blamed for rejecting progress, and fundamental human rights 
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when in reality they were never given a choice to accept or reject these 
laws.1154  
The state of exception that started in the colonial period continues today 
because instead of addressing the colonial wrongs imposed on local 
population by powers outside the region, the Pakistani state collaborated with 
foreign powers in inflicting collective military violence on FATA residents. For 
instance Pakistan, with the support of US and Saudi Arabia, trained 
mujahedeen in the FATA region in the teachings of violent jihad to politicised 
young people, radicalised and Islamised. Furthermore, the huge influx of 
refugees from Afghanistan, and the arrival of jihadis from all over the world 
eroded earlier tribal social organisation and propitiated the creation of safe 
haven for terrorists. The long porous and uncontrolled Pakistani-Afghan 
border enabled the Afghans to cross it at their own will during the Soviet 
invasion The mujahedeen, trained by the CIA and the Pakistani military: 
‘involved the local tribesmen in the proxy war and the Afghan affairs to the 
extent that presently both Pakistan and Afghan governments failed to 
convince them to stop their support to jihadis against the established 
authorities’.1155 After the heavy bombing of Tora bora, Afghan Taliban and Al-
Qaeda members took refuge in FATA. Both groups ‘hijacked the traditional 
tribal society and introduced a jihadi mind-set in the region’.1156 They killed the 
Maliks and political agents who were pro-state. It is estimated that:  ‘About 
two hundred of the Maliks, or leaders, of the Mehsud and Ahmadzai Wazir 
tribes in South Waziristan, who had acted as bridge between the Pakistani 
government and the tribes, were either killed, forced to leave the area, or 
made to keep silent. In FATA more than 100 Maliks were assassinated since 
2004 on suspicion of spying for the US or for the government and many 
others left Waziristan to find shelter in the cities’.1157 The whole fabric of the 
Pashtun society was disturbed. Al-Qaeda exploited the situation and recruited 
a large number of unemployed tribesmen for its future operations. These new 
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mercenaries supported the Afghan jihad by crossing the border with Pakistan 
to attack the US and NATO troops stationed in Afghanistan. 1158 
Marginalisation of people in FATA resulted in the creation of a militant 
movement that the state is now unable to control. Attempts to control the 
militancy through military operations and drone attacks have only further 
angered the people who for more than a century have lived a suppressed life 
due to its exceptional legal status and lack of any political will to develop the 
region.1159  
4.7.2 FATA Merger to KPK  
 
In past both civilian and military governments in Pakistan have tried to reform 
FATA.1160 Amongst various alternatives, the two options were discussed more 
widely in Pakistan. One to give the status of FATA as a separate independent 
province and second a merger of FATA with KP. 1161 Then finally on 24 May 
2018, Pakistan’s National Assembly passed a constitutional amendment bill 
allowing the merger of the FATA with the KP province1162 and, on 31st May 
2018, the President of Pakistan signed the bill that completes the merger of 
FATA-KPK.1163 There are different opinions and thoughts on the success of 
this merger. Opponents of merger argue that it will deteriorate situation in 
FATA and destroy tribal customs and traditions. 1164  Arguably the 
mainstreaming of FATA is a first step in the right direction. This merger has 
scrapped the FCR and brought the region under jurisdiction of the Pakistani 
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law and courts. FATA can no longer be called ‘illaqa-e-ghair’ (no-go area or 
strange land); instead it is now part of ‘proper Pakistan’. However the 
integration of tribal customs into the KP government is a complex task and 
must be handled judiciously.   
This merger further raises questions on the use of US drone strikes and what 
the Pakistani response to them will be. Any new US drone strikes will create a 
difficult situation for the civil-military establishment of Pakistan. Previously, 
Pakistan had no complete control over the semiautonomous region of FATA. 
The people of KPK may demand stronger action against such strikes; they 
can resort to courts in a context where the Peshawar High Court declared 
drone strikes illegal in 2013.1165 It seems unlikely that the US will respect 
Pakistan’s sovereignty and avoid any drone strike in KPK simply because now 
it is under complete control of Pakistan. The US has already disregarded 
these ‘boundaries’ by an airstrike in Baluchistan, was part of mainland 
Pakistan. Therefore it could be assumed that there will be no major shift in the 
US policy after the merger of FATA and KPK, especially when it comes to 
high value targets.  
The situation is different from a Pakistani perspective. The main purpose of 
this merger was to establish peace and the continuation of the US drones will 
hinder the peace process. There would be enormous amount of domestic 
pressure on the Pakistani government to stop further US strikes.  
4.8 Conclusion 
The careful examination of the US relations with Pakistan shows the 
complexity of the legality of the US drone strikes in FATA. The lack of 
transparency from both sides makes it difficult to make authoritative claims on 
the legality and legitimacy of these strikes. Nonetheless, the aggressive 
stance of the current Pakistani government against drone strikes reveals that 
the US has taken unilateral military action against non-state actors in Pakistan 
and has violated international law. Additionally, a main controversial aspect 
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remains centred on the uncertainty of the targets in the FATA area. The US is 
at war with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces, but the groups the 
US is targeting in Pakistan are not part of Al-Qaeda. The following chapter will 
discuss the major groups targeted by the US in FATA and will examine their 

















Chapter 5: Al-Qaeda affiliates  
Introduction 
After 9/11, the US claimed that ‘we’ were at war with Al-Qaeda, Taliban 
and associated forces. Since then, the US military and intelligence 
operations have relied on the concept of ‘associated forces’ of Al-Qaeda to 
add militant groups to the list of who can be killed or captured as potential 
threats to the nation. While the elements of Al-Qaeda that were present in 
Afghanistan immediately after September 11 were a legitimate target, it is 
less clear that ‘associated forces’ of Al-Qaeda outside Afghanistan are part 
of Al-Qaeda. If these ‘associated forces’ are part of Al-Qaeda, the US may 
have legal grounds to target them outside Afghanistan providing an armed 
conflict exists, or in the absence of armed conflict, they pose an imminent 
threat to the US. But if these so called ‘associated forces’ are not part of 
Al-Qaeda, targeting them outside Afghanistan would require the 
recognition of a separate armed conflict and a separate jus ad bellum 
justification for the use of force. The US is targeting terrorist groups or 
organisations with varying degree of closeness to Al-Qaeda in multiple 
territories based in Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan and Syria. Some have 
argued that Al-Qaeda has ‘very loose ties’ with these groups, resembling 
to a typical ‘confederation of likeminded fellow travellers, many of whom 
are fighting separate armed conflicts in different regions of the globe’.1166 
Therefore it is important to inquire whether or not or to what extent these 
forces are controlled by Al-Qaeda to determine if they are part of Al-
Qaeda. The chapter will argue that an overly broad and flexible criterion 
for establishing a link between Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organisations 
may be counterproductive because it will expand the scope of war and will 
allow the US to target individuals under the law of armed conflict where 
technically they should be relying on International human rights law.  
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5.1 Security Council’s response to the 9/11 attacks 
Immediately after the September 11 attacks, the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) passed a resolution condemning the attack. Most importantly, 
it recognised, for the first time, an inherent right of self-defence as an 
appropriate response to terrorism.1167 In its next resolution on the matter, the 
Security Council required every member state to change its domestic 
terrorism laws. 1168  The Resolution 1373 introduced a global plan to fight 
terrorism,1169 obliging all states to crack down against financing of terrorism 
and other support to international terrorism.1170 It also required that states 
shared information and intelligence related to terrorism. It called on states to 
pass anti-terrorism laws, prevent suspected terrorists from 
traveling across international borders, and ordered the screening of asylum 
seekers for possible terrorist ties.1171The resolution 1373 was a ‘revolutionary 
resolution’ because it was the first time that the Security Council forced all UN 
member states to revise national laws to comply with an international 
standard.1172 The effects of the Resolution 1373 clearly go beyond the Al-
Qaeda and Taliban regime. It imposed general legal obligation upon states, 
either with regard to terrorism or any other threat. Although there solution was 
passed as a result of the 9/11 attacks, its applicable to all instances of 
terrorism that constitute a threat to peace and security. 1173  The Security 
Council also imposed financial and travel sanctions as well as an arms 
embargo against Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated individuals and 
entities.1174  
In 2015, the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 2249 condemning 
terrorist attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The 
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resolution 2249 urges member states to ‘take all necessary measures, in 
compliance with international law’ against ISIL and to eradicate the group's 
safe havens in Iraq and Syria. 1175  Resolution 2249 condemns all terrorist 
groups (Al-Nusra Front and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and 
entities associated with Al-Qaida) but clearly pinpointed ISIS as the major 
challenge. ISIS was declared a ‘global and unprecedented threat to 
international peace and security’.1176 
These resolutions recognised the threat terrorism posed to international 
community but have not allowed states to use unilateral force against terrorist 
groups if they do not pose any threat to them. Thus, in the absence of state 
consent, the US may use force in self-defence against ‘associated forces’ 
extraterritorially if: a) they are controlled by Al-Qaeda and pose a threat to the 
US and its allies; b) they individually pose a direct and imminent threat to the 
US, whether or not they are linked with Al-Qaeda.  
5.1.1 Authorisation for the use of military force (AUMF) 
The concept of ‘associated forces’ does not exist in the 2001 AUMF itself. The 
AUMF does not explicitly name its targets. Instead: 
the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that 
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons1177 
Though not explicitly named, the ‘organisations’ referred to in the AUMF are 
widely understood to represent Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. There is no 
mention of Al-Qaeda associates, affiliates or of new groups who might join the 
fight.  Nevertheless, since 2001, successive US Presidents have invoked 
AUMF to use force against other groups they determine are connected to Al-
Qaeda, and in places far beyond the original Afghanistan battlefield.  
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The US seeks the justification for the broader application of AUMF in the well-
established concept of co-belligerency in the laws of war.1178 The gist of the 
US argument is that AUMF gives authority to apply force not only to Al-Qaeda 
and Taliban forces, but also to all groups that join the fight against the US 
alongside these forces. We can call those groups ‘associated forces’ of Al-
Qaeda. The US defines associated forces as a group that is ‘(1) an organised, 
armed group that has entered the fight alongside Al-Qaeda and (2) is a 
cobelligerent with Al-Qaeda in hostilities against the US or its coalition 
partners.’1179 
At face value, it seems to provide clear guidelines for determining which 
groups might be classified as ‘associated forces’. Yet, upon closer 
examination, it becomes clear that the term cobelligerent is not explained 
properly. The key question here is to determine the standards to determine 
who  are these co-belligerents? Does it include only those who have sworn 
allegiance to Al-Qaeda and who are controlled by Al-Qaeda, or can the US 
lawfully target other groups? Does it matter whether those groups have 
engaged in active hostilities, or can the US also use lethal force against 
groups who have merely supported Al-Qaeda in its conflict? Even after 16 
years of war international law has no answers for these questions.  
The term co-belligerent, a fairly informal term, has no precise definition. It is a 
label for entities or states that have joined an armed conflict on the side of one 
of the parties.1180 There is little to no international law content elaborating 
further on what types of activities would suffice to make an organisation a co-
belligerent. The term itself does not explain when a non-state armed group 
becomes a party to the armed conflict. Taking guidance from other sources of 
international law this chapter explores which group can be considered 
associated forces or co-belligerents of Al-Qaeda using the control test 
established by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Although the control 
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test set forward by the ICJ is applicable to states because it determines 
whether the acts of groups or individuals within the territory of a state can be 
attributed to another state, the study will apply the test on non-state actors. 
The ICJ’s interpretation of international responsibility remains the most 
authoritative when determining attribution of acts in international law. The first 
part of the chapter briefly explains the control test developed by International 
courts. 
5.2 The control tests put forward by the ICJ 
The ICJ has set forward the control test in the Nicaragua case 1181  to 
determine whether the acts of groups within the territory of a state can be 
attributed to another state. The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) applied a different test in its Tadic1182case, although the ICTY was 
dealing with a problem of jurisdiction rather than responsibility. The ICJ has 
maintained its position in two subsequent important cases, namely the Armed 
Activities case1183 and the Genocide Convention case1184.  
5.2.1 The Nicaragua case and ICJ jurisprudence 
In the Nicaragua case the Court had to decide whether to upheld Nicaragua’s 
claim that the US had ‘devised the strategy and directed the tactics of the 
Contras forces, and provided direct combat support for its military 
operations’. 1185  The Court determined that the acts of Contras were not 
attributable to the US. According to the Court’s reasoning, the US had not 
‘created’ the Contras nor it provided ‘direct and critical combat support to 
them’. The US was responsible for financing, training, equipping, arming and 
organising them.1186 Thus, despite the US’s wide-ranging influence over the 
Contras, the ICJ held that the Contras were not part of the US government 
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because it did not exercise effective control over them. In this case, the ICJ 
identified two levels of control: strict control and effective control.      
5.2.2 Strict control test 
The strict control test is based on ‘complete dependence’. The Court enquired 
‘whether or not the relationship of the contras to the United States 
government was so much one of dependence on the one side and control on 
the other that it would be right to equate the contras, for legal purposes, with 
an organ of the United States Government, or as acting on behalf of that 
Government’.1187 The ICJ identified three requirements of strict control:  
(1)  The entity must be completely dependent on the outside power.  
(2)  This complete dependence must extend to all fields of activity of 
the secessionist entity.  
(3)  The outside power must actually have made use of the potential for 
control inherent in that complete dependence, i.e. it must have actually 
exercised a particularly high degree of control.  
An entity will only be considered a de facto organ of the outside power 
according to the ‘strict control’ test if all three requirements are fulfilled.1188 
The strict control test is extremely demanding in terms of evidence and it 
requires proving the complete dependence of the group. Complete 
dependence means that the entity is ‘lacking any real autonomy’ and is 
‘merely an instrument’ or ‘agent’ of the outside power through which they are 
acting. 1189  Generally, close political, military, economic, ethnic or cultural 
relations between the outside power and the entity, and the provision of 
logistical support in the form of weapons, training and financial assistance do 
not in itself establish a relationship of complete dependence. This is so even if 
the entity and the outside power share largely complementary military or 
political objectives.1190 In addition, ‘common objectives may make the entity 
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an ally, albeit a highly dependent ally, of the outside power, but not 
necessarily its organ’.1191 
The ICJ identified two factors from which complete dependence may be 
inferred. Firstly, complete control may be established where a state created 
and organised the entity.1192 Complete dependence on the outside power is 
also demonstrated if the varied forms of assistance for instance, financial 
assistance, logistic support, supply of intelligence and arms provided by state 
are crucial to the pursuit of the entity’s activities. The entity is completely 
dependent upon the state if it cannot conduct its activities without the multi-
faceted support of the outside power.1193  
According to the ICJ an entity can be completely dependent on a state in the 
beginning but that situation can mutate. In this case the ICJ found that the 
Contras were initially completely dependent on the US, but that changed later, 
as the Contras activity continued despite the termination of US’s military 
aid.1194 Also in cases where the state and the non-state actor have different 
strategic options, a state of complete dependence cannot be presumed.1195  
Secondly, the entity must be completely dependent on the allegedly 
responsible state in ‘all fields’. It must be shown that the entity received 
support from the outside state in ‘all or the great majority of...activities’.1196 
Thirdly, the state must have actually exercised a particularly high degree of 
control over the entity. In other words, the state must have devised or planned 
the strategy and operations of the entity. In addition, the coordination of 
activities will not amount to control. 1197  So the mere provision of funds, 
intelligence, advisers or logistic support for non-state actors may not suffice to 
establish attribution.1198  
It can be argued that the test is very stringent and it is very difficult in any 
case to satisfy the high threshold, unless the states are only responsible for 
acts of their own administration  
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5.2.3 Effective control test 
Unlike the strict control test, the effective control test is based on partial 
dependence allowing attribution of acts for specific acts of private individuals 
and groups. The provision of financial assistance, logistic and military support, 
supply of intelligence, selecting targets and planning may infer partial 
dependency.1199 General control over the entity is not enough; the state must 
be able to control the beginning of the operation, the way it is carried out, and 
its completion.1200  
The ICJ held that the US was only responsible for its own conduct in relation 
to the Contras: ‘by training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying the 
contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and 
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, has acted, against the 
Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary 
international law not to intervene in the affairs of another State’.1201 None of 
these acts were imputable to the US because the US did not effectively 
control their activities.1202  
The ‘effective control’ test is based on partial dependency and evidential 
requirements that are less strict than that for the ‘strict control’ test. However, 
it remains extremely difficult in practice to prove that a state exercises 
effective control over the activities of another non-state or state actor. The 
ICTY Appeals Chamber did not follow the jurisprudence of the ICJ largely for 
this reason, and instead developed a different control tests, requiring a lower 
degree of control.1203 
5.2.4 The overall control test proposed by the ICTY in Prosecutor v 
Tadic 
In the Tadic case, the ICTY had to decide whether the accused were guilty of 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions during the armed conflict in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its own jurisdiction depended, inter alia, on whether 
the acts of the armed forces of the Bosnian Serbs operating within the territory 
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 236 
of Bosnia could be attributed to Yugoslavia (an outside power).1204In this 
case, the Appeal Chamber did not rely on the Nicaragua test and argued that 
it was inconsistent with the logic of state responsibility.1205 It claimed that, ‘the 
principles of international law concerning the attribution to states of acts 
performed by private individuals are not based on rigid and uniform 
criteria’.1206 The Chamber argued that the rationale behind the whole system 
of state responsibility is to ‘prevent states from escaping international 
responsibility by having private individuals carry out tasks that may or should 
not be promoted by state officials...states are not allowed on the one hand to 
act de facto through individuals and on the other to disassociate themselves 
from such conduct’.1207 The Court criticised the strict evidence requirement 
set out by the control test introduced by the ICJ and asserted that the law on 
state responsibility ‘is based on a realistic concept of accountability, which 
disregards legal formalities and aims at ensuring that states entrusting some 
functions to individuals or groups of individuals must answer for their actions, 
even when they act contrary to their directives’.1208   
The ICTY formulated the overall control test for attributing the acts of militarily 
organised groups to states. The overall control test lowered the threshold of 
control required for attributing responsibility to the state. ‘Under the overall 
control test, general not specific instructions are not necessary whereas, 
under the effective control test, they would be’.1209 The test requires: ‘that the 
state wields overall control over the group, not only by equipping and 
financing the group, but also by coordinating or helping in the general 
planning of its military activity’.1210  
The ICJ did not support the overall control test. In two subsequent decisions, 
the 2005 Armed Activities case and the 2007 Bosnian Genocide case, it 
reaffirmed the effective control test. The ICJ asserted ‘...a state is responsible 
only for its own conduct...the ‘overall control’ test is unsuitable, for it stretches 
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too far, almost to breaking point...’ 1211  According to Book, ‘the ICJ’s 
adherence to the effective control standard in the Bosnian Genocide case 
indicates its belief that there is a universal standard of effective control that 
applies to questions of attribution in all contexts, unless primary norms or lex 
specialis dictate otherwise.’1212  
Therefore it seems to be no consensus in international jurisprudence in 
relation to the preferable control test to be applied.  
5.2.5 The preferable control test to explore Al-Qaeda’s relationship 
with terrorist organisations 
Currently, the US is using force against groups that provide a certain level of 
support to Al-Qaeda, even if they do not first initiate direct attacks on the US. 
Al-Qaeda is a decentralised organisation that has a web of affiliates with 
different levels of connection to the specific conflict with the US. Regional 
groups like Al Shabaab in Somalia or Tehrik-i-Taliban in Pakistan may have 
shared resources, or even ideology, with Al-Qaeda, but may nevertheless be 
focused primarily on a localised fights rather than attacking the US.  
In the context of this thesis, the chosen test to explore Al-Qaeda’s link with 
these terrorist groups or organisations is the effective control test put forward 
by the ICJ in Nicaragua1213for two reasons. First it was accepted by the ICTY 
in Tadic that the effective control test ought to be applied to ‘private 
individuals’ or ‘unorganised groups’. As Al-Qaeda is an unorganised armed 
group that lacks a centralised command structure, the effective control test is 
suitable. Second, the narrow scope of the effective control test, will filter out 
the groups who do not work alongside Al-Qaeda against the US. 
The US is targeting several distinct organisations in Yemen, Somalia and 
Pakistan. Assessing Al-Qaeda’s relation with each of those entities is beyond 
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the scope of this study. Therefore, the study will explore Al-Qaeda’s 
relationship with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Haqqani Network, Al-Shabab in 
Somalia and Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula in Yemen by utilising the 
effective control test as paradigm. 
5. 3 Al-Qaeda after 9/11 
The global jihad movement, originated from Afghanistan in the 1980s. It was 
at that time when Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri set up Al-Qaeda 
in Peshawar, Pakistan.1214 After the end of the Soviet war, in 1992, the jihadis 
who joined the Afghan war returned to their home countries. Conversely but 
Bin Laden, who had temporarily stayed in Arabia and Sudan moved back to 
Afghanistan in 1996 and allied with the Taliban. There, Al-Qaeda set up 
camps where jihadi fighters in large numbers from all over the world received 
training.1215 Initially, Al-Qaeda declared jihad against secular Muslim regimes 
and focused on destabilising local governments. But gradually Al-Qaeda, that 
has evolved organically throughout its existence,1216directed its jihad against 
Western states with special focus on the US.1217   
In Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda operated as a centralised organisation with 
bureaucratic structures, job descriptions, payrolls and a hierarchical structure 
with centralised command.1218 However, Al-Qaeda suffered heavy losses after 
the US invasion of Afghanistan. Its members scattered across the globe and 
merged with local jihadis creating franchise of likeminded groups. Al-Qaeda 
has undergone an extraordinary process of diffusion and fragmentation and 
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has suffered a metamorphosis due to internal and external pressures. Several 
factors explain the fragmentation of Al-Qaeda. The primary reason of the 
decentralisation of Al-Qaeda was the intense and sustained effort by the US 
and its allies to kill or capture the Al-Qaeda members. Marc Sageman, a 
leading terrorism expert, argues, ‘We can no longer talk about Al-Qaeda as a 
centralised organisation. In the wake of the closure of the training camps in 
Afghanistan, the halt of financial transfers, and the detention or death of key 
personnel, Al-Qaeda Central has receded in importance’.1219 
Some argue that the decline in major terrorist attack against the West 
indicates that Al-Qaeda is defunct. For instance, in 2012, Peter Bergen 
asserted that Al-Qaeda was defeated because the CIA drone policy in 
Afghanistan successfully eliminated 28 Al-Qaeda key members. Bergen 
defended that since 9/11 the only terrorist attack launched by Al-Qaeda was 
the 7/7 London bombing that killed 52 commuters. 1220 Another terrorism 
expert, Javier Jordan, has stressed that the deployment of CIA drones in 
Afghanistan has weakened Al-Qaeda and as a result, the organization has 
been unable to either launch serious terrorist attacks against the US since 
2007 nor to control or direct its affiliates.1221 The Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD) shows that, since 2008, Pakistan has only suffered one terrorist attack 
conducted by Al-Qaeda Central.1222  
Conversely, others commentators such as Hoffman, argue that Al-Qaeda is 
still relevant. He believes the core of Al-Qaeda survived by cooperating with 
local jihadis in other states and forming affiliations with them. He rejects the 
view that Al-Qaeda has loose connections with its affiliates. According to him, 
relations between Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are quite intimate and well 
structured. Al-Qaeda may be decentralised but is still united through local 
                                                        
1219 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 2008) 31 
1220 Bergen, Peter: ‘Time to declare victory: Al Qaeda is defeated’ CNN (27 June 2012)  < 
http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/27/time-to-declare-victory-al-qaeda-is-defeated-opinion/  > 
accessed 10 Dec 2017 
1221 Javier Jordán, ‘The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign against Al-Qaeda Central: A Case Study’ 
(2014) Journal of Strategic Studies 4 < http://www.ugr.es/~jjordan/AlQaedaDronesPakistan.pdf  >  
accessed 10 Dec 2017 
1222 "The Global Terrorism Database" <  
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=al+qaeda+central&sa.x=0&sa.y=0&sa=Se
arch > accessed 10 Dec 2017 
 240 
jihadi groups in South Asia (Pakistani Taliban and Haqqani Network), Yemen 
(AQAP) and Somalia (Al-Shabab) that are operating closely with the Al-
Qaeda.  
Therefore, there are at least two contradicting hypothesis; one sustaining that 
Al-Qaeda is defunct today because it is a decentralised organisation with 
limited military capacity. And, on the other hand, the belief that Al-Qaeda is 
decentralised, but still poses a significant threat because it has managed to 
maintain its presence via its affiliates or adherents.  
Indeed, it would be wrong to say that Al-Qaeda is irrelevant merely because it 
is inoperative and has failed to carry out major attacks against Western 
objectives since the 7/7 attacks. The quantity of terrorist attacks is only useful 
in measuring the terrorist group’s military capacity. However, it fails to 
measure the group’s ability to influence others. It is a fact that a terrorist group 
can become more resilient if it is decentralised and carries out attacks via 
affiliates. The question we are trying to address is whether Al-Qaeda controls 
these groups. If Al-Qaeda is controlling the groups targeted by the US outside 
active warzones, there are grounds to assert that Al-Qaeda poses a 
significant threat to the US and these groups are legitimate targets. Thus, the 
legality of the US targeted killing of these groups in undeclared warzones 
depends on Al-Qaeda’s control over them.     
5. 4 Al-Qaeda’s relationship with Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) Pakistan 
The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was officially formed in December 2007, 
when various distinct FATA’S tribal groups joined together.1223 Many of these 
groups had fought alongside Afghanistan’s resistance in the 1980s, or with 
the Afghan Taliban in the 1990s.1224 It is important not to confuse TTP with 
Afghan Taliban. It is often wrongly assumed that Pakistani Taliban are 
affiliates or another branch of Afghan Taliban in Pakistan pursuing similar 
objectives. The TTP and the Afghan Taliban are two distinct entities with 
different goals. The leadership of the ‘Afghan Taliban has never endorsed the 
formation or activities of the TTP. The Afghan Taliban, led by late Mullah 
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Omar, have always openly disassociated themselves from the TTP because 
of their different goals and objectives’. 1225  For instance, the Taliban 
spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, told the Dawn News in Pakistan that, ‘We 
have no concern…Taliban movement in Pakistan. Ours is an Afghan 
movement and we do not support militant activity in Pakistan... Baitullah is a 
Pakistani and we…have nothing to do with his appointment or his expulsion. 
We did not appoint him and we have not expelled him.1226 
On the other hand, the TTP leadership has always given the impression that 
the organisation has close ties with the Afghan Taliban. For instance, they 
adopted the name ‘Taliban’ to get quick recognition and support of Pashtuns 
of the tribal areas. 1227  Baitullah Mehsud created this transregional 
movement,1228  aligning himself with local disaffected groups to produce a 
network of militants across the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) region. The TTP is an umbrella movement 
where various groups came together to act collectively against the offensives 
of the Pakistani military, which it accuses of being apostate and an instrument 
of US/NATO imperialism.1229Another objective of the TTP is to control the 
country by establishing Sharia law across Pakistan.1230  
The TTP is an extremely decentralised organisation. Although there is a 
central body (Shura) and a president (Emir),most decisions are made at the 
local level. Each agency has a commander, a subcommander, and leaders at 
the village and town levels.1231Not all members of the TTP are ideological 
extremists. They have different reasons for joining TTP. Unemployment is 
high in FATA and most of the men from FATA have joined TTP for economic 
reasons. Young men who joined TTP in FATA received Rs 15-20,000 per 
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month (£100-120).1232 Some are criminals and are lured by the incentive of 
drug supply, money and guns. Yet others are angry and aggrieved relatives of 
those killed by US drone strikes and in military operations conducted by the 
Pakistani army.1233 The movement remains fractured and rebel infighting is 
not uncommon. Militant groups have fought each other for control of criminal 
networks1234, economic reasons and differences over religious opinion.1235  
Yusafzai has stressed that, on paper, the TTP appears to be an impressive 
terrorist organisation whose members are united against a similar cause, but 
reality is quite different. According to him: 
Though members of militant Islamic groups such as the Pakistani 
Taliban and other jihadis have almost the same anti-United States and 
pro-Al-Qaeda worldview, they are not especially disciplined when it 
comes to organisational matters. Difficulty in this area explains the 
existence of so many extremist factions operating under different 
leaders and commanders who sometimes express conflicting opinions 
on domestic and international issues.1236 
Yousafzai has also highlighted the traditional tribal rivalry within the TTP: 
The tribal nature of some of the Taliban groups soon became evident 
when militants in North Waziristan warned the Mehsud-led Taliban in 
neighboring South Waziristan not to launch attacks against the 
Pakistan Army in their part of the tribal region. The warning came from 
Hafiz Gul Bahadur, the emir of the Taliban in North Waziristan.... Hafiz 
Gul Bahadur was particularly furious when Mehsud’s men started firing 
rockets into the army’s camp at Razmak, a town in North Waziristan, 
during the recent fighting between the military and the Mehsud-
commanded militants. It was also evident that Hafiz Gul Bahadur and 
his Taliban fighters failed to abide by one of the major decisions of the 
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TTP by refusing to coordinate attacks on the security forces in North 
Waziristan to help ease pressure on the Taliban fighting under 
Mehsud’s command in South Waziristan. This failure defied a Taliban 
decision that every Taliban group was required to come to the 
assistance of others in its area of operation that were under attack from 
the Pakistan Army.1237 
The group leaders that formed TTP are from different tribes and past tribal 
rivalries have kept them apart. Although they work side-by-side, their relations 
are uneasy and uncertain. This explains that groups work under separate 
command structure.1238  TTP participating militants follow the instruction of 
local commanders and the local commanders runs his affairs autonomously. 
After the fall of the Afghanistan’s Taliban government in 2001, many Al-Qaeda 
leaders spilled into Northwest Pakistan. In FATA, ‘Al-Qaeda got protection 
and sanctuary from local clerics and tribal members from the Mehsud and 
Wazir tribes’ many of who supported Taliban in Afghanistan since the 
1990s.1239But Al-Qaeda never managed to run its terrorist activities smoothly 
in FATA. Al-Qaeda members were forced to leave South Wazirastan where it 
had opened its training camps after Pakistani military mounted a major 
incursion in the area. 1240 Al-Qaeda members relocated from to North 
Wazirastan and established their training camps.1241The exact number of Al-
Qaeda training camps in North Wazirastan is unknown, but according to a 
report in February 2007:  
The training camps had yet to reach the size and level of sophistication 
of the Al-Qaeda camps established in Afghanistan under Taliban rule 
but groups of 10 to 20 men are being trained at the camps and the Al-
                                                        
1237 ibid 
1238ibid 
1239 ibid 782 
1240 Mohammed Khan and Carlotta Gall, ‘Accounts after 2005 London bombings point to Al-Qaeda 
role from Pakistan’ The New York Times (13 August 2006) < 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/13/world/europe/13qaeda.html > accessed 12 Dec 2017 
1241 M Morgan, The Impact of 9/11 on Politics and War: The Day that Changed Everything? (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2009) 94  
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Qaeda infrastructure in the region is gradually becoming more 
mature.1242  
Nonetheless and despite of being able to run small sized training camps in 
North Wazirastan, Al-Qaeda failed to carry out successful attacks against the 
West mainly because of pressure from spies working for the Pakistani military, 
ISI and other agencies. It also lacked financial and military resources.1243 Al-
Qaeda’s frustration is evident from a letter written by Al-Zawahiri to Abu 
Musab. Al-Zawahiri wrote: ‘the real danger [towards the mujahidin] comes 
from the agent Pakistani army that is carrying out operations in the tribal 
areas looking for mujahedeen’.1244 
Officials in the US and Pakistan have often described the TTP as an affiliate 
of Al-Qaeda. For instance, the then Ambassador-at-large for counterterrorism, 
Daniel Benjamin, declared at a state department briefing:  
The TTP and Al-Qaeda have a symbiotic relationship; TTP draws 
ideological guidance from Al-Qaeda, while Al-Qaeda relies on the TTP 
for safe haven in the Pashtun areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border. 
This mutual cooperation gives TTP access to both Al-Qaeda’s global 
terrorist network and the operational experience of its members. Given 
the proximity of the two groups and the nature of their relationship, TTP 
is a force multiplier for Al-Qaeda.1245  
The then interior minister of Pakistan called TTP an extension of Al-
Qaeda.1246According to him, ‘There is a close connection [between the two 
outfits], and that there are similarities between Al-Qaeda and the TTP… If Al-
Qaeda is to move in a tribal area, they have to look to the TTP to get a 
refuge… The TTP is a host to Al-Qaeda and is their mouthpiece.’1247 
The TTP leaders have also approved Al-Qaeda’s actions and shared its 
ideology. The late TTP Chief commander, Baitullah Mehsud, supported Al-
                                                        
1242 New York Times, ‘Terror Officials See Al-Qaeda Regaining Power’ (19 February 2007)  
1243 Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, ‘Al-Qaeda in the tribal areas of Pakistan and beyond’ (2008)  
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 775, 800 
1244 Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi, (11 October 2005) < 
https://fas.org/irp/news/2005/10/dni101105.html > accessed 15 Dec 2017 
1245 Charlie Savage, ‘U.S. Adds Legal Pressure on Pakistani Taliban’ New York Times (1 Sep 2010) < 
 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/02/world/asia/02talib.html  > accessed 14 Dec 2017 
1246 Daily Times, ‘TTP is an extension of Al-Qaeda: Rehman’ (2 Sep 2008) 
1247 ibid 
 245 
Qaeda’s global jihad.  In the course of his first-ever interview, on 28 January 
2008, Baitullah told Al Jazeera television network:  
Our main aim is to finish Britain, the US and to crush the pride of the 
non-Muslims. We pray to God to give us the ability to destroy the White 
House, New York and London. And we have trust in God. Very soon, 
we shall be witnessing jihad’s miracles.1248  
A few months later, the TTP spokesperson, Maulvi Omer, insisted in a video 
interview that: 
There is no difference (between Al-Qaeda and Taliban). The formation 
of the Taliban and al Qaeda was based on an ideology.  Today, 
Taliban and al Qaeda have become an ideology.  Whoever works in 
these organizations, they fight against kafir (infidel) cruelty.  Both are 
fighting for the supremacy of Allah and his Kalma.  However, those 
fighting in foreign countries are called Al-Qaeda, while those fighting in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan are called Taliban. In fact, both are the name 
of one ideology. The aim and objectives of both the organisations are 
the same.1249 
5.4.1 Who were the targets of TTP? 
Another way to understand the objectives of a terrorist group is to see who 
their targets are. The table given below shows the number of terrorist attacks 
by the TTP for the period 2007-2016.1250 Between 2006 and 2016 the TTP 
has carried out 735 terrorist attacks within Pakistan. Terrorists targeted 
Pakistani military, government, citizens, religious scholars, businesses, 
educational and religious institutions, media, and civil society organisations. 
None of these attacks were directed against the US or its allies. This indicates 
                                                        
1248 Nick Schifrin, ‘More Dangerous Than Osama’ abc news (28 Jan 2008) < 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=4199754&page=1 > accessed 13 Dec 2017  
1249 Herschel Smith, ‘Interview with Taliban Spokesman Maulvi Omar’ (30 August 2008) 
 < http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/08/30/interview-with-taliban-spokesman-maulvi-omar/ >  
accessed 13 Dec 2017 
1250 The study gathered data of terrorist attacks by the TTP from 2007-2016 from University of 
Maryland terrorism database. Table has only included confirmed terrorist attacks carried out by the 
TTP. It has not included any “suspected” terrorist attack. 
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that despite the rhetoric, the TTP does not pose any threat to the US or its 
allies and is only interested in obtaining control in tribal areas of Pakistan. 
Year Country Terrorist Groups that are 
involved/claimed 
responsibility1251 
Target group Number 
of 
attacks 
2007 Pakistan TTP  Military 
 Private citizens 
1 
2008 Pakistan  TTP  Military 









2009 Pakistan TTP  Military 









2010 Pakistan   TTP 
 Lashkar-e-Jhangwi  
 Military 







                                                        
1251 The other groups mentioned in the table did not conduct joint operations with Taliban. They 
either claimed responsibility for the attacks or Pakistani military or government officials attributed 









2011 Pakistan TTP  Military 








 Terrorist non-state 
militias 






















           
151 
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2013 Pakistan  TTP 






 Jaish Usama 
 Taliban  
 
 Military 














2014 Pakistan  TTP 
 Lashkar-e-Taiba 
 Lashkar-e-Islam 





 Al-Qaida in the 
Indian Subcontinent,  





 Orakzai Freedom 
Movement 
 Baloch Waja 
Liberation Army  
 Military 














2015 Pakistan  TTP 
 Lashkar-e-Jhanvi 
 Lashkar-e-Islam 
 Khorasan Chapter of 
the Islamic State 
 Military 






 Jundallah  
 Al-Qaida in the 











2016 Pakistan  TTP 
 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi 
 Lashkar-e-Islam 
 Khorasan Chapter of 
the Islamic State 















5.5 Al-Qaeda’s relationship with Haqqani Network 
The Haqqani Network (HN) is a Sunni Islamist militant organisation based in 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. Mujahideen 
commander Jalaluddin Haqqani formed HN in the late 1970s.1252 The HN 
belongs to the Zadran qaum (tribe), who are mostly based in Paktia and Khost 
provinces in the East of Afghanistan.1253The Haqqanis are considered the 
most lethal and sophisticated insurgent group targeting the US and Afghan 
forces in Afghanistan.1254 Financial records of the HN obtained by the US 
military have demonstrated that the group gathers funds through various 
channels, including their collaboration in kidnap-for-ransom schemes with 
                                                        
1252 Counterterrorism guide, ‘Haqqani Network’ < 
https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/haqqani_network.html > accessed at 19 Dec 2017  
1253 Stanford University, ‘Mapping terrorist organisation, Haqqani Network’ < 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/363 > accessed at 20 Dec 
2017   
1254 Counterterrorism guide (n 1252) 
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other terrorist groups. They smuggle goods and have invested in real estate. 
They are also involved in drug supply. They are tied to large money 
laundering operations. They have ownership stakes in construction firms, 
transport, import-export business; they receive funds from ideological 
supporters in Pakistan and from Gulf region. 1255  A 2010 US Treasury 
Department’s report showed that the HN has also collected payments from Al-
Qaeda.1256  
The HN is a family-run network that operates semi-autonomously within the 
wider Taliban federation. The Haqqanis maintain distinct command and 
control, and lines of operations. 1257  The HN is a remarkably small 
organisation at the top, with less than a dozen key players, mostly all of them 
relatives of the founder, Jalaluddin Haqqani.1258 From the 1970s, the HN has 
forged relationships with both state and non-state actors, including senior Al-
Qaeda members, members of the TTP, wealthy private donors from the Gulf 
States, and officials of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). All these 
actors were supporting HN because they had interest in gaining influence in 
Afghanistan.1259 The HN established close relationship with Osama Bin Laden 
in the 1980s and even allowed him to open his first training camp in the 
territory under their control in Afghanistan.1260 The training manuals used by 
HN for operations on the field features religious propaganda and praise for Al-
Qaeda.1261 They also provided shelter and protection to Al-Qaeda and foreign 
fighters in North Waziristan in exchange of money or to multiply its force.1262 
Although HN is closely associated with Al-Qaeda but they are not known to 
                                                        
1255Gretchen Peters, ‘Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry’ (2012) HARMONY 
PROGRAM, THE COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT, 1  
 < https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/CTC_Haqqani_Network_Financing-
Report__Final.pdf > accessed at 20 Dec 2017 
1256 US Department of the treasury, “Treasury Targets Taliban and Haqqani Leadership: Treasury 
Designates Three Financiers in Afghanistan and Pakistan”, (22 July 2010) < 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg782.aspx > accessed at 15 Dec 2017   
1257 ibid 
1258 ibid 24  
1259 Brown, Vahid and Don Rassler, Fountainhead of Jihad: the Haqqani nexus, 1973-2012 (Oxford 
University Press 2013)  
1260  “Interview with Steve Coll,” Frontline, PBS 
1261 Bill Roggio, ‘Haqqani Network Releases Video of Training Camps’ (Long War Journal,17 Nov 2011) 
< http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/11/haqqani_network_rele.php > accessed 15 Dec 
2017 
1262 Jeffery Dressler, ‘The Haqqani Network from Pakistan to Afghanistan’ (2010) Afghanistan Report 
6, 37 
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seek goals beyond Pakistan and do not provide recruits or resources to Al-
Qaeda in its broader ambitions.1263  
The relationship between ISI and TPP is extremely controversial. Allegedly, 
some individuals from ISI have provided ‘extensive support, including safe 
harbor and access to weapons, to the HN, enabling the group to expand.’1264 
In 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, then chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
called the Haqqanis a ‘veritable arm’ of the ISI.1265 However, contrary to these 
claims the relationship between HN and the ISI is complex and tense. For 
instance, a senior Pakistani religious figure who has close ties to Haqqani has 
calimed that, ‘there is difference between having a relationship and being 
under control...They have a relationship with the ISI, but they are not under 
their control.’1266 Likewise, Shuja Pasha, Director of ISI admitted there was 
‘contact’ with Haqqani but not command and control.1267 The ISI’s support for 
HN has never been direct. Some ISI officials have provided small amounts of 
funding and training to HN fighters but their biggest role is limited to protection 
and intelligence.1268The two sides have only cooperated when it has suited 
them. The ISI has perceived the Haqqanis as slightly more reliable allies than 
the Taliban ever were.1269The Haqqanis’s open support for TTP (a group that 
has repeatedly targeted ISI and Pakistan military installations, killing dozens 
of intelligence officers and military personnel) and the Islamic Jihad Union 
(IJU), a terrorist group that carried out attacks against Pakistani soldiers in 
Swat 1270 ) demonstrates divergent interests of ISI and the HN. Haqqanis 
contacts with Al-Qaeda are troubling for Pakistan because Al-Qaeda poses 
                                                        
1263 John Rollins, ‘Al Qaeda and affiliates: Historical perspective, global presence and implications for 
US policy’ (2011) Congressional Research Service, 7 
1264 Counter extremism project , Haqqani Network,  
https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/haqqani-network  
1265 The Haqqani Network blacklisted, The Economist (15 Sep 2012) < 
http://www.economist.com/node/21562974 > accessed at 16 Dec 2017 
1266 Peters (n 1255) 
1267 Philip H. J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson, Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside 
the Anglosphere (Georgetown University Press 2013) 116  
1268 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, 
Politics, and Religion (Oxford University Press 2013) 145  
1269 The Economist, ‘The Pakistani army’s complex relationship with jihadists’ (1 Oct 2011) < 
http://www.economist.com/node/21531042  > accessed16 Dec 2017 
1270 Ronald Sandeep, ‘The Islamic Jihad movement’ (14 Oct 2008) The NEFA Foundation  
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security threat to Pakistan by propagating anti-Pakistan propaganda. 1271 
Moreover, the relationship between HN and Pakistan deteriorated drastically 
after the Peshawar attack1272and, in 2015, Pakistan officially outlawed the 
HN.1273    
5.5.1 Who were the targets of HN? 
The table below shows the total number of terrorist attacks by the HN 
between 2006 and2016.1274During this period, the HN has allegedly carried 
out 65 terrorist attacks that were, for the most part, confined to Afghanistan 
and directed against Afghan forces, government, citizens, businesses, 
religious scholars, educational and religious institutions and media. 1275 
Haqqanis were not involved in any attack against Western forces or targets 
outside Afghanistan. There is no credible evidence suggesting that Al-Qaeda 
played direct role in these attacks. This indicates that unlike Al-Qaeda 
Haqqanis do not have global ambitions. Instead, their ambitions are national, 
they want to force the US or its coalition partners to leave Afghanistan; they 
also aim at having a say in Afghan politics.  








2006 Afghanistan Haqqani Network  Government 
 Private citizens 
3 
                                                        
1271 Brown, Vahid and Don Rassler, Fountainhead of Jihad: the Haqqani nexus, 1973-2012 (Oxford 
University Press 2013)  
1272 BBC News, ‘Pakistan Taliban: Peshawar school attack leaves 141 dead’ (16 Dec 2014) < 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-30491435 > accessed at 15 Dec 2017 
1273 Mehreen Zehra-Malik, ‘Pakistan bans Haqqani network after security talks with Kerry’ (Reuters 16 
Jan 2015) < https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-militants-haqqani/pakistan-bans-haqqani-
network-after-security-talks-with-kerry-idUSKBN0KP1DA20150116 > accessed 16 Dec 2017 
1274 The study gathered data of terrorist attacks by the HN from 2006-2016 from University of 
Maryland terrorism database. Table has only included confirmed terrorist attacks carried out by the 
HN. It has not included any “suspected” terrorist attack. 
1275 Allegedly HN was involved in a terrorist attack in Pakistan see Haqqani group behind attack on 
Pakistan police station," Gulf News (3 March 2013); University of Maryland, Global terrorism 
database, < https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201302270018 > 
accessed at 20 Dec 2017 
1276 Taliban did not conduct joint operations with the HN. In most cases Taliban claimed responsibility 




2007 Afghanistan Haqqani Network Police 1 
2008 Afghanistan Haqqani Network  Government 
 Military 
 Private Citizens 
& Property 
 Journalists & 
Media 
5 
2009 Afghanistan Haqqani Network Government 1 
2010 Afghanistan Haqqani Network  Military 




2011 Afghanistan Haqqani Network  Government  
 Military 
 Police, 
 Private Citizens 
& Property 




2012 Afghanistan  Haqqani 
Network 
 Taliban 
 Government  
 Military 
 Police 
 Private Citizens 
& Property 








 Mahaz Fedai 
Tahrik Islami 
Afghanistan 
 Government  
 Military 
 Police 







2014 Afghanistan  Haqqani 
Network 
 Taliban 
 Government  
 Military 
 Police 
 Private Citizens 
& Property 
 Journalist and 
media  
6 
2015 Afghanistan  Haqqani 
Network 
 Taliban 
 Government  
 Military 
 Police 
 Private Citizens 
& Property 
 Journalist and 
media 
8 
2016 Afghanistan  Haqqani 
Network 
 Taliban 
 Government  
 Private Citizens 
& Property 






5.6 Al-Qaeda’s relationship with the Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) 
 AQAP was officially launched in 2009 when Al-Qaeda militants in Yemen 
merged with its Saudi counterpart to create AQAP.1277Most of the Jihadis who 
are active in Yemen today are those who took part in the Afghan war against 
the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. After the war, many mujahedeen were not 
                                                        
1277 Counter extremism project, ‘Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Penansula (AQAP)’ < 
https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap > accessed at 20 Dec 
2017 
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allowed to return to their home countries and settled in Yemen by joining 
Yemeni veterans of the Afghan war.1278These mujahedeen had support of the 
then late President Saleh. Saleh reportedly hired these mujahedeen to fight 
his enemies, from secessionists in the south to Marxists. The unstable 
political environment, powerful tribal system, weak economy and mountainous 
geography of Yemen provided safe haven to these extremists.1279This volatile 
environment enabled Al-Qaeda to operate and maintain its presence in the 
country since the 1990s.1280In 2000, Al-Qaeda launched an attack on the USS 
Cole.1281But the attack on the US forces from Yemen does not mean that the 
Al-Qaeda has sustained presence there. According to one observer, the Cole 
attack, ‘appears to have been more an example of opportunism than a sign of 
an enduring Al-Qaeda presence in Yemen’.1282 Al-Qaeda’s influence gradually 
declined in Yemen following the Cole bombing as the organisation failed to 
establish durable ties within the country.1283 However, the situation changed 
after a dramatic prison break in which some two dozen extremists, including 
future AQAP leaders Nasir al-Wahayshi and Qasim Al-Raymi, escaped.1284 
Within a year’s time, the escapees formed a new organisation known as ‘Al-
Qaeda in the Land of Yemen’ which carried out a few terrorist attacks against 
the West but mainly targeted local government officials and Yemen’s security 
services and military.1285 The new group developed substantial ties with local 
tribal leaders in provincial areas who were already resistant to central 
government control.1286 The new group eventually became known as AQAP 
when two prominent Saudis, who had formerly been held at Guantanamo, 
                                                        
1278 Combating Terrorism Center,  A False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes and Ungoverned Spaces in 
Yemen, (2011), p. 22 < 
 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a550461.pdf > accessed at 20 Dec 2017 
1279 Stanford University, Mapping Terrorist organisations, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula < 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/19 > accessed at 21 Dec 2017 
1280 ibid 
1281 9/11 Commission Report, 180,190-193 (It was attack against the US Naval vehicle by Al-Qaeda) 
1282 Combating Terrorism Center, ‘A False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes and Ungoverned Spaces in 
Yemen’ (2011) 22 < 
 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a550461.pdf > accessed at 20 Dec 2017  
1283 ibid 35 
1284 Gregory D. Johnsen, ‘Tracking Yemen’s 23 Escaped Jihadi Operatives’ (27 Sep 2007) 
Part 1,Jamestown Found, Terrorism Monitor < https://jamestown.org/program/tracking-yemens-23-
escaped-jihadi-operatives-part-1/ > accessed at 25 Dec 2017  
1285 Combating Terrorism Center (n 1282) 37  
1286 ibid 41-45 
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joined them.1287 
5.6.1 AQAP’s targets 
The table below provides the figures of the total number of terrorist attacks 
carried out by the AQAP between 2004 and 2016.1288During this period, 
AQAP has carried out total 661 terrorist attacks globally. Its focus remains 
local and most attacks have been directed towards Yemeni military, 
government, citizens, businesses, educational and religious institutions, 
religious scholars, media, and NGOs. The small scales of terrorist attacks 
against the West were attributed to individuals with loose connections with the 
AQAP and suggest that the organisation does not pose significant threat to 
the Western countries.1289 The first incident that is linked to AQAP occurred in 
2009. A man named Abdulhakim Muhammad shot two soldiers outside a 
military recruiting station in the US. One of the soldiers was killed and the 
second was injured. Initially, Muhammad denied any affiliation with known 
organisations but later claimed that he was a soldier for Al-Qaeda and that the 
attack on the military recruiting station was ‘a Jihadi attack’. Muhammad had 
spent time in Yemen, returning four months before the attack.1290In December 
2009, a second terrorist attack took place in the US, by a would-be suicide 
bomber, identified as Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. He was on board of 
Northwest Flight 253 travelling from Amsterdam when he detonated a device 
attached to his body. The assailant was wounded and damage was done to 
the aircraft but no other injuries or casualties were reported. The AQAP 
claimed responsibility for the failed attempt.1291 In a third failed terrorist attack, 
AQAP used parcels carrying explosive devices on board. UK counter-
                                                        
1287 ibid 13 
1288 The study gathered data of terrorist attacks by the AQAP from 2004-2016 from University of 
Maryland terrorism database. Table has only included confirmed terrorist attacks carried out by the 
AQAP. It has not included any “suspected” terrorist attack. 
1289 Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, “Assessing the terrorist threat”, A report of the Bipartisan policy 
centre’s National Security preparedness group (2010) 9-10  
1290 University of Maryland, Global terrorism database, < 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200906010028 > accessed at 
23 Dec 2017 
1291 University of Maryland, Global terrorism database, < 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200912250024 > accessed at 
22 Dec 2017  
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terrorism officials located and safely defused an improvised explosive 
device.1292 
The latest incident attributed to the AQAP occurred in France in January 
2015. Two assailants stormed the offices of Charlie Hebdo, a satirical 
magazine, and opened fire on journalists that killed 12 people. The AQAP 
claimed responsibility for the incident, explaining its rationale as retaliation for 
the magazine's depiction of Prophet Muhammad. 1293 Interestingly, IS also 
claimed responsibility for this event. The AQAP’s unsubstantiated claim and 
lack of any other credible evidence may suggest that this attack was carried 
out by a few radicalised individuals who were only distantly affiliated to a 
group, be it IS or AQAP.1294 




Target Groups Total 
Attacks 
2004 Saudi Arabia AQAP  Government 
(Diplomatic) 
 Military 





2005     0 
2006 Saudi Arabia AQAP Property 1 
2007    0 
                                                        
1292 University of Maryland, Global terrorism database, <  
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201010290009 > accessed at 
25 Dec 2017 
1293Joshua Keating, ‘France Was on Edge Over Terrorism Even Before the Charlie Hebdo Attack’ Slate 
(7 Jan 2015) < 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2015/01/07/france_was_on_edge_over_terrorism_even_b
efore_the_charlie_hebdo_attack.html > accessed 23 Dec 217  
1294 Charlie Winter, ‘AQAP vs ISIS: Who was really behind the Charlie Hebdo attacks?’  Middle East Eye 
(13 Jan 2015) < 
http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/aqap-vs-isis-who-was-really-behind-charles-hebdo-
692115745 > accessed 22 Dec 2017 
1295 According to this data the AQAP did not conduct joint operations with other terrorist groups. In 
some cases AQAP claimed responsibility for the attacks and in rest Yemeni government or military 
officials attributed the attacks to them.  
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2010  Yemen 
 UK 
 UAE 
AQAP  Airports and Aircraft 
 Utilities 
 Religious institutions 
and figures 
 Private citizens  
property 
8 
2011 Yemen AQAP  Military 
 Police 
 Government 
 Private Citizens and 
Property 
11 
2012 Yemen AQAP  Tourist 
 Military 
 Utilities 




2013 Yemen AQAP  Military 
 Police 
 Government 
 Private Citizens and 
Property 







 NGO  
86 





 Private Citizens and 
Property 






 NGO  
 Airport and aircraft 
 Educational 
institutions 


















 Supporters of 
Abd Rabbuh 
Mansur Hadi 
 Lahij Province 





 Private Citizens and 
Property 






 NGO  







2016 Yemen  AQAP 
 Lahij Province 




























5.7 Al-Qaeda’s relationship with Al-Shabaab 
Al-Shabaab’s origin can be traced back to the Al-Ittihad al-Islami, a militant 
Salafi group that gained prominence in the 1990s during the civil war in 
Somalia. The militants belonging from Al-ittihad al-Islam sought to establish a 
‘Greater Somalia’ with the aim of imposing Sharia law, by joining the Islamic 
Courts Union (ICU). Subsequently, the ICU was defeated by the then 
Somalian government and Ethiopian troops. 1296  The Ethiopian invasion of 
Somalia in 2006 had a profound effect on the rise of Al-Shabaab. 1297 
Inadequate governance allowed Al-Shabaab to operate unfettered in large 
safe heavens throughout the South region of Somalia. Al-Shabaab built 
training camps, established a system of taxation and extortion to raise funds 
and provided basic governmental services to gain popular support This 
strategy bolstered its recruiting and gave them safe space to operate.1298 
Al-Shabaab has taken up arms against the Federal Government of Somalia 
and its backers in the African Union Mission in Somalia.1299Whilst its influence 
has fluctuated due to military operations against its members, it continues to 
                                                        
1296 Robert Anthony Waters Jr, Historical Dictionary of United States-Africa Relations, (Scarecrow 
Press 2009) 260  
1297 Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘Ethiopian Troops Said to Enter Somalia, Opening New Front 
Against Militants’ New York Times (21 Nov 2011) A4 
1298Stanford University, ‘Mapping Militant organisations’ < 
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1299 Al-Shabaab primarily targets Somalian government and military and AMISOM troops that support 
Somalian forces in their operations against Al-Shabaab (AMISOM Military Component < 
http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component/ >) 
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control large swathes of territory in central and southern Somalia. 1300 Al-
Shabaab has faced internal discords regarding the scope of their actions, with 
a faction supporting that operations should remain confined to the national 
borders and others promoting the extension of their network beyond Somalia, 
including the possibility of becoming members of global terrorist brands, such 
as Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS).1301 
While their focus remains local, they have kept a positive relationship with Al-
Qaeda. They have endorsed each other’s movement and Al-Shabaab has 
offered refuge to Al-Qaeda members in the region.1302Al-Shabaab has also 
altered its propaganda to portray Somalia as a front in the global struggle 
against the West and has incorporated some Al-Qaeda members in the 
organisation.1303Al-Shabaab and its media wing, the Katai’b Foundation, have 
created number of websites denouncing the ‘far enemy’-the US and the 
African Union governments.1304   
Al-Shabaab’s quest to become part of the larger global terrorist network may 
be more strategic than driven by ideology. By becoming part of a big brand it 
has sought to boost its legitimacy and recognition, which in turn may make it 
more appealing to potential recruits, both in Somalia and abroad. 1305 
Additionally, Al-Shabaab’s members have travelled abroad to train with Al-
Qaeda.1306 In 2009, Al-Shabaab released a video formally pledging allegiance 
to Al-Qaeda.1307Al-Qaeda explicitly accepted Al-Shaabab in 2012 and formally 
announced a merger between the two organisations. The video included a clip 
of Ayman al Zawahiri himself welcoming Al-Shabaab aboard.1308  
                                                        
1300 Al-Shabaab, Origins, Current Status, and a Look into the Future, Other solutions (9 Nov 2015) 
1301 ibid; Al-Shabaab as a Transnational Security Threat, March 2016, Fostering Resilience, Regional 
Integration and Peace for Sustainable Development, p. 11; Will McCants, ‘A Tangled Net Assessment 
of al-Qaeda’ Jihadica (19 April 2012) < http://www.jihadica.com/a-net-assessment-of-al-qaeda/ > 
(“[I]t is not clear that the entire organisation has agreed with the al-Qaeda merger.”) 
1302 Jacqueline Page ‘Jihadi Arena Report: Somalia - Development of Radical Islamism and Current 
Implications’ (22 March 2010) International Institute for Counter-Terrorism 
1303 Rob Wise (n 1298)  4 
1304 Rob Wise ibid 7 
1305 Al-Shabaab, “Origins, Current Status, and a Look into the Future”, (9 Nov 2015) Other solutions 
1306  Ibid ; Christopher Harnisch, ‘The Terror Threat from Somalia: The Internationalization of Al 
Shabaab’ (12 Feb 2010), Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute 
1307ibid 
1308JM Berger, “Al Qaeda’s Merger.” Foreign Policy (15 Feb 2012) < 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/15/al-qaedas-merger/ > accessed at 22 Dec 2017; Nelly Lahoud 
‘The Merger of Al-Shabab and Qa’idat al-Jihad’ (2012) CTC Sentinel, 1–2  
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5.7.1 Who are the targets of Al-Shabaab? 
The table below shows the available data on the number of terrorist attacks 
carried out by Al-Shabaab between 2005 and2016.1309 Within those years, Al-
Shabaab carried out terrorist attacks in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya and Congo. 
Most of them were concentrated in Somalia against Somalian military and 
government officials, citizens, businesses, educational and religious 
institutions, religious scholars, media, and NGOs. Al-Shabaab was not 
involved in any terrorist attack against the US or its allies. The available data 
reveals that Al-Shabaab was solely responsible for almost all the attacks. In 
brief, no evidence suggests that Al-Shabaab poses a threat to Western 
countries in general and the US in particular. 




Target Group Number 
of 
attacks 
2005 Somalia Al-Shabaab Military 2 
2006    0 
2007  Somalia 
 Ethiopia  
Al-Shabaab Military 5 





















                                                        
1309 The study gathered data of terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab from 2005-2016 from University of 
Maryland terrorism database. Table has only included confirmed terrorist attacks carried out by the 
Al-Shabaab. It has not included any “suspected” terrorist attack. 
1310 According to this data Al-Shabaab allegedly conducted joint operation with Ogaden National 
liberation Front on one occasion. In other cases Al-Shabaab did not collaborated with any other 
terrorist group. Not all attacks were claimed by Al-Shabaab, the Somali officials attributed some 
attacks to Al-Shabaab. < 
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2010 Somalia Al-Shabaab  Military 
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2011  Somalia 
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 Government 













2012  Somalia 
 Kenya 
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 Government 





























































2015  Somalia 
 Kenya 
Al-Shabaab  Military 
 Government 

































It is clear that there is some sort of relationship between Al-Qaeda and these 
terrorist organisations. In terms of legal responsibility the question is not 
whether they support each other or share the same ideology, but to whom the 
military operations of these organisations can be attributed. Have these 
organisations been involved in any attack against the West controlled by Al-
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Qaeda? The following section bases the analysis of the relationship between 
Al-Qaeda and these organisations on the ‘control test’ devised by the ICJ in 
Nicaragua and subsequent jurisprudence.  
5.8 Al-Qaeda’s control over these organisations under strict control 
test      
Under strict control test Al-Qaeda will only be responsible for acts of these 
organisations if: 
1. They are completely dependent on Al-Qaeda  
2. The complete dependence of these organisations on Al-Qaeda 
extends to all fields of their activities 
3. Al-Qaeda exercises a high degree of control over them 
These organisations will only be completely dependent on Al-Qaeda if they 
lack any autonomy and are working as an agent of Al-Qaeda. It requires them 
to be following orders from Al-Qaeda without the ability of making 
independent decision. Most of these organisations and Al-Qaeda have 
common objectives that make them allies, not affiliates. Occasional 
coordination of activities and cooperation including provision of funds, 
intelligence, advisers and logistic support is not equivalent to control.  
TTP and Al-Qaeda share the same ideology and goals, and the TTP has 
provided sanctuary to Al-Qaeda in FATA. Further there is evidence that 
occasionally, Al-Qaeda provides military and financial assistance to the TTP 
members but there is no evidence suggesting that the TTP cannot conduct its 
activities without the support of Al-Qaeda. To sum, Al-Qaeda is not an entity 
on which TTP is completely dependent.  
Likewise the HN has managed to keep close ties with the TTP, Al-Qaeda and 
multiple foreign fighters operating in North Wazirastan.1311The HN has also 
carried out lethal attacks against the US forces in Afghanistan. However, it is 
still not clear whether Al-Qaeda itself was involved in those attacks against 
                                                        
1311 Gretchen Peters (n 1255) 
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the US and NATO forces.1312Mainly Haqqani’s have either carried out those 
attacks on their own or jointly with Afghan Taliban.1313Therefore its activities 
cannot be attributed to Al-Qaeda.  
Al-Qaeda’s main target is West but AQAP has directed almost all of its attacks 
against Yemeni civilians, government officials, military and the 
establishment.1314Bearing this in mind, is AQAP best understood to be part 
and parcel of the Al-Qaeda or a wholly distinct organisation that simply shares 
historic ties, branding, goals, and enemies? The late AQAP emir Al-Wahayshi 
(who died in the US drone strike in 2015)1315publicly pledged bayat to Ayman 
al Zawahiri, the post–Bin Laden leader of Al-Qaeda, promising ‘obedience in 
good and hard times, in ease and difficulty.’ 1316 However, there is little 
evidence that the Al-Qaeda senior leadership exercised detailed control over 
AQAP’s operational activities.1317  
Some of the Bin Laden’s letters obtained from the Abbottabad raid showed 
some contacts between AQAP and Al-Qaeda. In June 2010 Bin Laden sent a 
letter to leaders of AQAP and AQIM requesting support for Yunis-al-Mauritani 
and Shaykh Yunis. In this letter, Bin Laden asked the leaders of AQAP and 
AQIM to listen ‘whatever he asks of him’ and to provide financial 
support.1318Arguably, this kind of contact between Bin Laden and AQAP are 
not enough to establish control of Al-Qaeda over AQAP, particularly when Bin 
                                                        
1312 Stanford University ‘Mapping terrorist organisation, Haqqani Network’ < 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/363 > accessed at 20 Dec 
2017; University of Maryland ‘Global terrorism database’ < 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201302270018 > accessed at 
20 Dec 2017 
1313 ibid 
1314Stanford University ‘Mapping Militant organisations, Al-Qaeda in Yemen’ < 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/23#note39 > accessed  27 Dec 
2017; University of Maryland ‘Global terrorism database’ < 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=10&search=AQAP&count=100&expanded
=no&charttype=line&chart=overtime&ob=GTDID&od=desc#results-table > accessed at 20 Dec 2017 
1315 BBC News, ‘Yemen al-Qaeda chief al-Wuhayshi killed in US strike’ (16 June 2015) < 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33143259 > accessed 20 Dec 2017 
1316 Al Wuhayshi’s statement was translated by the SITE Institute see Bill Roggio, ‘AQAP 
Leader Pledges Oath of Allegiance to Ayman al Zawahiri’ (26 Jul 2011) Long War Journal 
1317 Gregory D Johnsen, ‘The Impact of Bin Laden’s Death on AQAP in Yemen’ (May 2011) 
CTC Sentinel, 9  
1318 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, ‘Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al Qaeda’s Senior Leadership, 
Gunpowder & Lead’ (20 January 2013) < http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/al-qaeda-in-
the-islamic-maghreb-and-al-qaedas-senior-leadership/ > accessed 19 Dec 2017 
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Laden himself was losing his grip over the organisation.1319Undoubtedly, Al-
Qaeda and AQAP share ideology, but not similar goals, because most of the 
AQAP’s attacks were directed at the Yemeni government in retaliation for 
security crackdowns against the group.1320 
Al-Shabaab merged with Al-Qaeda but the merger has not resulted in a 
unified organisation. This so-called merger is insignificant because Al-
Shabaab continues to identify itself and operate as a separate organisation. 
The terrorist affiliates remain organisationally distinct after announcing a 
merger, and their aim is to gain publicity.1321Alex Gallo has claimed that Al-
Qaeda today acts as a ‘financial adviser and facilitator and provides the 
ideological coherence within the global jihadist movement’.1322For instance, 
Al-Qaeda’s representatives in East Africa provide guidance on advanced 
training courses for elite forces, snipers, information technology or budgetary 
issues. 1323 This approach serves Al-Qaeda well because it allows the 
organisation to take credit for operations while remaining unburdened by the 
actual cost of waging war.1324There is some evidence suggesting that Al-
Qaeda members have been integrated into Al-Shabaab’s command 
structure.1325However, operational control of Al-Shabaab’s forces is reportedly 
divided geographically between independent Somali commanders in the Bay 
and Bkol regions, the southern parts of Somalia, and in the Northern regions 
of Somalia. 1326 This indicates that even Al-Shabaab’s leaders are not in 
complete control of the organisation and regional leaders work autonomously 
                                                        
1319 Imtiaz Gul, Pakistan: Before and After Osama (Lotus 2012) ; Peter Bergen, ‘An isolated Osama bIn 
Laden struggled to keep his bodyguards’ CNN (2 June 2016) <  
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/01/opinions/osama-bin-laden-letters-bergen/index.html > accessed 
19 Dec 2017  
1320Stanford University, ‘Mapping militant organisations, Al-Qaeda in Yemen’ < 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/23#note39 > ; University of 
Maryland, Global terrorism database < 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=10&search=AQAP&count=100&expanded
=no&charttype=line&chart=overtime&ob=GTDID&od=desc#results-table > accessed at 20 Dec 2017 
1321 Barak, Mendelsohn, The Al-Qaeda Franchise (Oxford University Press 2016) 30 
1322 Norman Cigar and Stephanie E. Kramer, Al-Qaeda after ten years of wars (Marine Corps University 
Press 2011) 73 
1323ibid 
1324 ibid  
1325 Rob Wise, ‘“Al Shabaab” AQAM Futures Project Case Study Series’ (2011) Center for Strategic & 
International Studies/Homeland Security & Counterterrorism Program Transnational Threats Project 
1326 Ibid 7 
 269 
in their areas. In this situation, the integration of a few members of Al-Qaeda 
fails to establish complete dependency of one group over them. Al-Shabaab 
decided to merge with Al-Qaeda because they needed multifaceted support of 
foreign militants to pursue their local ambitions.1327  
5.8.1 Al-Qaeda’s control over these organisations under effective 
control test 
Using the less stringent  ‘effective control’ test, the actions of these 
organisations can only be attributed to Al-Qaeda if it is established that Al-
Qaeda controls the attacks from beginning to end. There is no evidence 
showing that Al-Qaeda has managed to control the affairs of any of these 
organisatons. Thus it cannot be said that they are affiliates of Al-Qaeda. Their 
relationship can be at best explained as that of an ally but no more than that.  
The following section addresses the legal consequences that may be 
associated to the provision of assistance among them.  
5.9 State responsibility on assistance to foreign forces 
This section explores the legal implications that can be derived from the 
cooperation amongst these groups in the light of rules governing international 
responsibility.  Working with the presumption that the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility largely enshrine customary law, actions of non-state actors will 
be assessed under the same rules. This exercise does not intend to convey 
any conclusion on the personality of non-state actors or the applicability of the 
rules on State responsibility on them, but may nonetheless constitute the only 
fruitful approach in the quest of finding a valid ground to lawfully target 
terrorist group assisting Al-Qaeda.  
According to article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility, expressly 
accepted as a reflection of international customary law by the International 
Court of Justice,1328State is responsible for wrongful acts committed by a third 
                                                        
1327 University of Maryland, Global terrorism database, < 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=28&search=al%20shabaab&count=100&e
xpanded=no&charttype=line&chart=overtime&ob=GTDID&od=desc#results-table > accessed 17 Dec 
2017 
1328 Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro (2007) para 420 reads “reference should be 
made to Article 16 of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, reflecting a customary rule” 
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State if four conditions are met: 
1. The State aids or assists another State in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act; 
2. There must be a sufficient nexus between the assistance and the 
principal wrong  
3. The assisting State has knowledge of the circumstances of the 
internationally wrongful act; and 
4. The recipient State’s act would also be wrongful if committed by the 
assisting State. 
It is important to know that responsibility under Article 16 is not responsibility 
for the internationally wrongful act committed by the assisted state, but 
responsibility for assisting that state to commit the internationally wrongful act. 
The acting state is primarily responsible in each case and the assisting State 
has only a supporting role. It is therefore a secondary responsibility, arising 
from the fact that a state facilitated the wrongful act. States aiding or assisting 
recipient state are not co-perpetrators or co-participants in an internationally 
wrongful act.1329 The ILC Commentary implies that the liability of the assisting 
state will be lower than the responsibility of the principal, since ‘the assisting 
State will only be responsible to the extent that its own conduct has caused or 
contributed to the internationally wrongful act’.1330  
Terms ‘aid or assistance’ are not defined in Art 16, but most agree that it 
covers a wide range of activity.1331It includes provision of material aid such as 
weapons; logistical and technical assistance; financial support; provision of 
territory to launch attacks; or the transfer of intelligence.1332The support must 
                                                        
1329 Commentary of draft article for state responsibility, para 1 
1330 ibid; Graefrath argues that in general it may be assumed that participation by aid entails a lesser 
degree of responsibility than equal participation in the wrongful act. Graefrath, B, ‘Complicity in the 
Law of International Responsibility’ (1996) Revue Belge de Droit International, 380  
1331 Miles Jackson, Complicity in International Law (Oxford University Press 2015) 153; Neta Crawford, 
‘State Responsibility: The General Part’ (2012) 402; Helmut Philip Aust, ‘Complicity and the Law of 
State Responsibility’ (2011) 239; Lowe ‘Responsibility for the Conduct of Other States’ (2002) 5–6 
1332Harriet Moynihan, ‘Aiding and Assisting: Challenges in Armed Conflict and Counterterrorism’ 
(2016) Research paper <  
 https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-11-11-aiding-
assisting-challenges-armed-conflict-moynihan.pdf > accessed at 28 June 2017 
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consist on material assistance excluding moral support, encouragement to do 
a wrongful act or expression of approval.1333   
A second condition requires a causal relationship between the material 
assistance provided and the internationally wrongful act.1334The assistance 
must contribute ‘significantly’ to the commission of the wrongful act, limiting 
further the scope of responsibility.1335The meaning of ‘significant contribution’ 
is not explained in article 16 or the ILC commentaries. A paper published by 
the Chatham House has clarified the terminology by reference to practical 
examples drawn from armed conflict and counterterrorism: 
[If] State A provides a military base to State B, which State B uses to 
refuel its aircraft en route to carrying out an armed attack against State 
C in breach of international law on the use of force. Without the ability 
to refuel at the base in State A, it would be much more difficult for State 
B to reach its target. In this case, it would appear that State A 
significantly contributed to State B’s principal act, because State A’s 
contribution makes it materially easier for State B to carry out the 
principal act in each case.1336  
It then goes on to give example where assistance may not be enough to count 
as significant contribution: 
State A is assisting State B with building up its capacity for law 
enforcement. It provides State B with 10 jeeps for its police to 
undertake traffic control and other policing activities in its capital. In the 
event, this frees up State B’s other jeeps, which are then used to carry 
out human rights violations on a rebel group elsewhere in its territory. 
Here, although State A’s assistance has made some form of 
contribution to the principal act, the connection between the two is 
much more remote. It is doubtful whether the provision of assistance 
that leads to a freeing up of resources by the recipient state to carry out 
                                                        
1333 ILC Commentary, ‘Introduction to Chapter IV’, para (9), 147; Crawford (n 1331) 403-04; Aust (n 
1331) 221.  
1334 ILC ibid  
1335 ibid para 3-5 
1336 Moynihan (n 1332) Para 25 
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violations in other areas is sufficient to meet the significant contribution 
threshold under Article 16.1337  
These examples indicate that the state’s assistance will only be relevant in 
terms of raising international responsibility if it is possible to draw a strong link 
between aid and wrongful act.  A third condition requires the assisting state to 
know its assistance or aid may be used to carry out an internationally wrongful 
act. Paragraph 5 of the Commentary specifies that no responsibility arise 
unless the assisting state, ‘intended … to facilitate the occurrence of the 
wrongful conduct.’1338 However, a state cannot avoid responsibility if it ‘makes 
a deliberate effort to avoid knowledge of illegality on the part of the state being 
assisted, in the face of credible evidence of present or future illegality’.1339  
The ILC Commentary further provides that the State may also incur 
responsibility if ‘it provides material aid to a State that uses the aid to commit 
human rights violations’.1340 However if the assistance has contributed only to 
a minor degree, if at all, to the damaged caused by the wrongful act, the 
assisting State’s responsibility is confine to the consequence flowing from its 
own conduct.1341  
5.9.1 Liability of non-state actors for supporting Al-Qaeda 
 
If we apply the rule of Art 16 on non-state actors then they will be responsible 
for wrongful acts if these four conditions are met: 
The non-state group aids or assists another group in the commission of 
an internationally wrongful act; 
 There must be a sufficient nexus between the assistance and 
the principal wrong  
 The assisting group has knowledge of the circumstances of the 
wrongful act; and 
 The recipient group’s act would also be wrongful if committed by 
the assisting group. 
                                                        
1337 ibid Para 26 
1338 ibid Para 5 
1339 ibid Para 24 
1340 ibid Para 9 
1341 ibid Para 10 
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It is relatively easy to satisfy condition one, three and four. A state can easily 
fulfil condition one by showing that a particular group has been either 
assisting Al-Qaeda in some way or taking assistance from them (non-state 
groups facilitating Al-Qaeda by providing shelter to its members). Condition 
three and four are automatically satisfied because undoubtedly these non-
state actors are fully aware that their actions or any terrorist attack carried out 
by Al-Qaeda is unlawful.  
The presence of the second condition is difficult to prove. In any case, the 
responsibility of the aiding group will be limited to the consequences deriving 
from their cooperation, but the actions of the main acting organisations are not 
attributable to the assisting group. There is convincing evidence that the TTP 
has provided shelter to Al-Qaeda in the tribal areas in exchange of some sort 
of support from Al-Qaeda members for its terrorist activities in Pakistan.  If we 
apply the rules of international responsibility to terrorist groups, the TTP is 
only responsible for the provision of safe heaven if it has significantly 
contributed to any given wrongful act. There is no evidence suggesting that 
Al-Qaeda was able to plan or conduct major terrorist attack from FATA. Al-
Qaeda’s members were dispersed after 9/11 and few thousand low level 
members of Al-Qaeda were not strong enough to plan a major terrorist attack 
against the US or its allies. Therefore, the US may not be able to justify its 
targeted killing of the TTP under the principles governing article 16.    
A similar conclusion is reached in relation to the HN. Allegedly, HN has 
provided shelter to Al-Qaeda members in North Waziristan in exchange of 
money or other assistance. Providing shelter did not dramatically increased 
Al-Qaeda’s capability in attacking or planning against the West. I cannot be 
proved either that Al-Qaeda members benefiting from HN support were 
involved in major terrorist attack against the US. Extreme measures such 
targeted killing cannot be justified against HN members when their 
involvement in Al-Qaeda’s actions is uncertain.  
Similarly, AQAP has provided financial and military assistance to the Al-
Qaeda. But there is no evidence suggesting that this assistance helped Al-
Qaeda in carrying out any major attack against US. Therefore US cannot 
justify its targeted killing of AQAP members on the basis that their help 
significantly contributed in an attack against the US. 
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Al-Shabaab provided shelter and also took few members of Al-Qaeda in their 
group. However this assistance has not bolstered Al-Qaeda’s capabilities in 
any ways. To date there is no evidence that Al-Qaeda was able to carry out 
major attack against the US with the help of Al-Shabaab. Therefore US may 
not be able to held Al-Shabaab responsible for the activities of Al-Qaeda 
where Al-Shabaab’s contribution is only minor.  
5.10 Conclusion 
Prior to 2001, Al-Qaeda was considered a small band of revolutionary 
terrorists with limited capacity to conduct attacks against Western targets in 
Middle East and Africa. The September 11 attacks dramatically changed this 
perception. Al-Qaeda became, on the eyes of the international community, an 
active organisation with presence across the globe pursuing the clear and 
precise strategy to defeat the West. The unprecedented level of cooperation 
among the law enforcement bodies of States and the coordination of 
intelligence services that ensued following the attacks has debilitated 
considerably Al-Qaeda’s operational capabilities. Although, Al-Qaeda 
members are not completely eradicated and a small core of leaders protected 
by local tribes and the Taliban, survive in Afghanistan and Pakistan, they are 
subjected to continuous prosecution, key leaders have been eliminated and 
there is no global network run directly by Al-Qaeda.1342  
Progressively, terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda against the West have become 
unusual and terrorist attacks against non-Western states have rose 
drastically1343 and the ‘majority of deaths from terrorism have occurred outside 
the West’.1344 The groups that are often associated with Al-Qaeda have very 
weak ties with it, yet they are labelled as Al-Qaeda affiliates or associates. It is 
a mistake to use the term Al-Qaeda affiliates or associates as liberally as the 
US or its allies do: ‘Labels frame the way we see the world and eventually 
influence policies. Using the wrong words to describe problems that we need 
                                                        
1342 ibid 3-4   
1343 Lazaro Gamio and Tim Meko, ‘How terrorism in the West compares to terrorism everywhere else’ 
Washington Post (16 July 2016) < 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/the-scale-of-terrorist-attacks-around-the-world/ > 
accessed 10 Dec 2017 
1344 Moran (n 1214) 155 
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to understand distorts public perceptions and exacerbates the situation’.1345 
Transnational terrorism is a real threat that has been addressed by the 
Security Council on various occasions.1346 It is important to understand the 
true nature of threat posed by these organisations. Linking all the attacks to 
Al-Qaida has become a convenient way for the US and its allies to justify their 
targeted killings policies with drones or the presence of Special Forces in 
undeclared warzones. Al-Qaeda’s role should not be overestimated or 
underestimated but it is important to note that all the terrorist attacks occurred 
in the West after 9/11 were not controlled or planned by Al-Qaeda from distant 
lands. In fact, the terrorist attack that is often described as an ‘Al-Qaeda plot’ 
have been planned in the West (See the table below). 1347  Organisatons, 
which the US and its allies are targeting in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, 
pose little or no threat to the US. Arguably pursuing terrorists in foreign lands 
is a flawed strategy. The data strongly suggests that the US and other 
countries targeting terrorist abroad, could be more effective by focusing on  




















                                                        
1345 Jason Burke, ‘The myth of the ‘lone wolf’ terrorist’ The Guardian (30 March 2017) < 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/mar/30/myth-lone-wolf-terrorist > accessed 6 July 2018 
1346 See section “Security Councils response to 9/11 attacks”  
1347 Mitchell D Silber, The Al Qaeda Factor: Plots Against the West (University of Pennsylvania Press 
2011)  
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Table showing attacks in Western territories since 9/11  
 







2004 Spain Self-radicalised 
group1348 
No 190 
2005 UK Self-radicalised 
group1349 
No 56 
2011 Germany Lone wolf1350 No 2 
2012 France Lone wolf1351 No 3 












No At least 400 
                                                        
1348 Madrid bombing was wrongly attributed to Al-Qaeda but it was an act of terrorism carried out by 
group of individuals who were inspired by Al-Qaeda see Scott Atron, Talking to the Enemy: Religion, 
Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists (Ecco Press 2010); Jason Burke, ‘Talking to the enemy 
review’ (Guardian, 2010) < https://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/oct/24/scott-atran-talking-to-
the-enemy-review >  
1349 There was no credible evidence that London Subway and bus bombers (7 July 2005) has ever “met 
significant Al Qaida figures” (para 46, 48, 49) or received training in “training camps” operating in 
remote areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan (para 47). There is as yet no firm evidence to corroborate 
this claim or the nature of Al Qaida support, if there was any. But, the target and mode of attack of 
the 7 July bombings are typical of Al Qaida and those inspired by its ideologies (para 55). The 
explosives they used were homemade and required no expertise (para 59, 60) No external 
organisation linked to Al-Qaeda provided them funds the group was self-financed (para 63, 64) < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228837/1087.pdf > 
1350 ) In Germany on 2 March 2011 a self-radicalised Islamic extremist Arid Uka shot dead two U.S. 
airmen and injured two others at Frankfurt airport after apparently being inspired by a fake internet 
video purporting to show American atrocities in Iraq see https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trial-
opens-in-attack-on-us-airmen-in-germany/ >  
1351 In France on 19 March 2012 one man has shot dead a teacher and three children at a Jewish 
school in the French city of Toulouse. He was a self-styled Islamist who got radicalised by watching 
and reading stuff about Palestine children being killed by Israeli soldiers. Although he claimed to be a 
mujahid of Al-Qaeda French authorities confirmed that there is no evidence which suggest he has 
links with Al-Qaeda < http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/30/world/europe/toulouse-killers-path-a-
bitter-puzzle.html?mtrref=undefined&gwh=4D5D120E3BF766B029B3BEE6046BBC5D&gwt=pay >  
1352 On 22 May 2013, a British soldier Lee Rigby was attacked and killed by Michael Adebolajo. He 
acted alone and was not part of any organisation. He said during the trial that I love Al-Qaeda but 
there was no evidence that Al-Qaeda played any role in it < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
25301907 >    
1353 http://wgno.com/2016/03/22/isis-has-inspired-over-70-terrorist-attacks-in-20-countries/  
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is three-fold. First, it highlights the implications of 
the US reliance on drone strikes for counterterrorism purposes outside 
warzones, in eroding legal frameworks by normalising exceptional measures. 
The Bush, Obama and Trump’s administrations have been shaped by the 
9/11 attacks, resulting in policies, legislations and practices akin to a state of 
exception. Seventeen years later, the legitimation of extra-legal measures in 
the name of national security shows no signs of abating. There is no 
geographic boundary in the fight against terrorism and the list of enemies has 
expanded to include not only Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and its affiliates- but also 
ISIS and its associated forces. The reinterpretation of the term ‘imminent by 
the US -and also the UK- in the context of the legal framework regulating the 
use of armed force, implies justifications for pre-emptive self-defence, and the 
de facto elimination of the imminent threat requirement. Under this loose 
interpretation, states would be allowed to use force against unspecified and 
distant threats, targeting objectives outside areas of active hostilities. 
The design of the US targeted killing policies intentionally conceals the 
authorship of the organisation or agency conducting lethal drone operations 
by blending the activities of military and intelligence agencies. The integration 
of these state services has blurred the boundaries between traditional military 
activities and covert operations. The amalgamation complicates any oversight 
and often results in lack of accountability.  
The US does not have a monopoly on the use of armed drones in conflicts. If 
its interpretation of international rules gain support, further state practice 
modelling the US drone policies is likely to follow. The international standards 
the US is setting for drone use may serve US interests for the time being but 
prove counterproductive in the long run if adopted by other states. Currently, 
the UK drone policy seems greatly influenced by the US. The UK’s case may 
serve as one example of how the US government’s non-transparent drone 
practices can affect decision-making of other governments. At present, this 
may not appear an extremely problematic development for the US because 
the UK is an ally sharing the same security interests. However, the situation 
can change drastically if US enemies were to utilise drones, for their own 
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purposes and following the questionable drone policies formulated by the US. 
The current US policies are setting a significant precedent and require 
scrutiny to ensure their compliance with international law.  
The second objective of this thesis is to untangle the arguments supporting 
the legality of the use of drones advanced by the US through the analysis of 
the legal frameworks regulating the right to self-defence, as well as applicable 
human rights law and international humanitarian law. The second and third 
chapters highlight the clambering use of lethal force extraterritorially against 
non-state actors even when the alleged first attack cannot be attributed to the 
territorial state, contradicting well-established ICJ jurisprudence.  The use of 
force against non-imminent threats has been justified by the ‘unable or 
unwilling’ doctrine. This reinforces theoretical legal basis for pre-emptive uses 
of armed force, where the imminent threat requirement becomes vacuous and 
reverts the legal regime on the use of force to the aggressive and lawless pre-
Charter era. A 2018 statement by former UK Foreign Minister Boris Johnson, 
explaining drone strikes as ‘payback for jihadist atrocities’ confirms the revival 
of pre-Charter rules.1354 This statement suggests that the UK has employed 
drone strikes as reprisals rather than legitimate acts of self-defence.  
Thirdly, this study proves the internal and international political dimensions 
determining the use of drone strikes in specific geographical regions. 
Focusing on Pakistan, where the consent of the government to drone strikes 
has fluctuated and, when present, has affected particularly vulnerable tribal 
areas, illustrates further the weaknesses and problematic dimensions of the 
drone strike policies. The thesis demonstrates that the use of lethal force 
against groups or individuals unaffiliated to Al-Qaeda in undeclared war zones 
is not only unlawful but also counterproductive.    
Pakistan’s consent to the US drone strikes has been vague due to unstable 
US-Pakistan relations and the internal struggle for power between the civil 
and military powers. Pakistan has always been a key player in the US war on 
terrorism because of its geographical proximity, historical and cultural ties with 
Afghanistan. Current knowledge suggests that Pakistan never provided a 
                                                        
1354 Oliver Wright, ‘Drone strikes are ‘retribution for atrocities’ The Times (26 July 2018) < 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/drone-strikes-are-retribution-for-atrocities-boris-johnson-
suggests-p8rg90db7 > accessed at 27 July 2018 
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blanket consent to US drone strikes within its territory. Instead, strict 
conditions were attached to those strikes, which were frequently violated by 
the US. Even the strikes carried out with Pakistan’s consent can be  
categorised as unlawful if they failed to meet the necessary and proportionate 
requirements explained above. 
The thesis questions the validity of the ‘unable and unwilling’ doctrine using 
the Pakistani case-study. The US has justified its strikes polices by arguing 
that either the Pakistani state is incompetent in preventing terrorist attacks 
emanating from former FATA territories against the US, or that Pakistan is 
tolerating terrorist activities in tribal regions. The US’s position in this regard is 
not baseless. It is true that Pakistan has failed to govern its tribal regions, and 
in October 2001 few hundred high to low level Al-Qaeda members crossed 
Afghan border and received shelter in FATA. Clearly Al-Qaeda’s presence in 
FATA damages Pakistan’s reputation, but it does not provide US with any 
solid legal ground for its drone strikes in FATA. Even if the ‘unable or unwilling 
doctrines’ is considered accepted as a legitimate/lawful basis for the use of 
armed force, the US must demonstrate that Pakistan is actively controlling 
these terrorist organisations. The mere presence of Al-Qaeda members in 
FATA does not give the US a blank cheque to use drones.   
The final chapter explores the main organisations targeted by the US in 
Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Since 9/11 the US has expanded the scope of 
drone strikes by targeting Al-Qaeda associates outside areas of active 
hostilities. Relying on the ICJ jurisprudence and the Nicaragua test, the thesis 
has analysed the question of international responsibility and attribution by 
exploring the organisational links between Al-Qaeda and targeted groups by 
the US. If the group satisfies the effective control test criterion then it could be 
considered an Al-Qaeda’s associate and perhaps a legitimate target.          
In addition, the study has explored the objectives of these groups by 
observing their targets. The selection of targets is strategically vital for the 
purpose of these attacks if they are to provoke the authorities. Hence, if a 
group is engaged in a civil war their targets would be local government 
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officials or civilians. Conversely, if the groups are targeting ‘far enemy’1355 
then their attacks would be directed at foreign governments and civilians. The 
choice of targets demonstrates whom they want to influence and what their 
objective is. Using the data gathered by the University of Maryland it is 
possible to demonstrate that most terrorist attacks by groups targeted by the 
US, have been directed against their own government/civilians or against 
regional players. This is the case of TTP and Haqqani network. However 
AQAP and Al-Shabaab targeted regional players (Saudi Arabia, UAE, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Congo) who were actively targeting these groups in Yemen 
and Somalia. Only AQAP was allegedly involved in minor scale attacks 
against Western countries (UK, US and France). Even in these cases it was 
not confirmed if individuals were actual members of AQAP and that the 
attacks were directed, planned and controlled by AQAP. Media reports and 
official statements of security officers have indicated that attacks were most 
probably carried out by home grown terrorists with no links with AQAP.  
Targeting groups who pose no threat to the US is not only illegal but 
counterproductive. It expands the warzone, prolongs the war and destabilises 
local governments. Accordingly, the extraterritorial targeting of terrorists who 
pose no threat to the US is a flawed strategy and must be reviewed. Lone 
wolves who are mostly self-radicalised have carried out most terrorist attacks 
affecting Western targets.  An approach focusing actual threats should 
strengthen local counterterrorism measures and halt the extraterritorial use of 
force against individuals or groups who do not have capacity to target the US 
or its allies.  
It is imperative that the US or any state engaging in counterterrorism activities 
rely on transparent policies. Publicly available information on the current 
drone policies would remove many of the issues associated with 
internationally wrongful acts outlined in this thesis. 1356The US should specify 
the groups targeted under the umbrella of ‘Al-Qaeda associates or affiliates’ 
as well as the criteria followed to include terrorist groups in this category. This 
                                                        
1355 Fawaz A. Gerges, ‘The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global’ (Foreign Affairs, 2005) < 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2005-11-01/far-enemy-why-jihad-went-
global > accessed 4 August 2018  
1356 Loren DeJonge Schulman, ‘Behind the magical thinking: Lessons from policymaker relationships 
with drones’ (Centre for a New American Security, July 2018) 3    
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will provide grounds to determine individual membership to Al-Qaeda and will 
distinguish between individuals who were inspired by Al-Qaeda or declared 
their allegiance to the group from those operating under its command and 
control. 
Any drone policy should remove the authority to decide on strikes from the 
CIA and JSOC in order to facilitate accountability. For the same purpose, the 
US government should publish details of casualties resulting from each drone 
strike. The information released during the Obama administration was 
insufficient and probably misleading. The broad definition of ‘combatant’ the 
US seems to rely on is probably at the origin of a low count of casualties (and 
a violation in itself of international law). The respect to the principle of 
distinction, necessity and proportionality requires available data on the 
activities engaged by the person targeted, his active participation in hostilities 
and location. The US should accept the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on 
Direct Participation in Hostilities as it provides greater protection to civilians.  
The analysis of the deployment of drone strikes in the territory of Pakistan 
demonstrates that any rigorous research on the use of lethal drones, requires 
understanding of the host state. The research on the use of drones tends to 
focus on the practice of the targeting state, particularly the US and ignores the 
economic, social and political considerations of the host state where targeted 
groups are located. The thesis has explored the geo-political factors 
determining the Pakistani involvement with the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and the 
United States through time. The ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine only serves to 
justify attacks where the host state is in a particularly vulnerable position, or 
where they are complicit through consent. In the case of Pakistan, strikes 
have been deployed with and without the governmental consent. The strong 
institutional position the military retains, the ties with non-state groups that 
have been seen as strategically beneficial to consolidate the position of 
Pakistan in relation to India and the vulnerability of the tribal areas most 
affected by the drones, are fundamental in understanding the current drone 
strikes. Further research in the role of host states will further knowledge on 
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